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THEME AND VARIATIONS IN STATUTORY
PRECLUSIONS AGAINST SUCCESSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY
EPA AND CITIZENS
PART TWO:
STATUTORY PRECLUSIONS ON EPA ENFORCEMENT
Jeflrey G. Miller*
This is the second half of a two-part Article focusing on preclusior~s
against successive enforcement of the environmental statutes. Part One of
the Article, printed in Volume 28 of this Journal, examined preclusions
against citizen suits and argued that because of the theme-and-variations
nature of the preclusion language, that langrtage shortld be read in accordance with its plain meaning. Part Two, pitblished in this issue, studies the
restrictions on enforcement actions by the EPA and reaches the same conclusion.
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In drafting environmental statutes, Congress sought to ensure effective environmental protection by authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), states, and citizens to enforce against violations of
the federal environmental statutes. Foreseeing that successive actions by
multiple enforcers could cause disruption, Congress devised a three-element
preclusion device governing when successive actions are authorized or
barred. Congress developed variations for each of the three elements, giving
itself a flexible device to fine-tune the degrees to which successive actions
by different enforcers were allowed under each statute.
The preclusion devices which Congress placed in the citizen suit provisions of the statutes were relatively uniform, reflecting Congress's intention that government be the primary enforcer. On the other hand, Congress
placed widely varying versions of the preclusion device in the EPA enforcement provisions of the statutes, reflecting the different balances between federal and state implementation it intended under each of the statutes. This Article examines EPA enforcement preclusions.
The variations Congress used in each version of the preclusion device it placed in the enforcement provisions of the statutes indicate precisely when EPA or a citizen may or may not proceed with a successive action. In spite of clear Congressional intent, some courts have ignored the
wording of the preclusion devices and bypassed the normal canons of statutory construction. Instead, courts have interpreted the device to protect
choices made by the first enforcer, usually the state, thereby unacceptably substituting a judicial policy choice for a policy choice already made
by Congress. Worse, from the perspective of environmental law, however,
they encourage violators of environmental statutes to invite actions by weak
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enforcers for the purpose of insulating their violations from effective enforcement. This enables polluters to exploit weak enforcers, with the blessing of the federal courts, and to undermine the integrity of the environmental statutes. This Article urges courts to interpret the preclusion devices as enacted by Congress, observing the proper roles of the judicial
and legislative branches, and preserving the integrity of the environmental
statutes.
America's environmental statutes, and specifically their enforcement
provisions, were enacted against a backdrop of failures to effectively address environmental harm. Rampant industrial growth during the beginning of the twentieth century set the stage for several decades of environmental trauma at its end. The federal government augmented the developing trauma by largely abstaining from pollution control regulation for
much of the century. Once the federal government did act, it addressed
pollution control only on a fragmented, state-led basis, with little federal
intervention or enforcement. When the public finally demanded action
with massive demonstrations on the first Earth Day,' Congress reacted by
enacting comprehensive environmental protection legislation during the
1 9 7 0 ~The
. ~ legislation replaced earlier state-dominated pollution control
programs with federal programs, and replaced earlier weak and cumbersome federal enforcement authorities with strong and streamlined ones.'
For the most part, Congress did not oust states from the pollution control
field, but created programs with roles for both federal and state regulators, typically allowing for both state and federal enforcement. Not trusting even two sets of government regulators to comprehensively enforce
these programs, Congress also authorized private citizens to enforce the
same requirements, incorporating the "citizen suit" provisions in these

statute^.^

. When Congress created federal and citizen enforcement authorities
in addition to existing state enforcement authorities, it recognized the
potential for duplicative and conflicting successive enforcement against
the same violations. It was willing to tolerate that possibility in order to
assure more comprehensive compliance with pollution control laws through
more frequent enforcement, but sought to lessen and manage successive
enforcement by creating a flexible, notice, delay, and bar preclusion device, and by placing variations of that device in the federal and citizen
enforcement provisions of the statutes. This two-part Article examines
the legal issues raised in applying and interpreting that preclusion device.

' Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statuton Precl~rsionsAgainst Strccessive
Environn~er~tal
Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: Srat~rtoryBars in
Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL.L. REV.401, 408 (2004).
For a list of the statutes covered, see infra note 13 and accompanying text.
Miller, supra note I , at 407-08.
V d . at 408-09.
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Part One examined the issues under the citizen suit provision^,^ and Part
Two examines them under the federal enforcement provisions.
Part One concluded that the plain meaning of the preclusion device
addresses and answers the issues defendants have raised under it, often
favoring successive enforcement actions. It found, however, that some courts
disregard the plain meaning, interpreting the device to implement their
policy choice to preserve the enforcement discretion of the first government enforcer, rather than interpreting it to implement the congressional
policy choice to gain greater compliance through the actions of multiple
enforcers. The legislative history of the provisions contains no hint that
Congress was concerned with preserving the discretion of the first government enforcer. Indeed, that aberrant interpretation deprives the citizen
suit provisions of much of their force. The interpretation also derogates
congressional intent expressed in the plain meaning of the device and
elsewhere. Part One developed the thesis that the theme and variation
nature of the device underscored its plain meaning by emphasizing that
Congress made deliberate word choices when drafting the device, with
its variations throughout the statutes. Congress used the words it chose in
each variation to specifically enunciate the extent to which it intended to
preclude successive enforcement under the enforcement provision at issue. Significantly, the device limits successive enforcement, but does not
preclude it altogether. Indeed, the very presence of the citizen suit provisions indicates that at the very least Congress did not intend to preserve
the policy choice of governmental enforcers not to enforce. Finally, Part
One noted that the many reported citizen suit decisions evidenced little
real disruption of government actions by the citizen suits.
Part Two examines the preclusion device and its variations used in
the EPA enforcement provisions of the same statutes. The plain meaning
of these devices addresses and answers the issues defendants have raised
under them, often favoring successive enforcement actions. Nevertheless,
as with the citizen suit provisions, some courts interpret the device to implement their policy choice to preserve the discretion of earlier state enforcers. The legislative history of the provisions contains no indication that Congress was concerned with preserving the discretion of state enforcers. These
interpretations to the contrary undermine the integrity of the federal statutes and the environmental requirements they establish, thereby encouraging violators to invite lax state enforcement not requiring compliance
with the federal requirements in order to foreclose any enforcer thereafter
from seeking such compliance. Moreover, these interpretations are possible only by ignoring the variations in the provisions and the additional
emphasis they place on the plain meaning of the provisions.
Recognizing the existence and implications of the theme and variation nature of the preclusion device avoids the evisceration of the federal
Miller, sccprcr note 1 .
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statutes by emphasizing the primacy of the plain meaning interpretation.
Congress used the device in one variation or another at least sixteen times in
the citizen and EPA enforcement provisions of the nine environmental statutes considered here. Congress's pervasive use of the preclusion device
strongly implies that when Congress intended to preclude or limit subsequent enforcement by EPA, Congress did so by placing the preclusion device or one of its variations in the EPA enforcement provision. While the
preclusion devices in the citizen suit provisions are quite similar, the preclusion devices in the EPA enforcement provisions are varied. Congress
used at least five variations of the preclusion device in two or more of the
statutes' EPA enforcement p r ~ v i s i o n s The
. ~ significant variations in the
device that Congress used in the EPA enforcement provisions is further
evidence that Congress chose the wording of the devices carefully, intending
that courts interpret them to effectuate the words Congress employed.
The relative strengths of the restrictions Congress placed on successive EPA enforcement in different statutes mirror the degrees to which
Congress envisioned state implementation of the statutes, progressing from
no preclusion where Congress provided for exclusive federal implementation, to a presumption of preclusion where Congress expected state implementation. Despite the sometimes virtually identical nature of the preclusion devices in the EPA and citizen suit provisions, they serve somewhat different purposes. The device in the citizen suit provisions manages conflict and disruption from successive enforcement. The device in
the EPA enforcement provisions reflects the balances between federal and
state implementation in different statutes. Despite the somewhat different
purposes of the devices in the two sets of enforcement provisions, they
are all variations of the same device. This is underscored by subsection
309(g) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), in which Congress used the device in the statute's EPA enforcement provision to bar both EPA and citizen subsequent enforcement under specific circumstances.'
Statutes providing for both federal and state implementation usually
require EPA to approve a state program meeting statutory minimum criteria and substitute the state program for the federal program once EPA approves the state program. Defendants sometimes argue that these state
approval provisions infer that EPA cannot enforce in states with approved
programs, or at least cannot do so if the state already has taken an enforcement a c t i ~ nThe
. ~ role of the preclusion device as the regulator of EPA
See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
1251-1387 (2000).
See infra Parts 1II.B.-C. Relying on this theory, one court of appeals has held that
when a state with an approved Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") hazardous waste management program has taken an enforcement action, EPA is precluded
from "overfiling." Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). The
court also held that EPA was precluded from doing so by res judicata. Id. The opinion is
i
from the
flawed in many ways. See discussion infra Part 1II.C. The flaws follow i ~ part
court's failure to recognize the pattern of preclusions established by Congress in the envi-

' 33 U.S.C. $8
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enforcement under statutes authorizing state implementation .is emphasized by the fact that Congress knew how not to grant EPA enforcement
authority in states with approved programs. In view of this explicit, comprehensive, and nuanced cross-statutory pattern, it is unlikely that Congress intended to infer a preclusion on EPA or citizen enforcement from
other provisions containing no notice, delay, and bar device. The statutes
should not be interpreted to depart from this well-established pattern, absent
clear and unambiguous l a n g ~ a g e . ~
While there are many reported decisions on the preclusion device in
the citizen suit provisions, there are few reported decisions on preclusions in
the EPA enforcement provisions. This disparity arises from a variety of
factors. First, the preclusions on EPA enforcement are, for the most part,
less restrictive than preclusions on citizen suits, providing fewer possibilities for credible efforts by defendants to raise them. Second, EPA exercises self-restraint in filing successive actions, providing few opportunities to litigate the issues.I0 Third, defendants may accord greater legitimacy to EPA actions than to citizen actions and may be more willing to
settle enforcement actions with EPA than with citizens without litigating
legal issues." Even though there are a small number of judicial interpretations of the device in the EPA enforcement provisions, this case law
may be augmented by the many judicial interpretations of the device in
the citizen suit provisions. Because Congress used the same device in both
sets of provisions, precedents under one set are valid under the other set,
unless variations in the devices are sufficiently different.12
Part One examined the virtually identical preclusion devices in the
citizen suit provisions of the statutes as if they were the same device,
ronmental statutes, including RCRA. See Miller, supra note 1, at 412; infra notes 45-48.
9Congress did place one preclusion on CWA section 505 citizen suits outside of section 505, in subsection 309(g). 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g) (2000). It is noteworthy, however, that
subsection 309(g) is in the EPA enforcement provision, subsection 505(a) contains a crossreference to subsection 309(g), and subsection 309(g) contains an explicit preclusion that
follows the theme and variations pattern examined here.
' O ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECT~ON
AGENCY,REVISED
POLICYFRAMEWORK
FOR STATE/EPA
ENFORCEMENT
AGREEMENTS,
18-20, 24-25 (Aug. 1986), available at http://www.epa.gov/
Compliance/resources/policies/planning/state/enforce-agree-mem.pdf
(last visited Dec. 5,
2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
" Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizerz Suits, Standing, arzd Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKEENVTL.L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001); Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry,
Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T,
Spring 1997, at 20. Although the environmental defense bar does not articulate this explicitly, it can be inferred from both its generally negative attitude toward citizen suits and
from its far greater propensity to contest citizen enforcement than EPA enforcement. For
example, there are far more reported citizen suit decisions cited in Part One than reported
EPA enforcement decisions cited here. The disparity is remarkable because the numbers of
civil enforcement actions brought by EPA and citizens are roughly comparable and the
total number of enforcement actions brought by EPA far exceeds those brought by citizens.
See Miller, supra note I, at 415 11.68, 419-20.
l 2 A precedent interpreting one variation of an element in the device, however, might
not be useful in interpreting another variation of that element.
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analyzing their common legal issues with little or no distinction between
how they should be decided under different statutes. Because the preclusions on EPA enforcement are more varied than preclusions on the citizen suits, the format of Part Two differs. Part 1.A examines the preclusion
devices in the EPA enforcement provisions of all the statutes and identifies
their common variations. Part I1 examines the legal issues raised in each
of the common variations. Part I11 examines asserted limitations on EPA
and citizen enforcement not articulated in the enforcement provisions,
but inferred by some courts from the state program approval provisions.
Part IV revisits the doctrinal split identified in Part One between courts
interpreting the preclusion device in accordance with its plain meaning,
usually favoring successive enforcement, and those interpreting it to favor prosecutorial discretion, usually disfavoring successive enforcement.
The final Part suggests integrated interpretation of the preclusion devices
in EPA and citizen enforcement provisions.
Parts One and Two as a whole emphasize the importance of recognizing the theme and variations in the preclusion devices Congress developed to manage successive enforcement by both EPA and citizens. Two
principles emerge from that recognition. First, when Congress intended
to limit successive enforcement by EPA or citizens, i t used the preclusion
device to do so. This counsels that preclusions should not be inferred from
other provisions. Second, Congress employed considerable variations in
the device, particularly in limiting successive enforcement by EPA. This
counsels that the wording Congress used in a particular version of the device
precisely articulates congressional intent for how far that device limits
successive enforcement.
Courts ignoring these principles not only disregard plain wording
and congressional intent, they undermine the integrity of the federal environmental statutes. The facts underlying the reported decisions in Parts
One and Two indicate that EPA and citizens almost never initiate successive enforcement when an earlier enforcement action resulted in compliance or a penalty large enough to deter violations. They also indicate that
earlier, ineffective enforcement actions prompting such "overfiling" are
usually state enforcement actions. Interpretations that restrict successive
enforcement in favor of state prosecutorial discretion can insulate sources
from compliance with federal law. The proliferation of such decisions offers
violators the opportunity to shield themselves from compliance with federal law by soliciting actions from less than zealous state enforcers and
agreeing to state consent orders that require less than full compliance.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this could lead to systematic, judicially
sanctioned evisceration of federal environmental statutory standards and
protections. Congress did not intend this result when it enacted strong
federal enforcement provisions with limited preclusions on successive enforcement.
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Courts should interpret these preclusion devices as Congress wrote
them, through the lens of mainline canons of statutory construction, rather
than to protect the choices of the first enforcers. Congress has already determined with precision, by the variation of the device that it used in each
enforcement provision, when a subsequent enforcer may bring an action or
is barred from bringing one. This is a legitimate legislative policy choice:
balancing (1) environmental protection through effective enforcement by
multiple enforcers against (2) the possibility that successive enforcement
action may cause disruption and disturb choices made by the initial
prosecutors. Where congressional intent is clear, as it is in the preclusion
devices, courts should honor it.

I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES'
ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
AND
THEIRPRECLUSIONS
The Article examines federal environmental statutes administered by
EPA.I3 The wording of the preclusions in each of these statutes is informed
by concerns about allocating the proper authority to various potential enforcers. This Part will examine the general intent and wording of the
statutes to prepare for the in-depth analysis of specific provisions that
follows.
A. Impacts of Federalism
Each of the environmental statutes follows one of two general federalist strategies. The first gives EPA authority to implement and enforce
statutory programs, with little or no role for states.13 The second provides
roles for both EPA and states in implementing and enforcing statutory
program^.'^ Statutes establishing multiple regulatory programs may employ both strategies for different purposes.I6 While statutes adopting the
'"he Article examines the Clean Air Act ("CAA), 42 U.S.C. 55 7401-7671q (2000);
CWA, 33 U.S.C. $5 1251-1387 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 5 6901-6992k (2000); the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), 40 U.S.C. $5 1201-1328
(2000); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. $ 5 9601-9675 (2000); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. $ 5 136-136y (2000); the Toxic Substances Control
Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. $5 2601-2691 (2000); the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"),
42 U.S.C. $ 5 300f-300j-25 (2000); the Marine Protection, Resources and Sanctuaries Act
("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1401-1445 (2000); and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRKA"), 42 U.S.C. 5 5 11001-1 1050 (2000).
IJ TSCA, CERCLA, MPRSA, FIFRA (registration of pesticides, FIFRA 5 3, 7 U.S.C.
5 136a), and CAA (regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, CAA 95 202-208, 42
U.S.C. $ 5 7521-7542 (2000)).
' T A A (except for regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, CAA $5 202-208, 42
U.S.C. $ 5 7521-7542), CWA, RCRA, FIFRA (pesticide use regulation, FIFRA 5 26, 7
U.S.C. 5 136a), and SDWA.
l6The CAA, for instance, adopts the first strategy for its program regulating emissions
from motor vehicles and the second strategy for regulating emissions from other sources.
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first strategy authorize exclusive EPA implementation and enforcement,
they provide different accommodations with states. Some preempt state
regulation," while some explicitly allow parallel state programs and authorize EPA to accomplish its mission by contracting with states.''
Congress adopted the second strategy for most of the major environmental programs. Beginning with the CAA, Congress modeled complicated "cooperative federalism" constructs as the bedrock of its environmental programs. It envisioned that state laws, approved by EPA and
meeting federal requirements, would be the cores of the statutes. At the
core of the CAA, for instance, are EPA-approved state implementation
plans designed to achieve federal air quality standards for each regulated
p ~ l l u t a n t . As
' ~ long as a state submits a plan meeting the statutory requirements, EPA must approve it and has no authority to develop its own
plan, and the core of the CAA requirements becomes state law. On the
other hand, if the state fails to submit an approvable plan, EPA must itself promulgate an implementation plan for the state. At the core of the
CWA20 and RCRA2' are EPA-approved state permit programs. The CWA
and RCRA require EPA to promulgate and implement a permit program
in federal regulations, but also require EPA to approve state permit programs meeting the federal criteria. Once EPA approves a state permit
program, EPA ceases to issue permits in the state and thereafter states
issue permits under state law.22Congress subsequently amended the CAA
l7 CAA $ 209, 42 U.S.C. $ 7543 (2000) (preempting standards for emissions from
automobiles with some exceptions).
FIFRA $9 23(a), 24(a), 7 U.S.C. $9 136u(a), 136v(a) (2000).
l9 CAA $ 110, 42 U.S.C. $ 7410 (2000). Under the CAA, Congress intended states to
develop implementation plans to achieve federally promulgated ambient air quality standards, and authorized EPA to develop such plans only if a state failed to submit an approvable plan to EPA. State implementation plans consist of state statutes and regulations imposing emissions limitations on air pollution sources and mechanisms to administer and
enforce the limitations. Assuming that a state develops an approvable implementation plan,
there will never be a federally developed plan to be violated.
2o CWA $8 301(a), 402, 33 U.S.C. $8 13 1 ](a), 1342 (2000). Under the CWA, Congress
intended states to submit permit programs to EPA for approval. Permits, whether issued by
EPA or a state with an approved permit program, at a minimum must apply federally
promulgated technology-based standards relevant to the particular pollution source, and
federally approved state water quality standards designed to provide for the types of uses
the state designated as appropriate to the particular water body. Congress authorized EPA
to issue permits in the absence of an approved state program but commanded EPA to cease
issuing permits in a state once it had approved the state's program. Assuming that a state
submits an approvable program before EPA issues a permit to a source, there will never be
a federally issued permit to be violated.
2 1 RCRA $5 3005-3006.42 U.S.C. $8 6925-6926 (2000). RCRA establishes a permit
program for entities that treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste. It also establishes regulatory programs for generators and transporters of hazardous waste that are not implemented through permits. All of these programs may be administered and enforced by EPA
or by states with approved programs. Whether EPA or states with approved programs issue
the permits, they must contain the minimum standards promulgated by EPA.
"Under both statutes, however, EPA may approve partial state programs, covering
some but not all permits or some but not all federal requirements. In such cases, EPA remains the permit issuer for the unapproved portion of the program. CWA § 402(n), 33
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to add a permit program modeled in large part on the CWA and RCRA
permit programs.'-' All three statutes authorize EPA to exercise oversight
authority on the implementation and enforcement of plans and programs
approved by states.24At the same time, these core cooperative federal programs do not stand alone. The CAA, CWA and RCRA establish other major
regulatory programs and provisions unrelated to the core programs. Some
of these other programs and provisions contemplate pure federal implem e n t a t i ~ n , 'while
~
others contemplate state i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ nAnalyzing
.~~
the preclusions on EPA enforcement requires examining them in the context of the federallstate relationships in the programs that they enforce.
Differences in the federalist balance between EPA and states in implementing the statutes are not reflected in the types of enforcement sanctions and remedies that Congress provided to EPA and citizen enforcers.
They are reflected, however, in the statutory preclusions Congress placed
on EPA's exercise of those authorities. Congress developed a three-element
notice, delay and bar preclusion device that it could change by varying
one or more of the three elements to reflect the particular balance between the potential enforcers it intended in each statute. It generally placed
no preclusion on EPA enforcement in programs where it gave EPA authority to implement and enforce, with little or no role for states. But it
placed a wide variety of preclusions on EPA enforcement in programs where
it gave EPA shared implementation authority with states. The variety in
the preclusions reflects the different balances Congress struck between its
goal of protecting the environment through strong federal authorities and
its desire for state implementation of environmental programs. The care
that Congress took to place a version of the preclusion device appropriate
for a particular statute in its enforcement provisions underscores the importance of interpreting the device as Congress wrote it.
The preclusions may vary in any or all of their elements: (1) who
they require the potential enforcer to notify of its intention to enforce;
U.S.C. 5 1342(n) (2000); RCRA 5 3006(g), 42 U.S.C. 9 6926(g) (2000); see also CAA
9 502(i), 42 U.S.C. 9 7661a(i) (2000).
23 CAA $9 501-505,42 U.S.C. 99 7661-7661d (2000).
2 T o r instance, the CWA requires states to send copies of proposed permits to EPA for
review and authorizes EPA to both veto state permits not conforming to federal requirements and issue permits in their place. EPA also may assume primary enforcement responsibility in the state if it demonstrates the state's systemic failure to enforce, may enforce
against violations in a state with an approved program, and may revoke its approval of the
state's program if it fails to conform to federal requirements. CWA $5 309(a), 402(c)-(d),
33 U.S.C. 55 1319(a), 1342(c)-(d) (2000).
25 For instance, the CAA establishes a program for regulating motor vehicle emissions
at the manufacturing stage, implemented almost exclusively by EPA, and the CWA establishes an oil spill program implemented almost exclusively by EPA and the Coast Guard.
CAA $9 202-219,42 U.S.C. 59 7521-7554 (2000); CWA 9 31 1, 33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (2000).
'6 For instance, RCRA establishes a program for regulating disposal of non-hazardous
solid waste for which EPA establishes the standards, but for which states are almost exclusively responsible for implementing. RCRA $9 40014009(a), 42 U.S.C. 09 6941-6949(a)
(2000).
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(2) how long after notice they delay the potential enforcer from commencing its enforcement action; and (3) the extent to which they bar the potential successive enforcer from commencing its action. They may require the potential enforcer to notify all, some, or none of the violator, EPA,
and the state in which the violation occurs. They may require the potential enforcer to delay commencement of its enforcement action for periods up to ninety days or not at all. They may or may not bar the potential
enforcer from commencing particular actions if another enforcer has already commenced an action and is diligently prosecuting it. Congress
intended the many possible combinations of these variables to provide a
nuanced device, with a wide spectrum of effects on successive enforcement.
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions
The statutes provide EPA an arsenal of enforcement remedies and sanctions, ranging from notices of violation2' to criminal incarceration and
fines.28Some provide augmented incarceration and fines for violations that
the defendant knew placed persons in peril of life or limb.'9 The number
and variety of these remedies allow EPA considerable latitude to determine the appropriate enforcement remedy for a particular violation.
States have similar arsenals of enforcement remedies in their statutes.
In practice, however, EPA and states conduct most enforcement by issuing administrative orders. Approximately ninety percent of EPA enforcement actions and ninety-five percent of state actions are a d m i n i ~ t r a t i v e . ~ ~
The citizen suit provisions are very similar and share a common origin in the CAA. Courts often interpret the citizen suit provisions in a particular statute by reference to the wording, legislative history and precedent under the provisions of other statutes. On the other hand, the EPA
enforcement provisions sometimes appear less similar. Courts seldom interpret them by reference to wording, legislative history and precedent under EPA enforcement provisions in other statutes. However, the similarities and dissimilarities in the preclusion devices are critical to their proper
interpretation. Some of the differences between the EPA enforcement proviE.g., CAA 9: 113(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7413(a)(I) (2000).
E.g., CAA 9: 113(c), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7413(c). In between these ends of the spectrum are
administrative orders to assess penalties, e.g., CWA 9: 309(g), 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(g) (2000),
require compliance, e.g., CWA 9: 309(a)(l), (a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(a)(l), (a)(3), revoke
permits, e.g., RCRA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (2000), stop sales, e.g., FIFRA
9: 13(a), 7 U.S.C. 9: 136k(a) (2000). recall products, e.g., CAA 9: 207(c), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7541(c)
(2000), seize goods, e . g . , FIFRA 9: 13(b), 7 U.S.C. g 136k(b), and prohibit federal grants
or contracts to violating facilities, e.g., CWA 9: 508, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1368 (2000); and civil
judicial actions to assess penalties, e.g., CWA 5 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000), enjoin
compliance, e.g., CWA 9: 309(b), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(b), ban new connections to sewers,
CWA 9: 402(h), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1342(h) (2000). and abate imminent and substantial endangerments, e . g . , CWA 9: 504, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1364 (2000).
29 See infra note 34.
'O See Miller, supra note I, at 415 n.68.
27

28
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sions in different statutes reflect the different strategies adopted by Congress for those statutes. Statutes regulating environmental dangers from
the use of products, for instance, provide for product recall and forfeiture
provisions3' not found or needed in statutes regulating dangers from pollution and waste disposal. Other differences reflect peculiar circumstances
in the evolutions of the statutes and their EPA enforcement provisions.'?
However, close examination of the provisions reveals their common remedies are very similar and share the same origins. This is true both of basic
provisions initially included in the statutes beginning with the CAA,"
including administrative orders, injunctions, and criminal provisions, and
of more sophisticated provisions added later.'4 These similar EPA enforcement provisions can be interpreted by reference to the wording, legislative history and precedents under comparable provisions in other statutes, just as citizen suit provisions are interpreted by cross-statutory reference. This is particularly true of the preclusion devices in the EPA enforcement provisions, for they are manifestations of the theme and variations sounding in the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions of all of
the statutes.

1. Statutory Bars on EPA Enforcement
While Congress intended the preclusions in the citizen suit provisions to prevent unwarranted disruption in government enforcement, it
intended the preclusions in EPA enforcement provisions to reflect the
relative strength of EPA authority in the balance Congress struck between
federal and state implementation of the program being enforced. Nonetheless, when Congress placed preclusions against EPA enforcement, it
used variations of the same three-part notice, delay, and bar preclusion it

"

FIFRA, regulating pesticides and similar products, authorizes EPA to stop the sale
and use, seize and regulate the manufacture, use, importation and exportation of products
violating the statute. FIFRA $5 13, 17, 7 U.S.C. $5 136k, 1360 (2000). TSCA, regulating
the manufacture and sale of chemicals, authorizes EPA to seize offending chemicals, to
require their manufacturer to warn its customers and the general public of, and to replace,
defective chemicals, and to regulate the importation and exportation of chemicals. TSCA
I $ 11-12, 17, 15 U.S.C. 05 2610-261 1, 2616 (2000). Subchapter I1 of the CAA, regulating
automobile emissions, authorizes EPA to order the recall and repair of vehicles not conforming to air pollution requirements and requires manufacturers to warrant to their customers that their vehicles conform to those requirements. CAA 207, 42 U.S.C. 7541
(2000).
"CAA section 119, for instance, authorized protracted phase-out orders for copper
smelters in accommodation to an economically hard-pressed industry, typically the sole
significant employer in towns where they operated. 42 U.S.C. 7419 (2000).
" See CAA 5 1 13(a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. 3 7413(a)-(d) (2000).
'? For example, the knowing endangerment criminal provision was added successively
to RCRA, the CWA and the CAA, using virtually the same language. See Pub. L. No. 98616, $ 232(b), 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 6928) (RCRA); Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 5 3 12, 101 Stat. 7, 43-44 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(3)) (CWA);
Pub. L. No. 101-549, $ 701, 104 Stat. 2399, 2676 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 3 7413(c)(5))
(CAA).

s
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used in the citizen suit provisions. It created at least five categories in the
device precluding EPA enforcement. These preclusions range from more
restrictive than preclusions in the citizen suits provisions to much weaker
than citizen enforcement preclusions. A few EPA enforcement provisions, in
fact, contain no preclusion device. From the strongest to the weakest,
they: (1) bar EPA from taking some enforcement actions against a violation if EPA or the state has taken specific enforcement actions against the
v i o l a t i ~ n (2)
; ~ ~require EPA to give the state thirty days prior notice before EPA takes an enforcement action against a violation in the state, and
bar EPA enforcement if the state takes "appropriate enforcement action"
against the violation;36(3) require EPA to give the state notice before EPA
takes an enforcement action against a violation in the state;" (4) require
EPA to notify the state after EPA takes enforcement action against a violation in the state;38and ( 5 ) impose no preclusion on EPA enf~rcement.'~
2. Legislative History
The EPA enforcement provisions have proven to be quite dynamic,
as Congress has strengthened them from time to time. Though these amendments have introduced idiosyncrasies into the provisions, the structures,
basic authorities (administrative compliance orders, civil penalties, injunctions, and criminal sanctions), and basic preclusions can still be traced to the
first of these statutes, the CAA.40For these common elements, the legislative
history of the CAA provisions is useful and precedents from one statute
can be useful in interpreting others. This is often true beyond the basic
common elements as well, for the newer embellishments found in many
of the statutes were developed for one statute and copied into other^.^'
With some exceptions, however, there is little legislative history regard-

3s CWA § § 309(g)(6)(A), 3 1 1(b)(6)(E), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(A), 1321(b)(6)(E)
(2000); SDWA 1423(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(c)(5) (2000).
36 FIFRA
27(a), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(a) (2000); CWA § 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(l)
(2000); SDWA
14 14(a)(l)(B), 1423(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. $ 5 300g-3(a)( l)(B), 300h-2(a)(l)
(2000).
37RCRA 3008(a)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(l)-(2) (2000); CAA 113(a)(l), 42
U.S.C. 6 7413(a)(l)
. . . . (2000).
.
'SC%A 08 309(a)(4)-(5), 404(s)(3), 33 U.S.C. $3 1319(a)(4)-(5), 1344(s)(3) (2000);
CAA 113(a)(3)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 7413(a)(4) (2000).
39 FIFRA
14, 7 U.S.C. 1361 (2000); TSCA $9 16, 207, 15 U.S.C.
2615, 2647
(2000); MPRSA 105,33 U.S.C. 1415 (2000); EPCRKA 5 325,42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2000).
''"The Committee report accompanying the Senate CWA bill acknowledged that its enforcement provisions were based on those of the CAA and the Refuse Act (an 1899 statute
prohibiting the deposit of refuse into navigable rivers). S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1972),
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF THE WATERPOLLUTION
CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973) [hereinafter "CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY"].The Committee report accompanying the Senate RCRA bill acknowledged that its enforcement provisions were based on those of the CAA and CWA. S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 17 (1976).
See supra note 34.

"
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ing the preclusions, although some legislative history regarding the balance between EPA and states in enforcement bears on their interpretation.
The Committee report accompanying the Senate CAA bill in 1970
explained that, by providing new federal enforcement authorities, Congress did "not intend to diminish either the authority or the responsibility
of State and local governments" in the enforcement arena. Although the
new enforcement authorities provided "the necessary tools to act swiftly
to abate violations," the federal government "should not interfere with
effective State action." The federal enforcer "would be authorized to issue . . . an order when [it] determined that a State had not satisfactorily
administered its enforcement author it^."^^ These expectations are consistent with the congressional findings that "air pollution prevention . . . and
air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States
and local government^."^^ The implied primacy of state administration and
enforcement, however, is hyperbole. Congress authorized only EPA to establish emission standards for new motor vehicles and contemplated that it
would have sole responsibility to enforce them. It authorized only EPA to
establish emission standards from new sources and for hazardous pollutants, and contemplated that it would have primary responsibility for enforcing them. And even the above-quoted report language asserts that
EPA should not interfere with effective state enforcement and acknowledges EPA is free to interfere with unsatisfactory state enforcement. But
this report is not reflected in the EPA enforcement provisions that Congress enacted. It does not limit EPA's enforcement authority to cases in
which the state has not taken satisfactory actions. Indeed, it authorizes EPA
to bring an enforcement action without regard to whether the state has
enforced, satisfactorily or not.44
Two years later, congressional trumpeting of state enforcement responsibility grew even stronger in the legislative history of the CWA. The
Committee report accompanying the House CWA bill stated that the
Committee expects that the Administrator will rely to the maximum extent possible upon the enforcement actions of the individual States. The Committee in providing for Federal enforcement'does not intend to replace enforcement by the States. The
provisions of section 309 are supplemental to those of the States
and are available to the Administrator in those cases where . . .
State . . . enforcement agencies will not or cannot act expeditiously and vigorously to enforce the requirement of this Act. The

42

S. REP.NO. 91-1 196, at 21-22 (1970). reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
OF
1970, at 421-22 (1974) [hereinafter "CAA LEGIS-

THE CLEANAIRACTAMENDMENTS
OF
LATIVE HISTORY"].
43

CAA 8 101(a)(3),42 U.S.C. 5 7401(a)(3) (2000).
CAA 5 113(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 7413(a) (2000).
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Committee clearly intends that the greater proportion of enforcement actions be brought by the States.45
The Committee report accompanying the Senate CWA bill stated similar
expectations:
In any regulatory program involving Federal and State participation is (sic) the allocation or division of enforcement responsibilities is difficult . . . .
Against the background of the Clean Air Act and the Refuse Act
the Committee concluded that the enforcement presence of the
Federal government shall be concurrent with the enforcement
powers of the States. The Committee does not intend this jurisdiction of the Federal government to supplant state enforcement.
Rather the Committee intends that the enforcement power of the
Federal government is available in cases where States . . . are
not acting expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.
Under the Refuse Act the Federal government is not constrained
in any way from acting against violators. The Committee continues
that authority in this Act.
The Committee . . . notes that the authority of the Federal Government should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those
cases deserve (sic) Federal action because of their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State. It is clear
that the Administrator is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to reserve his authority for the cases of paramount
interest.46
Again, deference to state enforcement in these statements is exaggerated. The enacted enforcement provision did not contain the suggested
limitations. Indeed, the statute envisions EPA as a permit issuer in states
with no approved programs and it makes little sense to view non-participating states as the primary enforcers of federally issued permits. To the
extent that Congress modeled the CWA enforcement provisions on the
Refuse
it modeled them on a statute contemplating no state role in

45 H. REP. NO. 92-91 1 , at 115 (1972), reprirtted in CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra
note 40, at 802 (1973).
46S.REP. NO. 92-414, at 73-74 (1971), reprir~tedin 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 1481-82. The Committee repeated much of the same language in its report accompanying its RCRA bill. S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 17 (1976).
47 33 U.S.C. 88 407, 41 1 (2000).
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enforcement. Indeed, the Committee report acknowledged the CWA enforcement authorities, like those in the Refuse Act, were "not constrained
in any
And its statement that EPA is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy is puzzling, since EPA had a preexisting enforcement
bureaucracy that operated EPA's part of the Refuse Act permitting program. Congress was well aware of this for it provided a budget for those
operations and heard testimony from EPA enforcement officials supporting the enactment of the CWA.49
Despite its overblown championing of the state role in enforcement,
the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the preclusion devices to ease friction between federal and state enforcers. It does not,
however, illuminate how the provisions should be interpreted.
3. An Anomaly: Limited Federal Enforcement Authority

RCRA's program for regulating non-hazardous solid waste is a stark
contrast to the dominant statutory pattern of strong federal enforcement
authority tempered by a sliding scale of preclusions on EPA enforcement
when the state has already taken an enforcement action. It reflects Congress's intent not to displace state responsibility for solid waste management. It also demonstrates that Congress knows how to deny EPA enforcement authority or to drastically curtail it when that is its intent, which
undercuts arguments that Congress obliquely implied restrictions on EPA
enforcement authority in non-enforcement provisions.
In RCRA section 3008, Congress granted EPA broad authority to enforce against violations of "this subchapter," i.e., subchapter 111, regulating hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal.50 Subchapter 111
does not regulate the disposal of non-hazardous solid waste. That is accomplished in Subchapter IV, which adopts a model from an earlier era.
It contemplates that states will develop and implement plans for nonhazardous solid waste [hereinafter "solid waste"] disposal to protect the
environment and encourage resource conservation by recycling." Subchapter IV confines the federal role largely to providing financial and
'
technical assistance and promulgating standards for safe d i s p o ~ a l . ~As
enacted in 1976, RCRA required EPA to promulgate criteria for "sanitary

S. REP.NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprirzted irz 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra
note 40, at 1482.
J9 See, e.g., Hearirzgs orz H.R. 11896 Before the House Cornnz. 0 1 1 Public Works, 92d
Cong. 336, 338 (1972) (testimony of John Quarles, EPA General Counsel and Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement, discussing the enforcement and permitting programs under
the Refuse Act and projected under the to-be-enacted CWA), reprirzted in 2 CWA LEGISLAT I V E HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 1234, 1236.
50 42 U.S.C. 9: 6928 (2000).
s' RCRA 5 4001,42 U.S.C. 5 6941 (2000).
5' RCRA $ 5 4002-4004,4007-4008,42 U.S.C. $8 6942-6944,6947-6948 (2000).
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landfill^."^' It declared that solid waste disposal facilities not meeting the
sanitary landfill criteria were "open dumps," and made the further operation of open dumps
It also used grant money to encourage states
to submit to EPA control programs, closing open dumps and regulating
sanitary landfills, for approval as meeting federal standard^.^' Unlike in
other statutes, Congress did not authorize EPA to develop a regulatory program in states failing to submit approvable programs, nor did it authorize
EPA to enforce against open dumps to require them to meet sanitary
landfill standards. Curiously, however, it did authorize citizens to enforce
against open
Congress soon prompted amendment of RCRA because several developments demonstrated that municipal landfills were not benign, but
were the ultimate disposal sites for considerable amounts of hazardous
waste. First, approximately twenty percent of the sites listed for remediation on CERCLA's National Priority List were operating or defunct municipal landfill^.^' Second, generators of small quantities of hazardous
waste were allowed to avoid the RCRA Subchapter I11 regulatory net if
they disposed of that waste in state-licensed municipal landfills.s8 Third,
municipal waste itself had a hazardous waste component from households
and commercial establishment^.^^ Finally, leachate from municipal landfills,
even those without a significant industrial waste component, can be very
like leachate from hazardous waste landfills6" These factors prompted
Congress to amend Subchapter IV in 1984, upgrading controls on solid
waste disposal facilities receiving wastes from small quantity generat o r ~ . As
~ ' part of the upgrade, Congress authorized EPA to enforce against
disposal facilities not meeting the federal standards, but only in states
without approved programs.62 RCRA does grant EPA authority to abate
imminent and substantial endangerments, including endangerment from
solid waste, and does not limit that authority to endangerment caused by
violations of the statute or EPA's regulation^.^^ The RCRA amendments
continued to favor citizens, however, giving them authority to enforce
5'RCRA 5 4004,42 U.S.C. 8 6944.
54 RCRA 5 4005,42 U.S.C. 5 6945 (2000).
55 RCRA 5 4006,42 U.S.C. 5 6946 (2000).
56 RCRA subsection 7002(a)(l) authorizes citizens to enforce against any violation of
a requirement or standard that "has become effective pursuant to this chapter." 42 U.S.C.
5 6972(a)(1) (2000). The "chapter" referred to is all of RCRA, including both Subchapters
I11 and IV. If there was any doubt, Congress specifically provided in section 4005(a) that
the prohibition against operating an open dump was enforceable under section 7002. 42
U.S.C. 5 6945(a) (2000).
57 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B (2004).
ss RCRA 5 3001(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. 5 692l(d)(5) (2000).
59 See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50978, 50982-83 (Oct. 9,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257-258).
Id.
6 1 RCRA 5 4010(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 6949a(c) (2000).
RCRA 5 4005(~)(2)(A),42 U.S.C. 3 6945(~)(2)(A)(2000).
63 RCRA 5 7003,42 U.S.C. 5 6973 (2000).
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against solid waste disposal facilities not meeting the federal standards,
regardless of whether they were located in states with approved programs
or whether they posed an endangerment.&l
The author is aware of no reported decisions on EPA enforcement
under these provisions. On the other hand, there are numerous reported
decisions on citizen enforcement of them.6s The juxtaposition of limited EPA
enforcement authority and unlimited citizen enforcement authority is curious and unique. It is illustrative of the lengths to which Congress will
go to adjust the balance between federal and state enforcers.
C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions
An understanding of the preclusion mechanism in citizen suits is important for understanding preclusions against EPA enforcement, since
both share the three element notice, delay and bar structure. Indeed, they
both resonate the theme and variation nature of this preclusion structure.
The citizen suit provisions of the various environmental statutes are modeled
on CAA section 304.66Indeed, the citizen suit provisions in the different
statutes are so nearly alike that courts commonly interpret one of them by
comparing and contrasting its wording with the wording of others and by
using legislative history and precedent from the others.67 CAA section
304 contains a three-element statutory preclusion in a form followed closely
by the citizen suit provisions in the other statutes. It provides generally that
See supra note 56.
See, e.g., Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
6642 U.S.C. 5 7604 (2000). Both the House and Senate CWA Reports acknowledge
this. CWA section 505 is "modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970." S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971). reprinted in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,supra note 40, at 1497. The section "closely follows the concepts utilized in section
304 of the Clean Air Act." H. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 820. Indeed, they are so alike that the Senate Report on
the citizen suit provision in the CWA follows the Senate Report on the citizen suit provision in the CAA almost paragraph by paragraph and word for word. See S. REP. NO. 9 l 1196, at 36-39 (1972), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra note 42, at 43639; S. REP.NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1972), reprinted in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra
note 40, at 1497-1500. This is particularly significant because the provision in the CAA
originated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the House bill. CONF.REP. NO. 911783, at 55, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 5388.
67 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57
(1987) (comparing wording of CWA section 505 to citizen suit provisions of several other
statutes); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
493 U.S. 20 (1989); Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
1985) (using the CAA citizen suit provision legislative history to interpret CWA citizen
suit provision); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 n.55 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (using the CAA citizen suit provision legislative history used to interpret CWA citizen suit provision); Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990)
(interpreting SDWA citizen suit provision); Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 791-92 (W.D.
Okla. 1989); Student Pub. Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.
579 F. Supp. 1528, 1533-34 n.8 (D.N.J. 1984). aff'd,759 F.2d 1 131 (3d Cir. 1983).
65
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No action may be commenced . . .

. . . prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
violation [to EPA, the state and the violator] . . . or
if [EPA or the state] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order [that the
citizen seeks to enforce]. . . .68
Under the notice and delay elements, citizens must give the government
the first opportunity to sue in court.69Under the bar element, citizens may
not sue if the government has taken and is diligently prosecuting that opportunity. If the preclusive government action is filed in federal court,
however, a citizen may intervene as a matter of right.70The citizen suit provisions in the other statutes share these features; indeed, the "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting" language in the bar element is identical in most of them.7' There are only three differences among the bar
elements. First, the citizen suit provisions of the statutes that do not envision a state role in implementation do not bar a citizen suit because of a
state action.72 Second, several of the citizen suit provisions bar citizen
suits when EPA has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a civil or
criminal a ~ t i o n . ~Finally,
'
other citizen suit provisions bar citizen suits
when EPA has commenced assessing an administrative penalty,74 or has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an adminis-

CAA 9: 304(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(b)(l).
A few variants on the notice and delay provision should be noted. All of the statutes
require that citizens give notice to EPA before suing it for failure to perform a mandatory
duty. Most of the statutes require a sixty-day delay after notice before a citizen may file
suit against a violating polluter. On the other hand, many of the statutes do not require a
delay period before citizens may sue for particular violations, often associated with hazardous substances, although prior notice must still be given. RCRA section 7002(b)(2)(A),
for instance, normally requires citizens to give EPA a ninety-day delay before they may file
a suit to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment, but requires only prior notice
with no delay period for citizens filing complaints alleging violations of Subchapter 111 (regulating the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste). 42 U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(2)(A)
(2000). See also CWA Q: 505(b), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(b); CAA Q: 304(b), 42 U.S.C. 9: 7604(b)
(2000) (providing for differential notice requirements).
70CAAQ: 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q:7604(b)(l)(B).
7 1 Except as noted in the text below, it is identical in CWA section 505(b)(l)(B), RCRA
section 7002(b)(l)(B), SDWA section 1449(b)(l)(B), TSCA section 20(b)(l)(B), and
EPCRKA section 326(b)(l)(B). 33 U.S.C. 9; 1365(b)(l)(B)(CWA); 42 U.S.C. 9; 6972(b)(l)(B)
(RCRA); 42 U.S.C. Q: 300j-8(b)(l)(B) (2000) (SDWA); 15 U.S.C. Q: 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000)
(TSCA); 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(e) (2000) (EPCRKA).
7Z TSCA 9: 20(b), 15 U.S.C. Q: 2619(b); MPRSA Q: 105(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. 3 1115(g)(2)
(2000); EPCRKA 5 326(e), 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(e).
73 CWA Q: 505(b)(I)(B) , 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(b)(l)(B); MPRSA 9; 105(g)(l)(D) , 33 U.S.C.
9; 1415(g)(l)(D); RCRA 5 7002(b)(l)(B) , 4 2 U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(l)(B).
74 MPRSA 9: 105(g)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C. Q: 14 15(g)(2)(C).
68

69
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trative penalty.75Some of the provisions contain other limitations on citizen suits not germane to this inquiry.
Some related aspects of the citizen suit provisions are also relevant
to this analysis. First, while the provisions bar citizen suits if the federal
or state government has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, an action, most allow citizens to intervene as of right in government actions
filed in federal courts.76Second, they allow the federal government (but
not the state) to intervene as a matter of right in any citizen
Finally,
the CAA and CWA require citizens to give the federal government (but
not the state) notice of a proposed settlement of the citizen suit and allow
the federal government to comment on it.78
Although there are variations in the three-element preclusion device
in the citizen suit provisions, there are fewer and they are far less varied
than the preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions. This reflects
the somewhat different purposes the devices serve in the two sets of provisions. In the citizen suit provisions the devices serve to manage duplicative
litigation by successive enforcers, a purpose that does not vary much from
one statute to another. In EPA enforcement provisions the devices serve
to modulate the federalist balance between EPA and states, a balance that
varies considerably from one statute to another.
11. INTERPRETING
THE PRECLUSIONS
I N EPA ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
To IMPLEMENT
THEIRPLAINMEANINGS
Analysis of Congress's intent in promulgating the enforcement preclusions demonstrates that, except where such interpretation renders the
preclusions absurd or contradictory, those preclusions should be interpreted
according to their plain meaning. This Part will examine the specific preclusions against EPA enforcement in light of this conclusion. This Part
75TSCA Q: 20(b)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. 5 2619(b)(l)(B); EPCRKA Q 326(e), 42 U.S.C.
5 11046(e). The CWA includes a bar on EPA and citizen suits for penalties when EPA or a
state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an administrative
penalty or has assessed and collected such a penalty. CWA Q: 309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)
(2000). Although i t differs from the more common bars in several respects, it raises many
of the same or similar issues. Because it bars EPA as well as citizen enforcement, however,
Part Two addresses it, although Part One frequently referenced it where appropriate.
76 Most allow "any citizen" or "any person" to intervene. See CWA 5 505(b)(l)(B), 33
U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B); SDWA 5 1449(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q 300j-8(b)(l)(B); RCRA
Q:7002(b)(l),42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(l); CAA Q: 304(b)(l)(B),42 U.S.C. Q 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000).
EPCRKA section 326(h)(2) qualifies those who may intervene, and TSCA subsection
20(b)(l)(B) allows only those parties to intervene who gave notice of citizen suit before
the government filed suit. 16 U.S.C. 9: 2619(b)(l)(B); 42 U.S.C. Q: 11046(h)(2).
77 TSCA Q 20(~)(1),16 U.S.C. 9: 2619(c)(I); SMCRA 9: 520(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. Q 1270(c)(2)
(2000); CWA Q 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(c)(2); MPRSA Q 105(g)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C.
5 1415(g)(3)(B); SDWA Q 1449(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-8(c); RCRA Q: 7002(d), 42 U.S.C.
5 6972(d); CAA Q: 304(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. Q 7604(c)(2); EPCRKA Q 326(h)(l), 42 U.S.C.
5 1 1046(h)(l).
7X CAA Q 304(~)(2),
42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(c)(2); CWA Q 505(~)(3),
33 U.S.C. Q: 1365(~)(3).
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discusses the legal issues that arise under each type of preclusion, beginning with the most stringent and proceeding in order of decreasing power.
A. CWA Subsection 309(g) and Its Kin

The strongest preclusion against EPA enforcement is found in the
CWA and the SDWA. In each case, the preclusion applies to enforcement
subsequent to an administrative penalty assessment by either EPA or a
state with an approved program under a cooperative federalism arrangement. Both the SDWA, in the enforcement provision for its underground
injection p r ~ g r a m , 'and
~ the CWA, in its general enforcement and oil spill
provision^,^^ authorize EPA to assess administrative penal tie^.^' The provisions preclude subsequent EPA and citizen actions against violations
for which: ( I ) EPA has commenced and is diligently pursuing an administrative penalty action or (2) has finally assessed an administrative penalty. The CWA's enforcement provision precludes both EPA and citizens
from taking other penalty actions against violations for which the state
has taken similar action under comparable state law.82The CWA provision precludes only successive penalty actions and its second prong applies only if the violator has paid the penalty." The SDWA provision
omits this preclusion against EPA action, probably because the SDWA
already precludes EPA enforcement if the state has taken "appropriate
enforcement action."84 CWA subsection 309(g) is unique in that its preclusion device contains a bar on both EPA and citizen enforcement. Defendants have invoked the subsection 309(g) bar in many citizen suits,
but in few EPA enforcement actions. Because of a dearth of opinions under the comparable provisions in CWA section 31 1 and SDWA, this Article focuses on the preclusion device as it is used in CWA subsection 309(g),
but its conclusions are applicable to the use of the device in the SDWA.

I . Introduction: The Provision and Its Preclusions
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA enforcement section to add administrative assessment of civil penalties to EPA's enforcement arsenal.85
It intended this authority to address relatively minor violations in a sort
of traffic ticket fashion. Whereas subsection 309(d) authorizes courts to
assess penalties up to $25,000 a day for each violation, with no limit on

SDWA 5 1423(~)(5),4 2 U.S.C. 5 300h-2(~)(5)(2000).
CWA $5 309(g), 31 l(b)(6)(E), 33 U.S.C. $5 1319(g), 131 l(b)(6)(E) (2000).
Other statutes authorize EPA to assess penalties, but they do not incorporate the preclusion device in those authorities. E.g., CAA 5 113(d), 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(d) (2000).
82 CWA 5 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(6).
CWA 5 309(g)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(6)(B).
84 See infra Part 1II.B.
85 Pub. L. No. 100-4, $ 3 14, I01 Stat. 7 , 4 6 4 9 (1 987).
79

so
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total penalties assessed, subsection 309(g) authorizes EPA to assess penalties only to a total of $25,000, using informal administrative procedures,
or $125,000, using formal administrative procedure^.^^ Both administrative penalty processes, however, require EPA first to consult with the state
in which the violation occurs, give the violator notice allowing it thirty days
to request a hearing, and give public notice and opportunity for participation in the assessment procedures.*' The provision also allows interested
parties the opportunity to appeal EPA's ultimate assessments and to request that the court assess greater penalties than EPA if EPA abused its
discretion in assessing too low a penalty.88To prevent the assessment of
duplicative penalties for the same violation, Congress included the preclusion device in subsection 309(g)(6)(A). It provides that "any violation
. . . shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action" by EPA or a citizen
suit if
(i) . . . [EPA] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under this subsection,
(ii) . . . a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under a State law comparable to this subsection, or
(iii) . . . [EPA or a State] has issued a final order . . . and the
violator has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law . . . .89
But subsection 309(g)(6)(B) provides that the bar does not apply in the
event that:
(i) a civil action under section 1365(a)(1) . . . has been filed prior
to commencement of an action under this subsection, or
(ii) notice . . . has been given in accordance with section 1365(b)
(l)(A) . . . prior to commencement of an action under this subsection and an action under section 1365(a)(l) . . . with respect
to such alleged violation is filed before the 120th day after the
date on which such notice is given.90
Although an EPA action under subsection 309(g) may bar a citizen suit, EPA
must provide public notice of such an action, and citizens may intervene
or, if a penalty has been agreed between EPA and the violator, demand a
hearing on the adequacy of the penalty. Citizens may also appeal final EPA
action on penalty assessment^.^' This is the only instance of which the
CWA Q 309(d), (g)(2), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(d), (g)(2).
CWA Q 309(g)(1), (4), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(l), (4).
88 CWA Q 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(8).
89 CWA §309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A).
90CWA Q 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(B).
91 CWA Q 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(8).
86

87
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author is aware that Congress provided citizens with judicial review of
consented-to administrative penalties between EPA and violators. Of interest in interpreting the preclusions is subsection 309(g)(7), which provides that EPA penalty assessments do not "affect any person's obligations to comply with" the CWA, without mentioning the effect of state
penalty assessment^.^^
The CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is a variant of the familiar three-element device against subsequent enforcement. It contains
the notice and delay elements requiring EPA to issue a notice to the violator and to consult with the state before commencing a penalty action. It
then gives the respondent thirty days to request a hearing. Uniquely, however, 309(g) contains the bar element for the device's limitation on successive actions by both EPA and citizens. Normally, preclusions on EPA
enforcement are located in the EPA enforcement provisions, and preclusions on citizen enforcement are located in the citizen suit provisions.
The CWA subsection 309(g)'s wedding of the two bar elements into one
provision is a graphic illustration that the statutes' preclusions on EPA
and citizen actions are variants of the same device. Despite its uniqueness
in this regard, the CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is structured as
the other preclusion devices and raises many of the same interpretive issues, albeit in a somewhat different context: (1) What levels of government may act to bar an EPA or citizen action? (2) What government actions will bar an EPA or citizen action? (3) When must the government
action be commenced to bar an EPA or citizen action? (4) How diligently
must the government prosecute the action to bar an EPA or citizen action? ( 5 ) What EPA or citizen actions will the government action bar?
Before addressing these issues, however, it is useful to examine the legislative history of subsection 309(g), for Congress recognized that if not
properly implemented, subsection 309(g) could interfere with the compliance goals of CWA sections 309 (EPA enforcement) and 505 (citizen
enforcement), and structured subsection 309(g) to prevent that interference.
The subsection 309(g) preclusion device has generated considerable
litigation and reported decisions, almost all of them in citizen suits.93Courts
swayed by deference to prosecutorial discretion or otherwise hostile to citizen suits have disregarded the plain wording of subsection 309(g) to interpret the preclusion device broadly. They have done so without considering the implications of their interpretations on EPA enforcement under
CWA subsection 309(g) and the other statutes. Moreover, they utterly fail
92 CWA 5 309(g)(7), 33 U.S.C. 9 13 19(g)(7).
93This discussion of the subsection 309(g) preclusion device cites nearly fifty decisions considering its application in citizen suits. But the author is aware of only one reported subsection 309(g) decision in an EPA enforcement action. See United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 791-95 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part oil other grolrtzds, 191 F.3d 5 16, 524-26 (4th Cir. 1999).
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to grasp that the CWA subsection 309(g) preclusion device is part of a
nuanced spectrum of preclusions on EPA and citizen actions in the statutes, rendering the congressional wording of each preclusion to be of particular significance in determining the legislative intent. Finally, they
have ignored the legislative history of subsection 309(g), which demonstrates congressional intent to strengthen, not weaken, EPA enforcement
authority and to limit the bar against subsequent enforcement when the
initial penalty was inappropriately lenient.

2. Background and Legislative History
Congress's 1987 CWA amendments94 strengthened the deterrent value
of EPA's enforcement authorities in three ways.95 First, Congress provided greater deterrence through civil penalties by raising the amount of
penalties that courts could assess from $10,000 per day to $25,000 per
day for each violation and by establishing factors for courts to consider
in setting the amounts of penalty assessments, including the economic
benefit of non-compliance to the violator.96 Second, it provided to EPA
the option of assessing administrative penalties in subsection 309(g). Finally, it increased the criminal sanctions that courts could impose and
added a new criminal offense with particularly harsh sanctions for knowing violations which the violator knew put others in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.97It based the administrative penalty and the knowing endangerment provisions on EPA proposals made as early as 1982.98
Both the House and Senate bills contained provisions for all three enforcement enhancements, although they varied in their details.99
The legislative history emphasizes three aspects of congressional intent behind the new administrative penalty authority. First, Congress intended to strengthen EPA's enforcement program by giving it a new enforcement option. Second, and most important in terms of coverage, Congress intended the new administrative penalty authority to be used against

9-' Pub. L. No. 100-4, $5 3 12-3 14, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). Both chambers initially passed
the amendments in 1985. A Conference Committee reconciled the two versions in 1986
and President Reagan vetoed the legislation that year. Congress enacted it over his veto in
1987. See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792,
803 n.1 1 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (recounting the history of the statute).
95 Pub. L. No. 100-4, $ 8 3 12-3 14, 101 Stat. 42-49 (1987).
96Pub.L. NO. 100-4, 8 313, 101 Stat. 4 5 , 4 5 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d)).
9 7 P ~ bL.
. NO. 100-4, 5 312, 101 Stat. 42, 42-44 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
!j 1319(c)).
98 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envirorlmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong. 34, 78-85 (1982) [hereinafter "Senate Heari ~ ~ g s (written
"]
testimony of John Hernandez, Deputy Administrator, EPA); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong. 341, 384-91 (1982) [hereinafter "House Hearings"] (written testimony of John Hernandez, Deputy Administrator, EPA).
99 Id.
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lesser violations, not against serious violations for which substantial penalties or injunctive relief are more appropriate. Third, almost as an afterthought, Congress was concerned that violators not be forced to pay two
penalties for the same violation. The last-minute revision of the provision
to accomplish the third goal created a cumbersome preclusion device encouraging some courts to misinterpret it to undercut the first two goals,
potentially doing great damage to the entire statute.
The legislative history on the first point is straightforward; by all accounts congressional intent was to strengthen EPA enf~rcement.'~"
Most of
the legislative history focuses on the second point: that the new administrative penalty was for lesser violations. Indeed, the testimony of EPA's
Deputy Administrator in hearings before both the Senate and House authorizing committees stressed that:
[tlhe efficiency afforded by this administrative assessment plan
would be negated if EPA used this procedure to assess penalties
for major violations of the Act or complex cases. For this reason, it
is EPA's intent to use administrative penalties to address clear and
well documented violations of the Act which may not be serious
enough to require judicial e n f ~ r c e m e n t . ' ~ '
The Senate Committee was quite concerned that the provision only be used
for such lesser violations. The Senate Report reiterated:
This authority . . . is . . . not to replace a vigorous civil judicial
enforcement program. Civil judicial enforcement is a keystone
of successful enforcement of the Act and necessary for . . . cases
requiring injunctive relief, serious violations of the Act, or large
penalty actions, and cases where remedies are sought requiring
significant construction or capital i n v e ~ t m e n t . ' ~ ~

loo The original enforcement provision provided EPA "with two civil enforcement options," administrative compliance orders and judicial actions for penalties and injunctions.
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985). "These amendments give the Administrator a third option." Id. Administrative penalty assessments "could provide greater deterrent value than
an administrative [compliance] order for a violation that does not warrant the more resource intensive aspects of judicial enforcement." Id. When introducing both the House bill
and the Conference Committee bill for floor debate and vote, Rep. Roe, chief sponsor of
the House Bill and Chairman of the House Authorizing Committee, stated that the administrative penalty provision was "designed to substantially increase EPA's enforcement capability to ensure compliance with the act." 131 CONG.REC. 19847 (1985); 132 CONG.REC.
31961 (1986). Sen. Chaffee Mitchell said substantially the same thing in support of the
conference committee bill for the ultimate vote. "The amendments provide for new authority for the EPA to use administrative penalties . . . ." 133 CONG.REC. 1270 (1987).
'01 See House Hearings, supra note 98, at 387; Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 8 1.
lo's. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985).
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Indeed, two thirds of the Senate Report's discussion of subsection 309(g)
is devoted to this concern, which explains many of the distinctive features of
the Senate bill.
The initial version of the Senate billlo' and the final House bi11IM provided EPA authority to commence a penalty proceeding against a person
who "is in violation" of the statute. However, the final version of the Senate
bill changed the tense of the phrase, providing EPA authority to commence a penalty action only against a person who "has violated" the statute.'05 Both chambers adopted the Senate past tense version in the enacted provision, subsection 309(g)(l)(A).Io6 The Senate's use of the past
tense was thus intentional and meaningful. The Senate report stated that
the bill contained several measures to assure that EPA did not use the
new authority against violations more appropriately addressed by judicial
action, the first measure was use of the past tense:
First, this new authority is designed to address past, rather than
continuing, violations . . . . Continuing violations are more appropriately addressed by abatement orders or injunctive actions,
and, if EPA seeks both civil penalties and injunctive relief, one
judicial action should be filed . . . . These limitations are intended
to assure that violations of greater magnitude are handled judicially and pursued in a judicial forum.'07
The Senate Report also identified public participation as another of
the "several safeguards . . . to prevent abuse of the administrative penalty
authority, such as significant violators escaping with nominal penalties."lo8
Both the House and Senate bills contained detailed requirements for giving public notice of penalty assessments, allowing citizens to intervene in
assessment proceedings, allowing citizens to request hearings if penalty
assessments were concluded by agreement without a hearing, and authorizing citizens to appeal assessments to the courts.lW But only the Senate
bill allowed courts in such appeals to assess higher penalties than the EPA
penalty being appealed.Il0 This too was one of the safeguards the Senate
bill contained against lenient penalty assessments for serious violations,"'
I0-'S.2652,97th Cong. Q 8 (1982), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 15-17.
H.R. REP.NO. 99-189, at 89 (1985).
Io5 S. REP.NO. 99-50, at 100 (1985).
IM33U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(l)(A) (2000).
Io7S.REP.NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985).
Io8 Id. at 27.
Im S. REP.NO. 99-50, at 26-29, 102 (1985); H.R. REP.NO. 99-189, at 9 0 (1985).
] I 0 S. REP.NO. 99-50, at 102 (1985).
The report accompanying the bill stated:
Providing citizens with a right to appeal will serve as an added safeguard to assure that the Agency assesses appropriate penalties . . . that take into account the
seriousness of the violation . . . and serve to deter noncompliance . . . . Where it is
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and was adopted in the enacted version."* Senator Chaffee, chief sponsor of
the Senate bill, noted that state action could bar an EPA or citizen action
"only where a State is proceeding under a State law that is comparable to
section 309(g). For example, in order to be comparable, a State law must
provide for a right to a hearing and for public notice and participation
procedures similar to those set forth in section 309(g).""'
The Senate report identified a final measure to prevent use of the administrative penalty authority for violations more appropriately addressed
by judicial enforcement: the bar on subsequent EPA or citizen penalty action
was limited only to the specific violations against which a penalty had been
as~essed."~
The third legislative concern was that the new administrative penalty
authority not result in duplicative penalty assessments for the same violation.Il5 The Senate bill anticipated the possibility that EPA could seek civil
penalties under sections 309(b), 309(d), and 31 1, and that citizens could
seek civil penalties under section 505 after EPA had assessed a subsection 309(g) penalty for the same violations. The Senate bill provided preclusions against such successive penalty actions, and ultimately these
preclusions in the enacted provision. The Senate bill made no accommodations for state administrative penalty assessments. The House bill contained no preclusions on citizen suits in subsection 309(g), but did propose a preclusion in section 505(a) if EPA or a state had assessed an administrative penalty.'I6 The House bill was more deferential to states in
other ways, requiring EPA to confer with them before assessing a penalty
clear that the Agency has assessed such an unreasonably low penalty as to constitute and abuse of discretion, the court may choose to impose its own higher penalty rather than exercise its authority to remand.
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28-29 (1985).
l l z CWA 3 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g)(8) (2000); Joinzr Explanzatory Staremerzt of
the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 99-1004, at 139 (1985) ("From the
Senate bill, . . . court authority to impose additional penalties is included in the conference
substitute . . . .").
' I 3 133 CONG.REC. 1264 (1 987).
' I 4 The Senate Committee underlined this in its report:
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for the same violations
which are the subject of the administrative civil penalties proceeding. It would not
apply to an action for civil penalties for a violation of the same requirement of the
Act that is not being addressed administratively or for a past violation of another
pollutant parameter . . . . In addition, this limitation would not apply to: I ) an action seeking relief other than civil penalties . . . .

S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985). Moreover, the Committee noted that "[tlhis amendment
does not preclude administrative or judicial enforcement actions by the Administrator for
any violations not specifically penalized by the initial enforcement action." Id.
' I 5 "[Nlo one may bring an action to recover civil penalties under sections 309(b) and
(d), 3 1 I(b), or 505 of this Act for any violation with respect to which the Administrator has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative civil penalty action . . . ."Id.
'I6 H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985).
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and precluding EPA from assessing an administrative penalty for a violation for which the state could demonstrate it already had assessed an appropriate penalty.'" The consultation provision was adopted in subsection
309(g)(l) as enacted. The broad preclusion from the House bill was not
adopted, but the Conference Committee incorporated much of its substance
into the provision ultimately adopted by adding penalty assessments under comparable state statutes to those that would preclude EPA or citizen
penalty actions under subsection 309(g)(6).
Congress was aware of how the features of the provision knit together
and intended the intricate result. For instance, Representative Edgar, a ranking member of the authorizing committee in the House, commented that,
under the original House bill, "citizens would be precluded from seeking
redress in cases of violation of the Clean Water Act. I understand that the
Roe amendment will allow citizens to go to court in the case of continuing violations, which I believe is a fair c ~ m p r o m i s e . " ' ~ ~
The House Conference Committee Report reiterated the limitations the
Senate included in the legislation to prevent EPA from abusing the new
authority to protect violators from compliance by assessing small penalties against them.
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for
the same violations which are the subject of the administrative
civil penalty proceeding. It would not . . . apply to 1 ) an action
seeking relief other than civil penalties (e.g., an injunction or
declaratory judgment); 2) an action under section 505(a)(l) of
this Act filed prior to commencement of an administrative civil
penalty proceeding for the same violation; or 3) a violation which
has been the subject of a notice of violation under section
505(b)(l) of this Act prior to initiation of the administrative penalty process, provided that, in the latter case, the action under
section 505(a)(l) of this Act is filed within 120 days of the notice of v i ~ l a t i o n . " ~
The Senate Committee was rightly concerned with the potential for
abuse of the new provision. Perversely implemented and interpreted, the
preclusions could shield continuing violators from appropriate penalties,
and even from compliance, by paying a pittance in administrative penalties to the State. Such an interpretation would eviscerate any deterrent
value from civil penalties when the economic benefit of non-compliance
H.R. REP.NO. 99- 189, at 89, 91 (1985).
13 1 CONG.REC. 19852 (1985). There was no amendment offered by Rep. Roe to
the House bill or to what was to become subsection 309(g). The speaker evidently was
referring to the entire bill amending the CWA, including its provision for subsection
309(g), for Rep. Roe was one of its chief sponsors.
' I q H.R. CONF.REP.NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986).
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exceeds $25,000, which is usually the case. Such an interpretation could
effectively eliminate citizen enforcement and could limit EPA enforcement to criminal prosecution. Indeed, such an interpretation could eviscerate not only the enforcement provisions of the statutes, but also the
substantive requirements of the statutes by allowing paltry penalty assessments to shield violators from actions to force compliance. There is not a
hint in the legislative history that Congress intended either of these results;
indeed, the history indicates Congress anticipated these dangers and carefully drafted the preclusion device to avoid them.

3. Interpreting the Preclusion Device in CWA Subsection 309(g).
Several legal questions arise in the interpretation of subsection 309(g).
This Section discusses each of these questions in turn based on the foregoing analysis.
a . What Levels of Government May Act To Bar a Successive EPA or
Citizen Penalty Action?

Actions by the "Administrator" or a "State" may bar subsequent EPA
and citizen penalty actions under subsection 309(g). The scope of the meaning of these terms, however, is a relevant question. The statute defines the
"Administrator" to mean the Administrator of EPA,IZ0and defines "State"
to mean "a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico" and various territories.12' There are two issues regarding the meaning of "State." First, does the term include political subdivisions of a state,
such as cities or sewer districts? Second, does the term include all states
or only those with approved CWA permit programs? The statutory definition
of "State" does not address either issue explicitly.
Because municipalities and other state subdivisions, such as sewer
districts, may implement environmental programs responsive to the CWA
and may have authority to assess penalties against violators of related local
environmental requirements, defendants may claim cities are states for
purposes of the subsection 309(g) bar."? But the CWA defines "State"
with no reference to municipalities and, indeed, separately defines municipalities.'?' All courts considering the issue have held that municipalities
120CWAQ: IOl(d), 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(d) (2000).
I 2 l CWA Q: 502(3), 33 U.S.C. Q: 1362(3) (2000). There is a question about the Administrator's ability to take enforcement actions in court. See Miller, supra note 1 , at 429-30.
12' The CWA, for instance, requires municipal sewage treatment plants to secure per-

mits to regulate the treatment of their wastewater and the purity of their discharges. The
CWA requires most of them to develop and enforce programs to regulate discharges into
the sewer system from industrial water pollution sources. Thus, the CWA creates roles for
them as both regulators and members of the regulated public. The CAA authorizes states to

designate local agencies to implement and enforce state implementation plans.
CWA 5 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(4). The definition includes cities, towns, and spe-
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are not states for purposes of preclusion in the citizen suit provision^.'^^
There is no reason for a different answer under the subsection 309(g) preclusion provision.
A more serious question is whether "State," for the purposes of the provision, means any state or only a state with an approved permit program.
The plain meaning is any state, and this meaning is correct because the
CWA defines "State" to include all states, not just states with approved
programs,'25and does not define "State" differently for purposes of subsection 309(g). When Congress intended to use a generally defined term
in section 309 in a manner departing from the general definition, it provided a different special definition in section 309."6 Its failure to provide
a special definition for "State" in section 309 suggests that Congress did
not intend a special meaning for the term in the section. Its special treatment of violations in states with approved programs in subsection 309(a)
indicates it knew how to designate authorities in such states when it intended to do so. The structure of the section thus supports the plain meaning
of "State" to be any state, regardless of the status of its permit program.
The issue has been noted in one decision,12' but never decided in a reported decision of which the author is aware.
This is the one issue examined in the Article for which the plain meaning leads to such absurd results that it should be disregarded. Penalties
assessed under subsection 309(g) are capped at $125,000. A $125,000 penalty is blatantly insufficient to deter violation of a requirement to install
pollution control equipment costing several million dollars and is, therefore,
an inappropriate sanction for a polluter who violates a requirement, for example, to install such equipment. The legislative history is rife with congressional recognition of the lack of deterrent value of subsection 309(g)
penalties for serious violations and of the consequent congressional intent to limit the use of subsection 309(g) to less serious violations. Indeed, in both section 309 generally and subsection 309(g) in particular, Congress admonished that the amount of penalties assessed take into account
"the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation."lZ8Courts recognize that a penalty must be greater than the economic benefit or saving
of the violation to the polluter to have either general or specific deterrent
effect.l19 If a state assesses a five dollar penalty against a serious violacia1 sewer districts.
I z J See Miller, supra note I , at 43 1-33; see also supra Part II.A.2.
I z 5 CWA 5 502(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1362(3).
126SeeCWA 9: 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(c)(6) (2000) (adding, for the purposes of
subsection (c), "responsible corporate officer" to the general definition of "person" in
CWA section 502, 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(5) (2000)).
12' N. & S . Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 554 n.3 (1st Cir.
1991).
l z s CWA 9: 309(d), 309(g)(3), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d), 1319 (g)(3) (2000). Subsection
309(g)(3) adds "or savings" after benefit.
I z 9 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 492
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tion, the penalty will have no deterrent or punitive value; but worse, because of the bar against subsequent penalties, it will prevent the assessment of any penalties in the future that will have deterrent or punitive
value. This eviscerates the federal penalty provisions and their deterrent values. Worse, some courts interpret the bar to prevent any subsequent enforcement action, whether for penalties or compliance. While they are
plainly wrong,I3O under their interpretation, a state can assess a five dollar
penalty against a violation and insulate the polluter from compliance with
the federal requirements. This amounts to the federal judiciary empowering state agencies to amend federal statutes. This is an absurd result that
Congress cannot have intended.
Interpreting "State" to mean a state with an approved program would
limit the potential for states to eviscerate the federal program by assessing paltry penalties. To achieve EPA approval, a state must be committed
enough to the federal program to enact comparable legislation and promulgate comparable regulations. When it does so, the state has a stake in the
success of the federal program, thereby making it far less likely to undercut the federal program than a state with no commitment to it. Thus, interpreting "State" in this fashion avoids the absurd results of interpreting
it to mean any state.
There is good reason to believe that Congress used "State" rather than
"State with an approved permit program" in subsection 309(g) inadvertently. It added the bar from state penalties assessed under state authority
comparable to subsection 309(g) at the last minute, in Conference Committee."' Making a last minute addition to a provision as long and complex as subsection 309(g) risks an inadvertent mistake. Senator Chaffee,
the chief Senate sponsor of the amendments, appears to have recognized
that the Conference Committee had made just such a mistake when it wrote
that the bar was activated by a penalty assessed by a state rather than by a
state with an approved program. He noted on the Senate floor in the debate on the Conference Committee bill, that "State" in subsection 309(g)
means "State with an approved permit program.""?
(D.S.C. 1995) ("[Tlo serve as an effective deterrent, a civil penalty must recover an amount
beyond the economic benefit of noncompliance."); see also Atl. States Legal Found. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1141 (I lth Cir. 1990); PlRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1 158, 1166 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd it1 pclrt, rev'ct in part, 91 3 F.2d 64
(3d Cir. 1990).
"O See inzfrct Part II.A.3.e.
13' See slrpru Part 1.B.2.
'sI Sen. Chaffee explained that:

A single discharge may be a violation of both State and Federal law and a State is
entitled to enforce its own law. However, only if a State has received authorization under section 402 to implement a particular permitting program can it prosecute a violation of Federal law. Thus, even if a non-authorized State takes action
under State law against a person who is responsible for a discharge which also
constitutes a violation of the Federal permit, the State action cannot be addressed
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The absurd plain meaning of "State" in subsection 309(g) thus appears to be drafting error, recognized soon after by the chief sponsor of
the amendment that added subsection 309(g). As written, the provision
encourages violators to seek states that assess paltry penalties in hopes of
shielding themselves from meaningful penalties or even from compliance. At
the very least, this renders the federal penalty provisions super-fluous and,
at the very worst, renders the violated federal requirements meaningless.
These absurd results can and should be avoided by interpreting "State" to
mean a "State with an approved permit program," as suggested by the chief
Senate sponsor of the amendment prior to the Senate vote on the Conference Committee bill. That interpretation is consistent with the structure
and policy of the statute.
Part One came to the opposite result when it considered the issue in
the context of a "State" whose action could bar a citizen suit."' Although
the interpretive choice there was also between "State" and "State with an
approved program," the analytical context was sufficiently different not
to warrant departure from the plain meaning of "State." For example, the
interpretive issue with regard to citizen suits recurs in many statutes, emphasizing congressional intent. With regard to subsection 309(g), however, it
occurs only once. Moreover, generally only state actions for compliance
can bar a citizen suit; but, under 309(g), state-assessed penalties of five dollars can bar subsequent EPA and citizen enforcement. Under the citizen
suit provisions, state actions can bar only citizen suits, but under 309(g),
state actions can bar both citizen suits and EPA actions. In the citizen suit
provisions, no legislative history supports interpreting "State" to mean
"State with an approved program," but under 309(g), the legislative history suggests just that. Thus, the contexts of the issues are sufficiently different to warrant different interpretive results.
b. When Congress Provides that Particular Adrninistrative Penalty
Actions May Bar Successive EPA and Citizen Penalt?, Actions, May
Other Enforcement Actions Bar Them?

Subsection 309(g) specifically states that administrative penalty provisions bar subsequent enforcement, but does not refer to any preclusion
under this subsection produced by other forms of enforcement activity.
Under a plain-meaning reading of subsection 309(g), other forms of en-

to the Federal violation. for the State has no authority over the Federal permit
limitation or condition in question. In such case. the authority to seek civil penalties for a violation of the Federal law under subsections 309(d) or 3 1 I(b) or section 505 would be unaffected by the State action, notwithstanding paragraph
309(g)(6).
133 CONG.REC. 1264 (1987).
13' Miller, sirprn note I, at 433-35.
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forcement would not preclude subsequent enforcement, but many courts
wrongly interpret the preclusion device in subsection 309(g) to provide
that non-penalty state actions may bar successive EPA and citizen suits.
This Section discusses which of these interpretations should be favored.
The plain meaning and expressio unius ("expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others") canons of statutory interpretation both support a plain reading meaning.'34Similarly, Part One concluded that courts
overwhelmingly interpret the preclusion devices in the citizen suit provisions to bar citizen suits only when the government takes an action specified
in the preclusion as barring suit.'" Many courts are true to the plain reading and strong congressional intent that the listed penalty actions and no
other actions bar citizen suits and EPA actions. Other courts, however,
interpret the preclusion to allow all sorts of administrative actions, penalty and non-penalty actions, and formal and informal actions to bar citizen suits. Because the same preclusion device bars successive EPA actions as well as successive citizen actions, their holdings effectively bar any
federal enforcement action under those circumstance^.'^^ That holding
enables a violator to avoid compliance with federal law by the simple expedient of soliciting a paltry penalty assessment or other weak and ineffective action by the state. This is not a chimera; as demonstrated in this Section of the Article, violators do solicit ineffective state action as a sanctuary from compliance actions, and some courts have allowed this practice."'
The statute provides that action taken by EPA under subsection 309(g)
does not affect EPA or citizen authority to enforce the CWA, "except that
any violation" shall not be subject to a "civil penalty action" under sections 309(d), 31 1(b) or 505 if ( I ) EPA "under this subsection" or a state
"under a State law comparable to this subsection" "has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting" an action, or (2) EPA or a state has "issued a final
order" and the violator has paid a penalty assessed "under this subsection, or such comparable State law."'38 The statutory language could not
1 3 WILLIAM
~
N.

ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
323 (1994).
Miller, supra note 1, at 436-45.
In United Stares v. Smithfield Foods, I I I ~ .the
, defendant argued that an earlier state
action barred EPA's action under subsection 309(g), citing as precedent subsection 309(g)
decisions in citizen suits. The Smirhjield court analyzed the issue in the same manner in the
EPA enforcement action as other courts had analyzed it in citizen enforcement actions. 965
F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 191
F.3d 5 16, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
"'See Miller, supra note I , at 465-73 (recounting various weak and ineffective state
"enforcement" actions that defendants contended barred subsequent citizen suits). As one
court commented, "[c]omplete deference to agency enforcement strategy, adopted and implemented internally and beyond public control, requires a degree of faith in bureaucratic
energy and effectiveness that would be alien to common experience." Gardeski v. Colonial
S a n d & StoneCo., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
CWA 5 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. 8 13 19(g)(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). In ongoing penalty actions, the bar is activated only by EPA or a state commencing and prosecuting an action "under this subsection," i.e., subsection 309(g), or "under a State law comparable to this subsection," i.e., a state law comparable to subsection 309(g). Meanwhile, in
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be more clear: only an EPA penalty assessment under the authority of subsection 309(g) or a state penalty assessment under a comparable penalty
authority activates the bar. The legislative history supports the plain English reading of the preclusion language, which originated in the Senate bill.
The Senate report stated specifically that the bar operated "only for the
same violations which are the subject of the administrative civil penalties
pr~ceeding.""~
The questions that arise during a consideration of what enforcement
actions may bar subsequent enforcement differ depending on whether EPA
or state action is alleged to be preclusive. If EPA action is at issue, the
question is whether an EPA compliance or other non-penalty order will bar
EPA or a citizen from commencing a subsequent penalty action. If state
action is alleged to be preclusive, there are more numerous and complex

question^.'^^
i. May EPA Administrative Compliance Orders and Other
Non-penalty Assessment Actions Preclude Successive EPA and
Citizen Actions?
The structure of the CWA provides evidence in regard to the preclusive effect of non-penalty assessment procedures. EPA has two administrative order authorities under different subsections of CWA section 309.
Subsection 309(a) authorizes EPA to issue administrative compliance orders,
not to issue penalty assessment orders. Subsection 309(g) authorizes EPA to
issue penalty assessment orders, not to issue compliance orders. Not only
does each of these two subsections authorize EPA to take very different
types of enforcement actions, each subjects EPA's actions to very different procedural and judicial review regimes.I4' Other sections of the CWA

concluded penalty actions the bar is activated only by EPA or a state issuing "a final order"
and the violator paying a "penalty assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State
law." Again, "this subsection" is subsection 309(g) and a "comparable State law" is one
comparable to subsection 309(g).
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985) (emphasis added).
lWSee irlfrn Part II.A.3.b.(ii).
I J 1 Subsection 309(g) specifies administrative procedures for EPA to follow in issuing
penalty orders and authorizes judicial review of its penalty orders. 33 U.S.C. $ 1319(g)
(2000). Section 309(a) specifies no administrative procedures for EPA to follow in issuing
compliance orders and it does not authorize judicial review of its compliance orders, nor
does section 509, the CWA's general judicial review section. 33 U.S.C. $5 1319(a), 1369
(2000). Indeed, circuit court opinions uniformly hold that no pre-enforcement review is
available for EPA section 309(a) compliance orders. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58
F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995); Reuth v. E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993); S. Pines Assocs. by
Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990); Hoffman Group, Inc. v. E.P.A.,
902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990); City of Baton Rouge v. U.S. EPA, 620 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.
1980). For other examples, see LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Chap. 9:22 and
cases cited therein, at 9-99-9-108 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1987).
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provide EPA with authorities to issue orders addressing violations, although they are neither compliance nor penalty assessment orders.I4?
Because subsection 309(g) explicitly states that only EPA actions under
"this subsection," (i.e., subsection 309(g)), bar suit, it is not surprising
that courts universally have held section 309(a) compliance orders have
no preclusive effect on citizen suits, relying on the plain meaning of the
statute.IJ3 That interpretation also is in accord with the expressio unius
canon of statutory interpretation.I4-l It also follows from the legislative
history, which specifies that only EPA penalty assessments can be preclusive under subsection 309(g).'45It is supported by the fact that, if Congress intended compliance orders to bar successive enforcement, it could
easily have included such a bar, as it did in other statutes.'46Finally, it is
supported by judicial decisions holding that citizen suits are barred only
by the government actions specified in the citizen suit preclusion device.IJ7
No courts have considered whether the subsection 309(g) bar to EPA action or citizen suits can be activated by EPA administrative orders under
other sections of the statute. If a section 309(a) compliance order does not
constitute a bar under subsection 309(g), however, it follows that EPA orders
under other authorities cannot constitute a subsection 309(g) bar either.

I.'? For instance. EPA may order facilities violating the CWA to be barred from federal
contracts or grants. CWA 3 508, 33 U.S.C. (i 1368 (2000); 40 C.F.R. $5 32.1 100-32.1105
(2004). I t also may order abatement of emergencies, regardless of whether they arise from
violations of the statute. CWA (i 504, 33 U.S.C. 9 1364 (2000).
I A 3 In Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, the Ninth
Circuit considered an appeal from the dismissal pursuant to CWA subsection 309(g) of a
citizen suit because EPA had issued a section 309(a) compliance order. l l F.3d 883, 88586 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit reversed. relying on the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 886-87. Other courts considering the question have reached the same result. Old
Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist.. 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109. 1 1 14 (D.
Colo. 1999) (quoting as dicta legislative history asserting that "[tlhis limitation applies
only to an action for civil penalties for the same violations which are the subject of the
administrative civil penalty proceeding," H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986));
Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Haw.
1994) (holding that a section 309(a) compliance order did not bar citizen suit even though
order reserved the right to assess penalties under 3 309(g)); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Fina Oil & Che~n.Co., 806 F. Supp. 145, 146 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (noting that "comparable to
this subsection" in CWA subsection 309(g)(6)(a)(ii) requires interpretation, while "under
this subsection" in subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(i)does not); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert
Corp., 791 F. Supp. 769. 775 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (concluding that the statute's language and
structure "only precludes a citizen's suit if the Administrator is diligently prosecuting an
action for administrative penalties").
IUSee ESKRIDGE,
slrprn note 134, at 323. E.~pre.s.sio~rrli~rs
means that expression of
one thing suggests the exclusion of others.
I A S See slrprn note 1 14 (reviewing the legislative history).
lab Wash. Pub. Interest Research Group, F.3d at 886-87.
'"The vast majority of decisions interpreting the preclusions in the citizen suit sections hold that, when Congress specified one or more government action that could bar a
citizen suit, i t intended that other government actions could not bar a citizen suit. See
Miller, supra note 1 at 436-45.
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ii. May State Adrninisrrative Cornl~licrrzceOrders and Otlzer
Non-penalty Actions Preclude Successive EPA and Citizerl Actions?
The question of what state actions may bar successive EPA and citizen actions is more complex than the question of what EPA actions will bar
them, because of the necessity to determine the meaning of "an action
under a State law comparable to this subsection." The plain meaning of
this phrase is that only a state administrative penalty action taken under a
state authority comparable to subsection 309(g) may bar a successive action.
However, the first court of appeals to consider the matter entirely ignored
the wording of the provision, holding in North and South Rivers Watershed Assn. v. Town of Scituate that the statute should be interpreted in derogation of its wording to protect enforcement choices made by the state.'48
The state order before the court in Sciruare, was an administrative compliance order, not a penalty assessment order. The citizen enforcer argued
that the state authority to issue a compliance order was not comparable to
EPA's authority under subsection 309(g) to issue a penalty assessment
order. Explicitly disregarding the wording of subsection 309(g) and without examining its legislative history, the Court held that the state's administrative compliance order was sufficient to bar the citizen suit under
subsection 309(g) if the state had comparable administrative penalty authority somewhere in its statute. Faced with this, the citizen enforcer argued that the state's unused administrative penalty assessment authority
was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because the state statute did not
require public notice and opportunity to comment on proposed penalty
assessment orders, public participation in the proceedings, and public
rights to appeal similar to those in subsection 309(g). The court dealt cavalierly with this argument in a footnote, apparently finding that the status
of penalty assessment orders as public documents satisfied the public notice
requirement and state regulations allowing intervention in penalty assessment actions "adequately safeguard the substantive interest of citizens in
enforcement actions."'49 Finally, compounding these errors, the court held
that the state action barred all successive actions, not just penalty actions,
again ignoring the wording of the ~ t a t u t e . " ~
The court's excursion from the statute has misled many courts in subsequent decisions and unduly has clouded the proper interpretation of
~'
are three
this element of subsection 309(g)'s preclusion d e ~ i c e . ' There

I J 9 4 9 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991).
M. at 556 n.7.
Id. at 557-58.
Is' Virtually every post-Scirlrote decision cited in this Article for not following the
plain meaning of subsection 309(g) pays homage to Scitirnte. See, e.g., Lockett v. EPA. 319
F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'rl ell
bmlc or1 other grounds, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co..
852 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-1483 (D. Colo. 1994).
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issues in addressing the interpretation of the "comparable state statute"
phrase. What does "comparable" mean? What federal and state laws must
be compared? And must the state use its comparable penalty authority and
assess a penalty to bar a successive action? These questions are the only
issues unique to the preclusion device in CWA subsection 309(g).IS2Before addressing these questions, it is instructive to understand why the Scituate court and those following it stray so far from the plain meaning of
the statute.
The court's errors result from its general approach to citizen suits. The
court assumed it was more important to protect the enforcement choices
made by the state than to examine the wording of the statute. It made this
error by a combined consideration of: (1) the general policy of the CWA
that states have the primary responsibility to combat water pollution;'53
(2) legislative history of the 1972 CWA, cited in Gwalrney, to the effect
that Congress intended states to bring most enforcement actions;'54and
(3) the Supreme Court's observation in Gwalrney that citizen suits are to
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement.ls5This led the
Scituate court to conclude that, when government enforcement action "begins and is diligently prosecuted, the need for citizen's suits van is he^."'^^
To interpret subsection 309(g) consistently with this conclusion required
the court to ignore its plain wording that only EPA and state administrative penalty actions will bar successive citizen actions and that such government actions will bar only successive actions for penalties. The court
rationalized this omission by commenting that the wording of the subsection was merely the "happenstance of statutory drafting,"'57which the court
could disregard to accomplish the court's higher goal of preventing citizens from interfering with the state's enforcement choices. The court appeared oblivious that its logic bars successive EPA actions, enables violators to insulate themselves from compliance with federal law, and is contrary to legislative intent.
Aside from the court's obvious disregard of the plain meaning and
other controlling canons of statutory construction, each of the three supports it offers as a rationale for its approach is significantly in error. First,
the general statement of congressional policy it recites favoring state responsibility for controlling water pollution is only a general preference,
one that Congress explicitly and repeatedly overrode throughout the statute.
For instance, it authorized EPA to establish national technology-based
'sI Other issues are addressed generally in Miller, supra note I at 456-73. See in particular the discussion of what constitutes "diligent prosecution."
'sI CWA 5 IOl(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(b) (2000).
INN.and S. Rivers Watershed Ass'rz, 949 F.2d at 557 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 6 0 (1987) (citing S . REP. NO. 92-414, at 64
(1971), reprirtred ir~2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 1482)).
15s4 8 4 U.S. at 60.
949 F.2d at 555.
Id. at 556.
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standards applicable to sources of water pollution in all states;158establish
criteria for state water quality standards and approve state water quality
standard programs as meeting the federal criteria;Is9 establish national
criteria for state permit programs and approve state permit programs as
meeting the federal criteria;I6O inspect water pollution sources in any
state;I6' and enforce against water pollution sources violating state-issued
permits, in states with EPA approved permit programs, even when the
states have already taken enforcement actions.I6* Indeed, in the citizen
suit provision, Congress also authorized citizens to enforce against violations of state-issued permits in states with approved permit programs,
even when the states have already taken enforcement actions.I6' Thus,
Congress's preference for state implementation of water pollution control
programs is qualified throughout the statute. Its preference for state implementation is also qualified by the wording of the preclusion device in
subsection 309(g).
Second, the Scituare court's use of legislative history quoted in Gwaltney is curious, for the Sciruate court earlier cautioned against uncritical
In any event, the Supreme Court in Gwaltreliance on legislative hist01y.I~~
ney cited Senate Report language from 1972 to interpret section 505, enacted in 1972, not to interpret subsection 309(g), enacted in 1987. Legislative history from 1972 is of no value in determining what a later Congress meant when it enacted subsection 309(g), fifteen years later.165Moreover, the Supreme Court edited the quoted language to change its meaning.166In reality, the report passage addresses EPA enforcement rather than
citizen suits; it never suggests that citizen suits are subordinate to government enforcement. Indeed, it neither states nor implies that citizen suits
are "proper only" under the circumstances the Court states.I6'
Finally, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Gwaltney that citizen suits
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement is flawed because it is based entirely on the same legislative history, as well as for many
other reasons examined in Part One.168Even so, the Scituare court's reli-

CWA Q Q 301, 304,33 U.S.C. $5 131 I, 1314 (2000).
CWA Q Q 303-304, 33 U.S.C. Q Q 1313-1314 (2000).
IMI CWA Q 402(b), 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(b) (2000).
16' CWA Q 308, 33 U.S.C. Q 1318 (2000).
CWA Q 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(3)(2000); see also infra Part I1.C.
16' CWA Q 505, 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000) (authorizing citizens to proceed with
suits in the face of state actions, if the state actions were commenced after the citizen suit,
are not diligently prosecuted, are not judicial actions, or are not calculated to or capable of
securing compliance); see Miller, supra note I, at 435-73.
IN 949 F.2d 552, 556 n.6 (1st Cir. 1991).
16' Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ib6The Court found congressional history supported its conclusion only if it took Senate report language out of context and changed "if' to "only if." Miller, supra note 1, at
487.
I6'See Miller, supra note I, at 487 nn.424-27.
Id. at 488-90 nn.428-38.
Is8
ls9
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ance on G,valtney is misplaced. However questionable Gwnltney's "supplement, not supplant" mantra may be, the Supreme Court only used it in
dicta as a tertiary argument to follobv the plain rneaning of the CWA, while
the Scituate court used it as a primary argument to ignore the plain rneaning
of the CWA, in blatant disregard of Gwaltney's admonition to interpret
the CWA's citizen suit provision in accordance with its plain meaning.'69
The Scituate court concluded from these flawed or misunderstood
points that when a state commences and diligently prosecutes any action
against a violation, the need for a citizen suit disappears. In doing so, the
court disregarded the congressional determination of the circumstances
under which state action makes the need for EPA or citizen suit disappear.
Congress explicitly stated in the plain words of subsection 309(g) when
government action barred successive enforcement action, as it had in the
preclusion devices in the citizen and EPA enforcement provisions of all
of the statutes.
The Scituate court and its followers improperly rewrite the statute,
seeking to preserve the states' enforcement choices, in deference to the
states' enforcement discretion. Those courts perceive that the primary reason
Congress included the preclusion device in subsection 309(g) was to preserve the state governments' enforcement authority. That may be the primary reason Congress included the preclusion devices in the citizen suit
provision^.'^^ Subsection 309(g), however, is not in the citizen suit provision of the CWA and the legislative history of subsection 309(g) indicates the reason Congress included the preclusion device in subsection
309(g) was to prevent the assessment of duplicative penalties for the
same violations.17' Indeed, the legislative history of subsection 309(g)
contains no hint that preservation of the enforcement authority of the government was even a subsidiary purpose of the preclusion device.I7'
In the seminal opinion on the presumption of judicial deference to
the government's enforcement discretion, the Supreme Court cautioned
in Heckler v. Chaney that courts should not defer to such discretion when
Congress circumscribes it.l7' When Congress enacted section 505, it circumscribed the ability of EPA and states to exercise their enforcement
discretion free from the possibility of citizen suits. Under section 505 they
could exercise enforcement discretion unfettered from citizen suits only
Id. at 485 nn.409-12.
For an account of the legislative history of the citizen suit provisions, see id. at
420-25.
See strprrr Part II.A.2.
17' Id. Again, while the intent of the earlier Congress that drafted the preclusion device
in section 505 was to preserve the government's enforcement authority, the intent of the
earlier Congress in drafting section 505 is of no value in determining the intent of the later
Congress that drafted the preclusion device i n subsection 309(g). See s~tpranote 165.
17'470 U.S. 821. 832-33 (1985) ("The preSumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.").
Ibq

17"
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by commencing a civil action in court prior to the initiation of a citizen
suit and by diligently prosecuting the action. And even then EPA could
not exercise its discretion free from citizen intervention in its judicial
a ~ t i 0 n s . lWhen
~ ~ Congress amended section 309 to include subsection
309(g), neither the text nor the legislative history of the new subsection
suggests that it altered the bounds on EPA's or states' discretion to use
other enforcement authorities free from the possibility of citizen suits. In
adding subsection 309(g), Congress carefully bound EPA's and the states'
discretion to assess administrative penalties by prescribing penalty assessment procedures, citizen participation procedures, and judicial review
procedures. Scituate's refusal to give plain meaning to the words of the
statute ignores the bounds that Congress placed on EPA or the state to
exercise its enforcement discretion free from the possibility of citizen
suits or of the state to exercise its enforcement discretion free from the
possibility of EPA or citizen enforcement. It also ignores the legislative
history of subsection 309(g), reiterating the plain language of subsection
309(g) that only penalty actions activate the preclusion, preventing the
government from assessing paltry penalties against continuing and serious violations and thereby insulating violators from actions seelung complia n ~ e .Focus
' ~ ~ on preserving the states' enforcement discretion to act free
from successive enforcement actions by others can be preserved only by
limiting EPA's discretion to commence successive enforcement, for interpreting the preclusion device to bar citizen enforcement also bars EPA enforcement.
Finally, the Scituare court saw no reason to subject the state to duplicative and costly citizen enforcement that could not add to the environmental protection already afforded by the state's enforcement action
and might detract from it. The court recited that the goal of the CWA was
to combat water pollution and concluded that "[d]uplicative enforcement
actions add little or nothing to compliance actions already under way, but
do divert State resources away from remedying violations in order to focus on the duplicative effort."'76 The court found that "[d]uplicative actions aimed at exacting financial penalties in the name of environmental
protection at a time when remedial measures are well under way do not further this goal. They are, in fact, impediments to environmental remedial
efforts."'77The court here seems to promote the congressional purpose of
' ~ ~ in Scituate,
preventing duplicative penalties for the same v i o l a t i ~ n .But
the penalty sought by citizens was not duplicative; the state had not assessed a penalty and did not desire to. The court imposed a preclusion different than Congress imposed in subsection 309(g), one that prevented
171CWA
Q: 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C.5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000).
175 See Miller, srrprn note I , at 430-35.
949 F.2d 552,556 ( l st Cir. 199 1).
177 Id.
17* See strprn Part II.A.2.
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any penalty from being assessed once the state ordered compliance, rather
than one that prevented a duplicative penalty from being assessed once
the state had assessed a penalty. Congress could have established such a
preclusion, but chose not to.
The court was also unaware of the implications of its decision. While it
rightly recognized that requiring compliance is more important than collecting penalties, it was unaware that its holding could shield violators
from compliance as well as penalties in other contexts and that assessing
significant penalties deters non-compliance, a point recognized twice by
the Supreme Court under the CWA.'79 Moreover, the court failed to understand that an EPA or citizen action for penalties is not in conflict with,
does not interfere with, and does not duplicate a state compliance order
that does not assess penalties. A successive EPA or citizen action for compliance could conflict or interfere with an earlier state compliance order
by seeking a different means or schedule of compliance than the state had
imposed. An EPA or citizen action for compliance incorporating the same
terms as an earlier state compliance order would duplicate the states' action. However, an EPA or citizen action for penalties does not involve the
state, does not depart from its compliance order and does not duplicate it.
Although the court commented that the state would be forced to squander
scarce resources by involving itself in a citizen suit, it did not explain why
the state had to involve itself in the citizen suit. The plaintiff was not suing the state, and the citizen suit decisions cited in Part One do not reveal
one instance in which a state intervened in a citizen suit. Indeed, the author is unaware of any such case.
The court also suggested that the assessment of penalties would hinder pollution control. Of course, payment of penalties may divert funds the
violator might otherwise use to attain compliance. But Congress decided
the deterrence benefits of assessing penalties against violators outweigh
detriments imposed on the violators. Moreover, Congress provided for
the eventuality that the violator might not be able to comply if it had to
pay a judicially assessed penalty, by instructing courts to take into account "the economic impact on the violator, and such other matters as
justice may require" when determining the amount to assess.'s0 In the end,
the Scituate court's hostility toward successive actions by citizen enforcers is supported neither by its reasoning nor by wording of the statutes.
Worse, it wrongly substituted its policy choice for the congressional policy choice, manifested in the wording of the subsection 309(g) preclusion
device.
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987).
Ia0CWA 9: 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000). For an instance in which a court considered a penalty previously assessed by the state in establishing the amount of penalty the
court would assess in a citizen suit, see Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.
Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525 (D.N.J. 1993).
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iii. What Actions Under "Comparable" State Law May Bar
Successive EPA and Citizen Penalty Actions?
Thus far, this Section has delved into the preclusive effect of nonpenalty actions by EPA and states and has concluded that non-penalty
actions do not preclude subsequent enforcement under subsection 309(g).
The remaining issue focuses on which actions do have preclusive effect,
and raises three separate but related inquiries. What does "comparable"
mean? What federal law is to be used as a benchmark for comparison? What
state law is to be compared?

( a ) What Does "Comparable" Mean?
The statute does not define "comparable." The dictionary defines it
as "equivalent, similar."ls' Courts rightly point out that it does not mean
" i d e n t i ~ a l . " 'This
~ ~ means the states have some latitude to enact penalty
provisions that vary from the subsection 309(g) model but are still comparable to it. How far they may vary and still be comparable is a knotty
question. The structure of subsection 309(g), however, does provide guidance. Subsection 309(g) establishes three sets of procedures: penalty assessment procedures; citizen participation procedures; and judicial review procedures, all to prevent misuse of the preclusive authority. That
suggests a comparable state provision is one that has all three sets of procedures and that each set of state procedures is approximately the same
as its corresponding set of federal procedure^.'^^
The legislative history does not directly elaborate on the meaning of
"comparable" because the phrase was added to the legislation at the last
minute in the Conference Committee. The tenor of the Senate report, however, does provide some insight into the intended meaning of the term.
The Senate Committee was deeply concerned that EPA not abuse subsection 309(g) authority by assessing lenient penalties for continuing or serious violations warranting injunctions and large penal tie^."^ The Committee crafted several limitations to prevent this. With regard to penalty
assessment procedures, it limited administrative penalty assessments to
WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH
NEWCOLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
267 (9th Ed. 1983).
IR2McAbeev. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1252 (I lth Cir. 2003); Ark. Wildlife
Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994).
18' McAbee, 3 18 F.3d at 1254.
In'

Unlike many of the other paragraphs in section 1319(g), paragraph (6) makes no
references to particular paragraphs within the subsection. Instead, paragraph (6)
refers to the subsection as a whole, which includes not only penalty-assessment
provisions but also public-participation and judicial-review provisions. This is
strong textual evidence that Congress intended courts to consider all three classes
of provisions when deciding whether state law is "comparable. . . ."
I8.'See supra notes 107-1 14 and accompanying text.
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past violations and required that EPA take into account the violator's
economic benefits of non-compliance in determining the penalty to assess.Is5 With regard to public participation procedures, it required public
notice of and opportunity to comment on proposed penalty assessments
and authorized citizen intervention in penalty assessments. With regard to
judicial review, it authorized citizens to appeal as insufficient EPA penalty assessments, even penalties made in the context of judicial settlements between EPA and violators, as long as the citizens meet specified
standards of review.Is6 These public rights, of course, continue to reflect
the strong emphasis on citizen participation that gave rise to the citizen
' ~ ~ the legislative history of the requirements indicates
suit p r o v i ~ i o n s .But
they were crafted to prevent EPA from addressing serious and continuing
violations with paltry penalties instead of injunctions and significant judicially assessed penalties. State penalty assessments, of course, are subject to the same lenient enforcement abuses as EPA penalty assessments.
In view of the Senate Committee's strong intent to prevent such abuse,
the most logical meaning of "comparable" state law is that state law must
have comparable protections against excessively lenient enforcement before it can bar successive EPA and citizens actions. Indeed, Senator Chaffee, chief sponsor of the bill, stated in the Senate debates that a state action could bar an EPA or citizen action "only when a State is proceeding
under a State law that is comparable to subsection 309(g)."'S8 This legislative history supports the same conclusion as suggested by the structure
of the provision.
The limitations the Senate Committee crafted to protect the provision from abuse are easily discernible and fairly objective factors with which
to make a comparability analysis. Not surprisingly, as discussed below,
most courts have focused their comparability analyses on some of these
factors, particularly on the notice and comment and citizen participation
intervention rights. Surprisingly, however, none of their decisions recognize that the legislative history establishes that Congress placed limita-

-

18s

-

Id

I S b If subsection 309(g) penalties are limited to past violations. it may be asked
for n Better Erlviwhether citizens have standing to appeal them under Steel Co. Citizer~s
ronmer~t,which considered the standing of citizens to enforce against a violator for wholly
past violations. 523 U.S. 83 (1998). Because the violation had ceased, the Court concluded
that whatever injury the citizen plaintiffs had suffered from it had also ceased, depriving
plaintiffs of standing. Id. at 106-10. Of course, in appeals under subsection 309(g)(8).
citizens are not suing violators for past violations. but are seeking judicial review of a
present EPA administrative action. They could plead a present and future injury caused by
EPA's failure to assess a sufficient penalty to provide both general and specific deterrence,
which would suffice under Frier~clsof the Er~rth.See 528 U.S. at 185-86.
IS7SeeMiller, slrprrr note I , at 420-25 (discussing the legislative history of the citizen
suit provisions). Citizen participation in the CWA is emphasized in CWA subsection
lOl(e), 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(e) (2000); see Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA. 596 F.2d 720
(7th Cir. 1979).
'" I33 CONG.REC. 1264 ( 1987); see also ir~frnnote 206.
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tions on the 309(g) preclusion to prevent abuse subsection 309(g) penalty
authority by imposing paltry penalties against serious violations.
The Scituate court did not attempt to define what "comparable" means,
except to reject in a footnote the argument that the public notice and participations requirements in the state statute must be identical to the notice
and participation requirements in subsection 309(g).Im It apparently conceded that the state statute must contain such requirement, but applied a
very relaxed test. For instance, it concluded in the footnote that the nature of
penalty assessment orders as public documents provided sufficient public
notice to meet the comparability test. It summarily stated that, as long as
the state statute's provisions "adequately safeguard the substantive interests of citizens in enforcement actions," the comparability test is met.Ig0
That is an enigmatic statement, for the limiting factors in subsection
309(g) are procedural rights, not substantive rights. While in theory government enforcement always protects the substantive rights of its citizens, theory does not approach reality.I9' Recognizing that, Congress limited the preclusion devices to allow some successive enforcement. Nevertheless, some courts have followed Scituate, including the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits.I9'
The most thorough analysis of the issue is in the recent appellate decision, McAbee v. Fort Payne.I9' First, the court determined that subsection
309(g) contained three sets of requirements for comparability: (1) penalty
assessment procedures; (2) public notice and participation provisions; and
(3) judicial review provision^.'^^ Then it examined whether the standard for
comparability should be either (1) "rough comparability" for each set of requirements or (2) a balance of "overall effect[s]," a weaker test. It equated
949 F.2d 552, 556 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991).
Id.
1 9 ' See suprrr note 137.
1y2ArkorlsnsWildlife Federntior1 r? ICIAnrericns, Ilrc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994), followed Scirlrate, holding that state procedures did not have to be precisely the same as subsection 309(g) procedures, "as long as the state law contains comparable penalty provisions which the state is authorized to enforce, has the same overall enforcement goals as
the federal CWA, provides interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to participate at
significant stages of the decision-making process, and adequately safeguards their legitimate substantive interests." Id. at 381-82. While this reference to citizen participation may
appear to be somewhat more true to congressional intent than Scitlmte, it enabled the ArPorrscrs Wildlife court to find a state procedure requiring no pre-order public notice and
comment to be comparable to the federal procedure requiring them. The citizens unsuccessfully contended that Arkansas administrative penalty procedures were not "comparable" to subsection 309(g) because they did not require public notice of or opportunity to
comment on proposed orders and provided citizens only an after the fact opportunity to
intervene. Id. at 381-82; see also Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v.
City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd err bnr~cor7 other grolrrlrls, 224 F.3d
518 (6th Cir. 2000); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-1483 (D.
Colo. 1994) (holding that subsection 309(g) bars CWA citizen suit when state enforces
under its hazardous waste statute); Saboe v. Oregon, 8 19 F. Supp. 9 14 (D. Or. 1993).
l Y s 3 I8 F.3d 1248 (I I th Cir. 2003).
Icl. at 1254.
IXy
Isn
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the balance of "overall effects" test with that adopted by Scituate and its
progeny.195However, it rejected the balance of overall effects test in favor of
rough comparability of each set of requirements for three reasons. First,
the overall effects standard balances "incommensurable values."'96 That
makes it arbitrary, inviting courts to reach different conclusions on similar state provisions. Indeed, such an arbitrary suggestion is no standard at
all. Second, the rough comparability for each requirement standard is
easy to apply and reduces uncertainty for everyone involved.19' Third, the
legislative history explicitly adopts a standard comparing each of the
three requirement^.'^^ Under this standard, the court ruled a state procedure not requiring pre-order public notice and comment was not comparable to subsection 309(g).'99The sixth and Ninth Circuits are roughly in
accord with the decision in Fort P ~ y n e . ~ "
Most courts have dealt seriously with whether state law was comparable to subsection 309(g), placing the burden of proof of comparability
on the defendant pleading the bar.*O1They have split fairly evenly on
whether particular state penalty assessment provisions are comparable to
subsection 309(g), usually focusing on the public notice and citizen participation aspects of the state statutes. One court, for instance, held a state
statute was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because it authorized the
state agency to assess a penalty only with the consent of the violator and
had no provision for citizen participation in the administrative order issuance or for citizen appeal of an assessment order.202Another held that a
state's procedure was not comparable to subsection 309(g) because it did
not require public notice or participation, although it allowed appeal by
persons receiving notice,203quite similar to the Massachusetts procedure
the First Circuit found comparable in Scituare.
Other courts have held that similar state statutes are not comparable
to subsection 309(g).204A number of district courts have found state pen'95 Id. at 1255. The court concluded that Arkansas Wildlife Federatiorl followed Scitrrate in this regard.
196Id.
'91 Id.
"91
18 F.3d at 1255-56.
I w Id. at 1257. The court did, however, find comparable to subsection 309(g) the state's
authority to assess administrative penalties from $100 to $25,000 per violation, capped at
$250,000, with penalty factors similar to the federal factors.
'
M Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000); Citizens for a Better Env't
v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 I 1 l(9th Cir. 1996).
'O' Jones, 224 F.3d at 529; Citizens for a Better Env't, 83 F.3d 1 I 11; Cmty. Ass'n for
Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, No. CY-98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240, at
*6-*7 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp.
Va. 1997), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 525-26
769 (E.D.
(4th Cir. 1999). See also infra notes 203-205.
'02 Smithjeld Foods, 965 F. Supp. at 792-93.
'03 Waste Action Project v. Atlas Foundry & Mach. Co., No. C975082R, 1998 WL
210846, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1998).
'04 Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1182 (D. Idaho 2001); Cmty.
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alty assessment authorities comparable to subsection 309(g), after examining the state authorities and determining they had none of the deficiencies
found in the above decisions.205The decisions turn, in whole or in part,
on the lack of state requirements that the state give public notice of and
opportunity to comment on proposed penalty orders or that states allow
public intervention in administrative penalty assessment proceedings.206
Some courts, however, relying on the Scituate line of reasoning, have
found state authorities comparable to subsection 309(g) despite the state
statute's lack of requirements for public notice, opportunity for comment,
and inter~ention.~~'
The most dramatic split in this regard is between decisions of the circuits holding that "ex-post facto" notice and comment
are and are not comparable to the pre-order notice and comment of subsection 309(g).?08As the Eleventh Circuit rightly points out,
Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't, 2001 WL 1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wa. Feb. 27, 2001);
Lead. Envtl. Awareness Dev. v. Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 at *31
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, No. C-3-95-156, 1996 WL 1670982, at '5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 1996) (determining that citizen participation was neither required nor permissive); Molokai Chamber of
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1405 (D. Haw. 1995); Save Our
Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1133 (D. Haw.
1994); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1992);
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 950 (D.N.J.
1991); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404,
1416 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. Country Place Waste Treatment
Co., 734 F. Supp. 667, 670 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Waste Action Project v. Atlas Foundry &
Mach. Co., No. C975082R, 1998 WL 210846, at * 6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1998).
205 Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (E.D. La. 2001), aff'd, 319 F.3d 678 (5th
Cir. 2003); Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 91 1 F. Supp. 273, 277 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Cal.
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Cal. 1995);
Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, 183 (D. Conn.
1991).
206 For instance, the court in Atlnntic Stcites Legal Folrndatior1 v. Urziversnl Tool &
Stampirlg Co., Ir~c.,735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990), began its analysis with the statement of Sen. Chaffee, one of the authors of subsection 309(g):
[Tlhe limitation of 309(g) applies only where a State is proceeding under a State
law that is comparable to section 309(g). For example, in order to be comparable,
a State law must provide for a right to a hearing and for public notice and participation procedures similar to those set forth in section 309(g) . . . .
Id. at 1415 (quoting 133 CONG.REC.S. 737 (1987)). The court found that state procedures
were not comparable to subsection 309(g) if they required public notice of hearings on
nonconsensual penalty orders, but not of penalty assessments concluded by consent.
'07 Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (D. Or. 1995)
(requiring that state procedures be comparable, not identical; discretionary public notice
enough), rev'd or1 other grourlds, 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.
Supp. 914, 918 (D. Or. 1993) (stating that mandatory public notice is "not necessarily the
sirle qua rlorl of comparability").
'OR McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (I lth Cir. 2003) (holding
"ex-post facto" notice and comment not comparable to the pre-order notice and comment
of subsection 309(g)): Lockett, 319 F.3d 678, 686-87 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding "ex-post
facto" notice and comment comparable to the pre-order notice and comment of subsection
-309(g));Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 5 18, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding "ex-post
facto" notice and comment not comparable); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29
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a right to pre-order participation is markedly different from the
right to post-decision participation. In pre-order proceedings, an
agency has not hardened its position and interested persons are
not subject to the same technical pleading requirements or burdens
of proof that are imposed once the state has issued an order.2w
Such differences in notice and comment requirements "strike at the heart
of whether the statute 'provides interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to participate at significant stages of the decision-making p r o c e ~ s . " ' ~ ' ~
Without public notice, of course, other public participation rights may be
moot. Several courts have held that lack of the right to or denial of citiBut this goes
zen intervention denotes a lack of diligent prose~ution.~"
more toward the comparability of state and federal procedures than it
does to diligent prosecution.
Congress placed procedural requirements on EPA's penalty assessment procedures under subsection 309(g), not just to protect the due process
rights of violators, but also to prevent EPA from assessing insignificant
penalties against serious offenses, thereby insulating the offenders from
significant penalties. The length to which Congress went in this regard is
highlighted by its uniquely providing citizens with the right to seek judicial review of penalties consented to by EPA and violators and to petition
reviewing courts to assess higher penalties. Courts have not recognized
this, which may explain why they focus on the familiar public notice and
intervention requirements as if they were merely normal procedures to
assure government transparency. When it is recognized that these and
other requirements were placed on EPA's procedures not just to promote
transparency of government,"' but to prevent abuse by under-enforcement,
and that such abuse is just as likely from states as from EPA, it is inescapable that state penalty assessment procedures cannot be comparable to
subsection 309(g) without similar requirements to prevent such abuse.
(6) W l ~ aFederal
t
Law Must Be Compared?

The question of which federal law should be the basis of comparison
is answered once again by reference to the plain meaning and structure of
the CWA. The plain meaning of "an action under a State law comparable
F.3d 376, 381-82 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding "ex-post facto" notice and comment comparable).
""McAhee, 318 F.3d at 1257.
"O Id. (quoting Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 29 F.3d at 38 I).
'I1 See Frilling v. Vill. of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995); Love v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation. 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Section I.B.2 of Part One describes the legislative history of the citizen suit provisions, including their role as part of citizen participation in government, in turn a part of
the quest for transparency in government. See Miller, supra note 1. at 420-25.

"'
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to this subsection" in subsection 309(g) is a state administrative penalty
assessment authority having the same characteristics as CWA subsection
309(g). Although the statute does not define "subsection," the nomenclature of federal statutory structure is familiar. A subsection in the United
States Code is a principal subpart of a section and is delineated by a lowercase letter in parentheses. "This subsection," then, defines itself as subsection 309(g).
When Congress drafted section 309 and, later, subsection 309(g), it
was conscious of the differences between the title (Title 33 of the United
States Code), a chapter of the title (the CWA), a section of the chapter (309),
a subsection of the section (309(g)), a paragraph of the subsection (309(g)
(6)), and a subparagraph of the paragraph (309(g)(6)(A)). Indeed, it carefully observed those distinctions and correctly used the different terms
throughout section 309 and subsection 309(g)."3 It is unlikely in this one
instance that Congress intended "this chapter" or "this section" when it
wrote "this subsection." Every court considering whether EPA may bar a
citizen suit by issuing a compliance order under subsection 309(a) has assumed that the bar under subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(i) for an action under
"this subsection" meant subsection 309(g), not the entire Chapter of the
CWA or even the entire section 309.?'' It is extremely unlikely that Congress intended "this subsection" in CWA subsections 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)(iii) to mean anything other than subsection 309(g).
L.

(c.) WIzat State Lcrtt- M L I SBe
~ Conzl?ared?

Once the meaning of "comparable" is understood and a reference
point in federal law established, the question of which state law is to be
compared may be answered by applying the lessons of the foregoing analysis. The "comparable" state law phrases in subsections 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)
and (iii) differ somewhat. In (ii) the phrase is "an action under a State
law comparable" to "this subsection," i.e., subsection 309(g). Because
the only action that EPA can take under subsection 309(g) is to assess an
administrative penalty, the only action that a state could take under a comparable state law would be to assess an administrative penalty. That means,
to be comparable, a state law must provide administrative penalty author? " For instance. i n sectlon 309(a)(l) i t correctly distinguished between "section." and
"subsection." 33 U.S.C. (i 1319(a)(l)(2000). In section 309(a)(2) it correctly distinguished
between "section." "subsection." and "paragraph." 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(a)(2) (2000). In section 309(c)(3). it correctly distinguished between "title," "chapter." "section." "subsection."
"paragraph." and "subparagraph." 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(c)(3) (2000). Apart from subsection
309(g). i t correctly referenced subsections no less than seven times: subsections 309(a)(l)(3). (c)(S)-(6). and (d)-(0. 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(a)(I)-(3), (c)(5)-(6). (d)-(0 (2000). In subsection 309(g) itself. Congress correctly distinguished between "title." "chapter." "section,"
"paragraph." and "subparagraph." 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g) (2000). See McAhee. 318 F.3d at
1255: s~rprrrnote 182.
"4 Srr Miller. .slrprn note I . at 433-35.
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ity. In (iii), the phrase is "a penalty assessed under . . . such comparable
State law." The reference here to a state assessed penalty reinforces the
conclusion that "comparable State law" is administrative penalty authority. Moreover, because (iii) refers to "such" comparable state law, and the
only antecedent reference to a "comparable state law" is in (ii), both phrases
refer to the same state administrative penalty authority. The remaining
questions are: (1) whether the state administrative penalty assessment authority must be embedded in the enforcement provision of its water pollution statute, as subsection 309(g) is embedded in the enforcement provision of the CWA; (2) whether the state must actually use that authority
to bar subsequent EPA and citizen actions; and (3) what is a penalty?
The Scituate court suggested the comparable state authority could be
~'~
found outside the state's water pollution enforcement p r o v i s i ~ n . Some
, courts have followed Scituate by looking outside the state's penalty assessment authority for public participation and judicial review provisions
applicable to that authority.216Other courts have rejected Scituate and looked
It does no violence to the compaonly within the relevant state pro~ision.~"
rability requirement for public participation, procedural, and judicial review requirements comparable to those in subsection 309(g) to be located
in state statutes outside the state's water pollution enforcement provisions,
as long as those requirements apply to the state's assessment of penalties
for violations of its water pollution statute. Of course, if a state has comparable public participation, procedural, and judicial review requirements
outside its water pollution enforcement provisions and those requirements do not apply to the state's assessment of penalties for violations of
its water pollution statute, the state does not have a water pollution violation penalty assessment authority comparable to subsection 309(g). The
wording and structure of subsection 309(g) indicate that the citizen participation and judicial review procedures must relate to the state's water
pollution administrative penalty assessment procedures to be comparable
to subsection 309(g). Moreover, the legislative history makes it clear that
the purpose of requiring citizen participation and citizen appeal of penalty amounts is to prevent paltry penalty assessments for water pollution

n5 9 4 9 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991). The court reasoned that:
It is enough that the Massachusetts statutory scheme, under which the State is
diligently proceeding, contains penalty assessment provisions comparable to the
Federal Act, that the State is authorized to assess those penalties, and that the
overall scheme of the two acts is aimed at correcting the same violations, thereby
achieving the same goals.

n6 Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2000). In McAbee, the
court noted and discussed the issue, but concluded it need not decide i t . 3 18 F.3d at 1255
n.8.
"'Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 17-18 (9th Cir.
1996).
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violations where more aggressive enforcement is
That purpose
could not be served unless the citizen participation and judicial review
provisions in the state law applied to the state's water pollution administrative penalty assessment procedures.
( d ) Must the State Use Its "Comparable Authority" To Bar a
Successive EPA or Citizen Penalty Action?

If a state must have legal authority comparable to subsection 309(g)
to preclude an EPA or a citizen enforcement action, it follows that the state
must use that authority to preclude an EPA or a citizen action. Surprisingly,
a line of cases has reached contrary conclusions. This Section will elucidate the proper interpretation of this issue.
The plain meaning of subsection 309(g) limits preclusion to situations in which the state "has commenced . . . an action under a State law
comparable to this s u b ~ e c t i o n . " ~If' ~a state has an administrative penalty
authority that is comparable to subsection 309(g), but uses an administrative compliance order authority that is not comparable, it simply has not
"commenced an action under a State law comparable" to subsection
309(g). The compliance order authority cannot be comparable to subsection 309(g), even if it theoretically has comparable citizen participation
and judicial review provisions, because it has no administrative penalty assessment procedures. Moreover, compliance order authority could not have
citizen participation and judicial review provisions comparable to those
in subsection 309(g), because the latter are tailored to participating in
and appealing decisions regarding penalty amounts.220
This is emphasized by the parallel structure of the clauses dealing with
EPA and state actions. The preclusion of EPA and citizen penalty actions
applies only for a violation
(i) with respect to which the Administrator . . . has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under this subsection,
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsection, or
(iii) for which the Administrator . . . or the State has issued a final
order not subject to further judicial review and the violator has
paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such comparable State law . . . .22 1

"8

39

"'

See supra Part II.A.2.
CWA Q 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2000).
CWA 3 309(g)(4)(c), (8), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(4)(c), (8) (2000).
CWA 5 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)(6)(A).
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Clauses (i), dealing with EPA actions, and (ii), dealing with state actions,
are exactly parallel, except that (i) ends with "under this subsection7' while
(ii) ends with "under a State law comparable to this subsection." Every
court considering clause (i) has held that it refers only to EPA administrative penalty actions.??' The plainest and most logical reading of the
parallel state provision is that clause (ii) also refers only to administrative
penalty actions. Of course, it is a familiar canon of statutory construction
that similar terms in a statute should be interpreted in the same way.'?"
Clause (iii) is even clearer, for it uses the same operative words for both
EPA and state assessed penalties that have been paid. The structure of the
paragraph admits no other reading than that it bars duplicative EPA or
citizen enforcement only when the state assesses an administrative penalty.
Moreover, the legislative history of subsection 309(g) indicates the
intent of Congress was to prevent EPA from abusing the authority to assess paltry penalties against continuing or serious violations warranting
judicial action for injunctions and severe penalties.'?' It would make no
sense for Congress to allow citizens to act to prevent EPA from this practice, but not to allow citizens and EPA to act to prevent states from doing so.
The first court of appeals decision to consider the issue, North and
South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, however, held
that a state administrative action need not be an action taken under state
authority comparable to subsection 309(g) to bar a citizen suit under subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), as long as the state has comparable administrative penalty assessment authority somewhere in its arsenal.??%s discussed
above, the court was far less interested in interpreting the words of the
statute than in forwarding its policy of deferring to state enforcement
decisions. Other courts have followed its lead, relying on the absence of
the word "penalty" in (ii)."(' They ignore the unanimous precedent that an
EPA subsection 309(a) compliance order does not bar a citizen suit under
(i), even though (i) also omits the word "penalty" and EPA obviously has
subsection 309(g) authority elsewhere in its arsenal. The inclusion or
omission of the word "penalty" in (i) and (ii) does not bear on this issue
because subsection 309(g) is an authority to issue penalty orders and nothing
else. There is no reason for (i) and (ii) to mention "penalty," because they
both describe the government's ongoing administrative action, and under
subsection 309(g) or a comparable state authority, that action can only be

"'See supra Part II.A.3.b.(i).

See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 324.
"-'See srcpra Part II.A.2.
"j

949 F.2d 552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991).
United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 792 n.34 (E.D. Va. 1997),
off 'd it1 pcrrr, rev'd irl part 011 other grourlcls, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 525-26 (4th Cir. 1999); Sierra
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1484-85 (D. Colo. 1994); Atl. States Legal
Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1187-89 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
"5

"6

Heinonline - - 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 52 2005

20051

Theme a n d k r i a t i o n s in Statutory Preclusiot~.~

assessment of a penalty. Congress used "penalty" in (iii) to describe the
violator's compliance with the government's penalty order, not to describe the purpose or contents of the government's action. The evident
purpose of "penalty" in (iii) is to limit the preclusion in completed actions to instances in which the violator is not a scofflaw, but actually has
paid the penalty assessed. There is no inconsistency in interpreting (i),
(ii) and (iii) all to refer only to penalty orders; indeed, it is the only consistent interpretation, for there is no discernable reason for completed
administrative proceedings under (iii) to preclude subsequent enforcement actions only if the violator actually pays a penalty, when ongoing
administrative proceedings under (ii) may preclude concurrent enforcement where the government is not attempting to assess a penalty.
Indeed, the court in Scituate admitted as much. "[A] narrow reading
of section 309(g)(6)(A) . . . turns on the logistical happenstance of statutory drafting."??' The theme and variations nature of the preclusion device
that Congress used throughout the EPA and citizen enforcement provision of the environmental statutes makes it clear that the words Congress
used in the preclusion device reflect its intent rather than "happenstance."
The decision admits that it simply ignored the words of the statute to follow the court's policy choices.
A few pre-Scit~iatecourts had reached similar results, relying on
~
courts have foldeference to the state's enforcement d i s c r e t i ~ n . "Other
lowed Scituate.'" Some courts have taken the Scituate line of reasoning
to extremes to hold that virtually any action on the part of the state will
bar a citizen suit.''0 The Scituate court and its followers focus exclusively
on what they term the secondary nature of citizen suits, compounding the
illogic of the Court's reasoning in Gwaltney by ignoring the Supreme
Court's primary plain meaning rationale for its holding in that decision
and the importance it placed on the conclusion that only government actions for compliance could bar citizen suits. They also fail to see that their
rulings make EPA a secondary enforcer as well, for the subsection 309(g)
preclusion applies to EPA in the same manner as it does to citizen actions. However, it is not credible that Congress intended to make EPA a
secondary enforcer when its avowed purpose in enacting subsection 309(g)
949 F.2d at 556.
Conn. Coastal Fisherrnen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.. Inc.. 777 F. Supp. 173.
183-86 (D. Conn. 1991): N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation.
772 F. Supp. 162. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991):Atl. Strrtes Legrrl Fotrr~d..Irlc., 682 F. Supp. at 1189.
'"For a similar case. see Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investments Co.. 904 F.
Supp. 1 177 (D. Or. 1995). rell'd, 94 F.3d 5 14 (9th Cir. 1996).
"O In Willitr~rlsPipe Line Co. I: Bayer Corp.. for instance. the state had issued a series
of directives to a permit violator to investigate and remediate the violations. The record did
not disclose whether the directives "were written or oral, or their specific content." 964 F.
Supp. 1300. 1320 n. 17 (S.D. Iowa 1997). The court held that "a citizens suit [sic] may be
barred even absent formal administrative proceedings where . . . the state has authority to
issue orders and assess penalties for violations but chooses instead to order compliance
and settle informally with the violator." Id. at 1322.
'?'

"*
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was to strengthen EPA enforcement. Indeed, the legislative history contains not one hint that it intended to make EPA enforcement secondary.
These decisions ignore the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of
Congress, in favor of policies of their own, to the detriment of achieving the
goals of the CWA.
The Ninth Circuit, in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil
Company of California, I ~ c . , ' ~provided
'
an accurate analysis of the wording
and structure of subsection 309(g)(6)(A) to reject the holding in Sciruate.
The court rejected, for three reasons, the Scituate holding that the subsection 309(g) bar on citizen suits applied when the state had administrative
penalty authority comparable to subsection 309(g) somewhere in its ar~ e n a l . First,
' ~ ~ the plainest reading of the statute is that when subsection
309(g)(6)(A)(iii) bars an action because a state "assessed [a penalty] under this subsection, or such comparable State law," the state must have assessed the penalty under a comparable state law to activate the bar.233Second, subsection 309(g)(4) requires that EPA administrative penalty assessment proceedings have a list of procedural safeguards for the respondent and for other interested parties.*" The court was right; the legislative
history demonstrates that Congress included the safeguards in subsection
309(g) to prevent the government from abusing its enforcement discretion
by issuing lenient penalties for serious ongoing violations rather than requiring compliance, an abuse that may be made by either state or federal enf o r c e r ~ . ? 'To
~ be comparable to subsection 309(g), state administrative
penalty procedures must contain such safeguards. The requirement that
comparable state provisions contain safeguards against abuse by enforcers would be meaningless if the state uses non-comparable authorities
lacking such safeguards to bar subsequent enforcement. This reasoning applies even if the safeguards were provided when the state used the comparable enforcement authority in some other case.
Finally, the court concluded that a contrary result would cause state
actions to be more preclusive than EPA actions, since only EPA actions
assessing penalties would bar a citizen suit, while all state administrative
orders, whether assessing a penalty or not, would preclude citizen suits as
long as the state had an unused comparable penalty authority somewhere
in its arsenal.?" Indeed, EPA filed an amicus brief making just that point."'
Although not noted by the court, the ultimate consequences of its third
line of reasoning are even more persuasive. If, as some courts hold, any

"' 8 3 F.3d 1 1 1 I (9th Cir. 1996). See also Knee Deep Cattle Co., 9 4 F.3d at 516 (following Urliorl Oil in holding that a state must actually use its penalty authority to bar a
citizen suit under subsection 309(g)).
8 3 F.3d at 1 1 18.
zn Id,
2'4 Id.
See Miller, strpra note I , at 445-49.
"6 Citizens for a Better Env't., 83 F.3d at 1 1 18.
237 Id. at 1 I 18-20.
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state order or action could bar citizen suits or EPA actions, it would make
both citizens and EPA secondary enforcers. By enacting subsection 309(g),
however, Congress intended to strengthen EPA's enforcement authority
by giving it a new remedy, rather than to curtail its enforcement authority
by allowing the states to oust its enforcement authority with ineffective
actions. The Senate Committee envisioned that the new authority would
increase the number of EPA enforcement actions, adding new administrative penalty actions to an undiminished number of civil actions and continuing administrative penalty orders.238Many courts have no trouble following Citizens for a Better Environment, easily discerning that the plain
reading of the statute mandates its result and recognizing that state administrative compliance order authorities are no more comparable to subsection 309(g) than is EPA's own compliance order authority in subsection
309(~i).~~~
The court also held that not only must the state use its comparable
administrative penalty authority to invoke the subsection 309(g) preclusion to bar a citizen suit or an EPA action, the state must also assess a penalty and be diligently pursuing the penalty under subsection 309(g)(6)(A)
(ii) or have finally assessed a penalty that the violator pays under subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(iii).

( e ) What Is a Penalty?
In many cases, violators agree to perform good works in lieu of
payments to the government, and seek to use these works as a shield against
subsequent enforcement. This practice raises the question of whether these
See the discussion in srrpra Part II.A.2.
'39Natural Res. Def. Council v. NVF Co., No. 97-496-SLR, 1998 WL 372299. at "12
(D. Del. June 25, 1998) (holding that state monitoring of voluntary action was not assessment of a penalty to invoke the subsection 309(g) bar); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (D.N.M. 1995) ("Defendants, and many courts,
wish to read more into the citizen suit bar of this subsection than exists. Although their
desire is well-founded, and their policy goals are laudable, their vision cannot be reconciled with the literal terms of the statute."). The preclusion is narrowly drawn to operate
only if the state has commenced and is diligently assessing a penalty or has assessed a
penalty that has been paid. See also Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai),
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995) (determining that the state must assess a penalty to
bar citizen suits); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822
F. Supp. 174, 184 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that subsection 309(g) does not bar citizen suita
when the state assessed no penalty). The most recent of this line of decisions, Old Tirner.
Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central Ciry Sanitation District, summarized the case law on both sides
of the issue and examined the evolution of the enforcement provisions of the statute to
reach its conclusion. 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 1999). In particular, it quoted remarks
of Sen. Chaffee, one of the primary drafters of subsection 309(g) and a conferee in reconciling the House and Senate versions of the provision. He repeated in different terms the
basic tenet that citizen suits are precluded "where the Federal Government or a State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an admi~~istrative
civil penalfy action." Id. at
1 1 14 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting 133 CONG.REC. 1264 (1987)). See also Knee
Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 9 4 F.3d 5 14, 5 16 (9th Cir. 1996).
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good works may be considered penalties under subsection 309(g). The
CWA does not define "penalty." The Miscellaneous Receipts Act, how? ~ ~ leads to the
ever, requires that penalties be paid to the T r e a s ~ r y , which
inference that a payment resulting from a subsection 309(g) or other action is a penalty only if it is in the form of a payment to the Treasury, unless
Congress otherwise provide^.?^' Good works are therefore not penalties,'42
although they may have a role to play in settlements of enforcement actions in addition to penalties."' Violators may also wish to make payments
to the Treasury but avoid the opprobrium associated with the payment of
a "penalty" by calling it something else. Faced with this, one court stated
that the violator "simply 'cannot have it both ways,"' and held that a payment defendant went to great lengths to have characterized as a payment
rather than a penalty, was not a penalty.'w This seems fair, for a penalty
must have some stigma to meet its objective of deterrence. Moreover, a defendant may secure benefits from disgorging its assets in forms other than
penalties.'45
Whether the violator's payment is a penalty turns on the same two
principles whether it results from an EPA or state action: the payment must
be to the Treasury (or the state equivalent) and good works do not qualify. Some state statutes require that violators pay penalties into a special
fund for environmental improvement rather than into the state trea~ury."~
Such payments are denominated penalties by the state statutes and thus
carry the appropriate opprobrium for stigma purposes. And while they eventually may be applied to environmental good works, they are applied at a
time and manner of the state's discretion; thus, the violator cannot claim a

9: 3302(c)(l) (2000).
did provide in the CAA citizen suit provision subsection 304(g)(2). 42
U.S.C. 9 7604(g)(2) (2000). that courts could direct that up to $100.000 of civil penalties
assessed in citizen suits could be "used in beneficial mitigation projects which are consistent with this chapter and enhance the public health or the environment."
"'See Sierra Club v. Elec. Controls Design. Inc.. 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
IJ'CAA subsection 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9 7604(g)(2) (2000) is a limited departure
from the Miscellaneous Receipts Act requirement that penalties be paid to the Treasury.
The other citizen suit provisions, e.g.. CWA # 505. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000). contain no
comparable exceptions to the general rule. It is common. however. for consent decrees to
contain agreements by defendants to undertake such good works as an offset against what
otherwise would be a penalty payment to the Treasury. Citizen enforcers. more concerned
with improving the local environment than enriching the Treasury. are especially amenable
to such offsets. EPA and the Department of Justice call such good works Supplemental
Environmental Projects ("SEPs") and will agree to them in consent decrees under conditions elaborated in EPA policy on the subject. See the discussion of SEPs in 2 ENVTI..L.
INST..LAWOF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
9-237-9-240 (Sheldon N. Novick et al. eds..
2004).
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 16 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting plaintiff's brief).
x5 The payment of penalties may not be tax deductible, while payments for good works
may be.
'*See, e.g., CAL.WATERCODE5 13385(n)(l) (West 2004); LA. REV.STAT.ANN. Q: 30:
2205 (West 2004); N.C. GEN.STAT.9: 130A-306 (2004).
?'O

3 1 U.S.C.

?a' Congress

'''
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reputational benefit from any resulting environmental improvement. Such
payments should be considered penalties for CWA subsection 309(g) purposes.

c. When Must the Government Commence a Subsection 309(g)
Action To Bar a Successive EPA or Citizen Penalty Action?
In addition to the question of which types of enforcement actions result in preclusions, it is necessary to determine when these actions must be
undertaken by the enforcer to remain within the ambit of subsection 309(g).
Subsection 309(g)(6)(B) lifts the preclusion against citizen penalty actions if the citizen files suit either (1) prior to the commencement of "an
action under this subsection7' or (2) if "an action under this subsection7' was
commenced after the citizen gave notice of his section 505 action and
filed his complaint prior to 120 days after the notice.247
The first part of this bar-lifting provision is comparable to the provision in the citizen suit section that the bar is activated only if the government commences its action before the citizen commences an action.
Courts interpreting the citizen suit provisions have routinely held that
government actions filed after the commencement of the citizen suit do
not bar the citizen
Courts considering the issue under subsection
309(g) come to the same c o n c l u ~ i o n . Working
'~~
together with the notice
requirement of section 505, the first part of this bar lifting provision has
the same effect as the notice and bar provision of section 505, discussed in
Part One.250Together, they encourage government enforcement by giving
the government notice that the citizen is about to act, allowing the government free rein if it acts first, and giving the government sixty days in
which to act first. If the government does not act within that time, the
citizen is free to proceed.
The second part of this bar-lifting provision is less deferential to
government enforcers than the comparable provisions of the citizen suit
section; it allows citizens to proceed even if the government does commence a penalty action before the citizen suit is filed, as long as the citi'
zen served its notice before the government commenced its a ~ t i o n . ' ~This
actually undercuts the intended purpose of the section 505 preclusion device. The purpose of the notice is to encourage government enforcement,
and the purpose of the bar is to give the government free rein if it re33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B) (2000).
Miller, suprcr note I, at 449-52.
'49 Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 (M.D. Ga.
2001); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-39
(D.N.J. 1993).
Miller, supra note I, at 449-52.
"' Alrarnaha Riverkeepers, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 8 17 F. Supp. 1 164, 1 172 (D.N.J. 1993); Mass. Pub.
Interest Research Group v. 1CI Americas, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Mass. 1991).
247
'4X
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sponds to the notice within sixty days by commencing and diligently prosecuting an enforcement action.?52The subsection 309(g) variant provides
less encouragement of government enforcement, because it does not always give the government free rein if it commences its action within
sixty days after the citizen suit notice.253The legislative history of subsection 309(g) does not explain this divergence from the delay and bar elements
of the citizen suit preclusion. The divergence probably reflects the relatively lenient nature of the subsection 309(g) sanction.
The main questions with subsection (B)'s lifting of the bar are whether:
(1) the bar against citizen suits is lifted by state actions as well as by EPA
actions, and (2) the bar against EPA actions is lifted in the same manner
as for citizen actions. As for the first question, subsection 309(g)(6)(B)
lifts the bar for actions "under this subsection" in specified circumstances. EPA penalty assessments, of course, are "under this subsection"
and the bar is accordingly lifted for them under those circumstances.
Most courts assume, without analysis, that the bar is also lifted for state
penalty assessments under the same circumstance^.^^^ A plain reading of
the statute, however, suggests that it lifts the bar on citizen suits only for
EPA penalty assessments. It applies only to penalty actions "under this
subsection," subsection 309(g), not a provision of state law. If states impose administrative penalties, they do so using their comparable state authority, not using the federal subsection 309(g) authority. To interpret
subparagraph (B) as lifting the bar for state action is to read "under this subsection" as if it read "under this subsection or comparable state law."
This, of course, ignores the plain meaning of "under this subsection," and
the fact that Congress used "under this subsection or comparable State
law" elsewhere in subsection 309(g) when it intended that meaning.

'5'See Miller, supra note 1, at 421-23 (noting legislative history establishing encouragement of government enforcement as the purpose of the notice and delay provision).
'53 CWA 8 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(6) (2000).
'"Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1996); Ark.
Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994); Altanlaha
Riverkeepers, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry
Bosma Dairy, No. CY-98-3011, 2001 WL 1704240, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2001); Kara
Holding Corp. v. Getty Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Old
Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1 1 13-15 (D.
Colo. 1999); N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, No. C 97-4263.CRB.
1998 WL 886645 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1998); Natural Res. Def. Council v. NVF Co., No.
97-496-SLR, 1998 WL 372299, at *I 1 (D. Del. June 25, 1998); Sierra Club v. Hyundai
Am., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178-79 (D. Or. 1997); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 852
F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Colo. 1994); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (D.N.J. 1993); Pub. Interest Research Group
of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., No. 89-3146, 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J. May 17, 1990);
Mass. Pub. Interest Research Group v. ICI Americas, Inc. 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D.
Mass. 1991); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Yates Indus., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 438,
444-45 (D.N.J. 1991), recorzsideratiorz denied irl part arzd grarlted in part or1 other
grounds, 790 F. Supp. 5 1 1 (D.N.J. 1991).
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Noting this, the court in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
v. City of West Sacramento held that the bar against citizen suits was
lifted only for federal penalty assessments, not for state penalty assessm e n t ~ . "It
~ conducted an exhaustive review of the legislative history of the
subsection and could find no discussion or indication of what Congress
intended by omitting reference to state actions in subsection 309(g)(6)(B) or
that it intended to omit it. The court acknowledged the omission could
have been a result of inadvertence, a drafting error, or a deliberate choice
on federalism grounds.256Although most courts considering the matter have
assumed the bar-lifting provision applies to state as well as EPA actions,
California Sportfishing rightly noted that they made this assumption without
analysis or acknowledgment of the apparent plain meaning of the stat~ t e . The
~ ~ 'one court examining the California Sportfishing analysis rejected it as leading to absurd results.258Indeed, the results are worse than
that court recognized, as the discussion in the following paragraphs makes
clear.
Subsection (B) lifts the bar only for subsequent citizen actions, not
for subsequent EPA actions. No matter when a state commences a penalty action, it will bar an EPA or citizen judicial penalty action, as long
as the state diligently prosecutes it. Curiously, it bars EPA only from
seeking judicial assessment of a penalty under subsection 309(d), not EPA
assessment of an administrative penalty under subsection 309(g). Read literally, however, subsection 309(g) gives states the ability to thwart the use
of penalties as deterrents under the CWA because the small cap on subsection 309(g) penalties virtually eliminates its use as a deterrent of serious violations. Reading the provision as some courts do, it also gives
states the ability to thwart the use of injunctive remedies to require comp l i a n ~ e . 'Under
~ ~ their interpretation, a state may refrain from acting while
EPA or a citizen proceeds with a compliance action, wait until the eve of
trial or even until the defendant has rested its case, and only then commence and diligently pursue an insignificant administrative penalty action under authority comparable to subsection 309(g) to bar EPA or citizen action for significant penalties or to secure compliance, at least for the
same violations for which the state assessed the penalty.
There is no apparent reason on the face of the statute or in the legislative history of subsection 309(g) that the assessments should have such
different effects depending on which level of government makes them.
Indeed, the legislative history emphasizes the congressional intent to
905 F. Supp. 792, 802-03 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
It was probably inadvertence or a drafting error, because the preclusive effect of
state actions was an addition to the amendment made at the last minute in the Conference
Committee. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2.
lS7 905 F. Supp at 802 n. 10.
258 Sierrcc Club,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1 182.
259 See irzfru Part II.A.3.e.
2ss
lS6

Heinonline - -

29

Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.

59 2005

60

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 29

strengthen EPA's enforcement authorities and not to weaken citizen enf o r ~ e m e n tA. ~similar
~~
omission in subsection 309(g)(7) does additional
damage. It provides that EPA penalty assessments do not affect the violator's obligation to comply with the CWA. If it is interpreted by giving
meaning to the paragraph's failure to mention state penalty assessments,
the subsection may mean state penalty assessments could affect a violator's obligation to comply with the CWA. Indeed, a literal reading of paragraphs (g)(6) and (7) leads to surprising results. Commencement and
diligent prosecution by EPA of a subsection 309(g) penalty has the following consequences: (1) EPA may not seek penalties under other CWA authorities; (2) citizens may not seek penalties in citizen suits, unless they
commenced their action within the prescribed times; and (3) violators paying penalties must still comply with the CWA. Commencement and diligent prosecution by a state of a penalty under state law comparable to subsection 309(g) would have the following consequences: (1) EPA may not
seek penalties under subsection 309(d), but it may under subsection 309(g);
(2) citizens may not seek penalties in citizen suits, even though they filed
the suits long before the state commenced its penalty action;Bnd (3) violators paying state penalties may no longer be obligated to comply with
the CWA.
The end result is that a violator who would have to spend millions of
dollars to comply may be able to insulate itself from compliance or any significant penalty by paying a minimal administrative penalty to the state under comparable administrative penalty authority. This is an absurd result that
undermines implementation and enforcement of the CWA. It turns a provision that Congress intended to increase EPA's enforcement abilities and
to increase the number of EPA enforcement actions into a provision that
makes EPA a distinctly secondary enforcer.
An examination of the legislative history of the provision demonstrates
that Congress did not intend these results and that they were inadvertent,
resulting~fromlast-minute redrafting of the provision- to include comparable state actions in the preclusion device.261The results are absurd, and
"Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intendedto both spur and supplement government enforcement actions. They have deterred violators
and achieved significant compliance gains." S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985); see also slrpra Part II.A.2 (discussing the legislative history of CWA subsection 309(g)).
26' The Senate bill contained essentially the same language as subsection 309(g)(6)(A),
but it included no reference to state penalty assessments under comparable state law. S.
REP. 99-50, at 101-02 (1985). The House bill provided essentially the language of subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), with no reference to section 505, but would have amended section
505 to bar citizen suits if EPA or a state "has commenced and is diligently pursuing the
assessment of a civil penalty under section 309(g) of this Act." H . R . REP. NO. 99-189, at
91, 103 (1985).
Moreover, the Senate bill contained nearly the same language as subsection 309(g)(6)(B).
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 101-102 (1985). The House bill did not, but it included a provision
to the effect that EPA was not authorized to assess a subsection 309(g) penalty if the state
had already assessed an "appropriate" penalty. H . R . REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985). The
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the statute should be interpreted to avoid them.262The easiest way to avoid
those absurd results is to interpret the remainder of subsection 309(g) preclusions in accordance with their plain meaning-not to interpret them to
bar injunctive actions for compliance instead of just actions for penalties.263Congress should amend subsection 309(g) to eliminate this and the
other anomalies in the provision discussed in this Article.
Whether a government penalty proceeding bars a successive action
depends on when the government "has commenced" the action and whether
it is diligently prosecuting it. Subsection 309(g) does not define "has commenced." It does, however, require EPA to notify both the violator and
the public of proposed penalty assessment orders and offer them the opportunity to comment and request a hearing prior to issuing the penalty
assessment order.261EPA has promulgated regulations establishing procedures for penalty assessments, including filing an administrative complaint.26s Part One of this Article concluded that EPA "commences" an
administrative penalty proceeding when it files an administrative complaint with the Regional Hearing Clerk pursuant to the agency's Consolidated Rules of Practice.266When does a state commence its penalty assessment proceeding? States are not bound to follow EPA's procedural regulations to have comparable penalty assessment authorities. They are, however, required to have comparable authorities, including comparable penalty assessment procedure^.^^' Therefore, a state commences its proceedings by a preliminary filing giving notice of the agency's intent to issue a
penalty assessment order. Exactly what the filing is will depend on the
particulars of the state's procedures.
Some courts have held that the issuance of a negotiated consent order
commences a state proceeding.268Their conclusions are erroneous for several reasons. First, the "has commenced" language is found in section

House bill also incorporated language that was virtually identical to subsection 309(g)(7).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-189, at 103 (1985). Thus, the Senate bill addressed duplicative penalties
by EPA and citizens, but not by states and EPA or citizens. The House bill addressed duplicative penalties by EPA and states, but not between citizens and EPA or states. The Conference Committee attempted to combine the two by adding references to state penalty actions
in subsection 309(g)(6)(B) and (7). The execution, however, was less than precise.
262 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
263 See infra Part II.A.3.e.
2M CWA 5 309(g)(2), (4). 33 U.S.C. 5 13 19(g)(2), (4) (2000).
265 See 40 C.F.R. $ 5 22.1L.30 (2003).
266 See Miller, supra note 1, at 452-56.
267 Congress specified penalty assessment procedures, public participation procedures
and judicial review procedures to prevent EPA from abusing subsection 309(g) authority
by assessing small penalties for continuing, serious violations rather than seeking compliance injunctions and serious penalties. This concern and the specifics of the procedures are
strong "evidence that Congress intended courts to consider all three classes of provisions
when deciding whether state law is 'comparable.' . . . " McAbee v. Fort Payne, 318 F.3d
1248, 1254 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
268See,e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1251 n.6; Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc.,
29 F.3d 376, 379-89 (8th Cir. 1994).
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309(g)(6)(A)(i) & (ii), where it is followed by "and is diligently prosecuting." "Is diligently prosecuting" is in the present tense, indicating the
proceeding must be ongoing, not concluded for clauses (i) or (ii) to apply.269This is emphasized by subsection 309(g)(6)(A)(iii), using the past
tense "has issued a final order" and "has paid a penalty," indicating the
proceeding must be concluded and the defendant must have paid the penalty for clause (iii) to apply, and the defendant must have paid the penalty
for the clause to apply. If the negotiated consent order is a penalty assessment order and the violator has paid the penalty, there is nothing for
the government to do to diligently prosecute the order. If the negotiated consent order is a compliance or other non-penalty order, there may be much
for the government to do to diligently prosecute it, but that is not the sort
of order that bars successive prosecution under subsection 309(g), as recognized by other
d. How Diligently Must the Government Prosecute a CWA
Subsection 309(g) Action To Bar a Successive EPA or Citizen
Penalty Action?

The mere initiation of an applicable enforcement action within the timing restrictions is not sufficient to preclude subsequent enforcement. Instead, the enforcer must continue to diligently prosecute the violation.
The analysis of the meaning of diligent prosecution is slightly different
for CWA subsection 309(g)(6) than in the preclusions in the citizen suit
sections, but in both, the tense of the provision affects interpretation. Paragraph 309(g)(6) provides a bar in (i) and (ii) if EPA or the state "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an administrative penalty action and in (iii) if either regulator "has issued" a final order and the violator "has paid" a penalty. The same "has commenced and "diligently prosecuting" test in the citizen suit preclusions applies only to ongoing prosecutions, for "diligently prosecuting" is in the present tense. Its present
tense meaning in the citizen suit provisions is emphasized by its close
juxtaposition to the past tense "has commen~ed."~~'
The legislative distinction between tenses is even more pronounced in the subsection 309(g)
preclusion. Not only does it juxtapose the past and present tenses in "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" in (i) and (ii), it also juxtaposes the present and past tenses in (i) and (ii) with the exclusively past

269

See Miller, supra note I , at 457-63.

318 F.3d at 1256 (holding that a state order was not "comparable" to federal CWA, and thus did not bar the successive action); Wash. Pub. Interest Research Group
v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, l l F.3d 883, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an EPA
compliance order did not bar successive suits); Old Timer v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1 1 14 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that an EPA compliance
order did not bar successive suits).
17' Miller, supra note I , at 457-63.
270 McAbee,
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tense in (iii). The fact that Congress distinguished between the tenses in
both CWA subsection 309(g) and section 505 reinforces that it did so
deliberately and intended the resultant meaning in both of them. That Congress intended its use of different tenses in section 505 to have meaning
was the Court's primary reason for its holding in G ~ a l t n e y . That
~ ' ~ reasoning applies doubly here. Thus, diligent prosecution is not a requirement for the bar under (iii) when a penalty has been finally assessed and
paid, but is required in (i) and (ii), when prosecutions by EPA and states
are still ongoing. This is consistent with the notion that diligent prosecution reflects the effort put into the prosecution rather than the results
achieved.273
Diligent prosecution in the context of the citizen suit provisions meant
that the action commenced was capable of and calculated to require compliance and was being prosecuted with sufficient energy and vigor to be reasonably capable of securing compliance.274That flowed from the wording
of the phrase "diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court . . . to require compliance."275Subsection 309(g), on the other hand, does not condition the preclusion on the government action requiring compliance. This
concept has no bearing on the diligent prosecution requirement in subsection 309(g) because it is such a limited remedy. It authorizes no action
to require compliance, instead authorizing such small penalties that they
can deter only the least serious violations. This reinforces the conclusion
that "diligently prosecuting" has nothing to do with the amounts of penalties assessed.276Subparagraph (iii), dealing specifically with penalties
that have been assessed and paid, does not suggest that the amounts are
relevant to whether the preclusion applies.277 Further, if the penalty
amounts ultimately paid are not relevant to the preclusion, it is not relevant that the government prosecutes the assessment procedures with sufficient energy and vigor to be reasonably capable of securing a penalty
with strong deterrent value. Instead, the context suggests that "diligently
prosecuting" in subsection 309(g) is intended only to prevent the government from initiating a penalty action and thereafter sitting on its hands
while barring EPA and citizen penalty actions indefinitely.

272 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987);
see also id.
273 "Diligent" is defined as "characterized by steady, earnest, and energetic application
and effort." WEBSTER'S
NINTHNEWCOLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
223 (1983).
274 Miller, supra note I , at 463-73.
275CWA3 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
276 Bur see Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 n.5
(M.D. Ga. 2001) (noting that the state had assessed a $5,000 penalty for continuing violations and commenting that "[s]uch leniency hardly qualifies as 'diligent prosecution."').
277 If citizens wish to protest the inadequacy of EPA assessed penalties, they may seek
judicial review alleging the penalty amount is an abuse of discretion and ask the reviewing
court to assess additional penalties. 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g)(8) (2000).
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Courts have addressed whether prosecutions were diligent under subsection 309(g) only because they reached the issue after making initial
interpretive errors on the applicability of the subsection 309(g) bar. Rather
than adhering to the language of subsection 309(g), these courts assessed
the diligent prosecution of state actions other than penalty assessments
under state law comparable to subsection 309(g).278They also considered
the diligence of the results of government actions that were completed rather
than ongoing prosecution^.^'^ Furthermore, they examined the diligence
of state actions in connection with EPA and citizen actions not seeking
penalties for the same violations covered by the state actions.280These errors
in interpretation are a far more serious detriment to effective EPA and
citizen enforcement than the courts' failure to recognize that diligence in
prosecution is a measure of the energy the state puts into its administrative penalty assessment proceedings rather than the results it achieves by
its action. Examining the docket of an ongoing civil judicial action in
comparison with the dockets of typical civil judicial actions in the jurisdiction is a reasonable way to examine the diligence of the prosecution of
the action.28'The same exercise should suffice for assessing the diligence
of a state's prosecution of its penalty assessment. After all, the purpose of
requiring diligent prosecution here is only to prevent the government
from initiating a penalty action and then not prosecuting it, thus forever
barring a penalty action by another party.
e. When Congress Provides that a Government Penalty Action May
Bar a Successive EPA or Citizen Penalty Action Against the Same
Violation, May the Government Action Bar Successive EPA or
Citizen Actions Against Other Violations?
From time to time, violators attempt to invoke past enforcement actions to preclude subsequent enforcement against different violations, raising the question of whether government action may bar successive EPA
or citizen actions against other violations. Government actions preclude
citizen actions only for the common violations they address.282This issue
recurs in CWA subsection 309(g). CWA subsection 309(g)(6)(A) provides

278 See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st
Cir. 1991) (involving a compliance order); Williams Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F.
Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (involving an informal action); Atl. States Legal Found. v.
Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (involving a compliance order); see
supra Part II.A.3.b.
279 See, e.g., Scituate, 949 F.2d at 552; Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health v. City of
Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 2000); Atl. States Legal Found., 682 F. Supp. at
1186.
See, e.g., Cmfy. of Cambridge Envrl. Health, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 550; At/. States Legal Found., 682 F. Supp. at 1 186; see infra Part II.A.3.e.
'8' See Miller, supra note I, at 464-65.
282 See id. at 473-78.
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that "any violation" for which EPA or a state is assessing or has assessed
and collected a penalty "shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action"
under sections 309(d), 31 1, or 505.283Thus, a plain reading of the provision indicates it imposes two conditions on the preclusion. First, subsection 309(g)(6)(A) precludes EPA and citizen actions only to the extent that
they address violations for which the state is assessing or has assessed a
penalty. As a result, it applies to the penalties assessed against any violation, not against any violator. Second, the provision only precludes EPA
and citizen actions for penalties, as opposed to other actions.
The plain reading of the provision is supported by the expressio
unius canon of statutory construction.284To say that EPA and citizens are
precluded from maintaining actions for "any violation" subject to a government administrative penalty action means they are not precluded from
maintaining actions for violations not subject to government administrative penalty actions. Similarly, to preclude EPA and citizens from maintaining penalty actions implies they are not precluded from prosecuting
compliance actions. This latter point is reinforced by SDWA subsection
1 4 2 3 ( ~ ) ( 5 )the
, ~ ~parallel
~
provision to CWA subsection 309(g). In SDWA
subsection 1423(c)(5), Congress provided that when EPA assesses an
administrative penalty, the defendant "shall not be subject to an action"
by EPA or citizens under other enforcement provisions of the statute.286
Congress knew how to preclude all successive actions when EPA assessed
an administrative penalty; Congress was clear about when it intended
preclude such actions and when it did not in CWA subsection 309(g).
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended this plain
meaning of the statute. The Senate Report explained the provision explicitly in this regard.
This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties for
the same violations which are the subject of the administrative civil
penalties proceeding. It would not apply to an action for civil
penalties for a violation of the same requirement of the Act that
is not being addressed administratively or for a past violation of
another pollutant parameter . . . . In addition, this limitation

283 33 U.S.C. $9 1319(d), 1321, 1365 (2000) (emphasis added). The CWA citizen suit
provision, subsection 505(a), provides that citizens may not commence suits against violations of the CWA "[elxcept as provided in . . . subsection 309(g)." The section 505 preclusion does not bar a citizen suit because of an EPA or state administrative penalty proceeding. See Miller, supra note 1 , at 436-45. It only incorporates whatever preclusion subsection 309(g) imposes.
284 See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 323.
42 U.S.C. $ 300h-2(c)(5) (2000).
286 Id.

'"
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would not apply to: 1) an action seeking relief other than civil
penalties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment) . . . .287
The House Conference Report repeats this set of limitations on the subsection 309(g) bar almost verbatim.288
Determining the scope of the preclusion raises several issues. The
most obvious is whether a government penalty action against violations
on particular dates may bar a successive action for violations of the same
requirement on subsequent dates. The plain reading of the provision and
its legislative history indicate that the government action should not preclude a successive enforcement action in such a situation. It is no surprise
that when a state assessed and concluded a penalty action, collecting a
penalty for violations occurring two years prior to the commencement of
a citizen suit, a court held that the state action did not bar a citizen suit
for violations subsequent to the state action.2s9A contrary ruling would
allow violators to continue their violations forever without further penalty,
just by paying the state for a one-day violation.
In a variant of this issue, another court held that a citizen suit against
a violation of requirements relating to pollutant A was not precluded by a
government action against a violation of requirements relating to pollutant B, although remedial actions to be taken to bring pollutant B into compliance should also bring pollutant A into compliance.290It so held because
the two actions were not against the same violations and the government's action was injunctive in nature and application of the preclusion
"would effectively insulate Defendant Plant from any civil liability for its
allegedly impermissible and repeated lead discharge^."'^' Some courts
have held that when a state issues an administrative order against a violation, subsection 309(g) bars citizen actions against future violations, although they are based on the false predicate that subsection 309(g) will
bar citizen suits when states issue compliance orders.292Subsection
309(g), however, does not address the effect of compliance orders and
many of the citizen suit preclusion devices do not either.293
The plain reading of subsection 309(g) and its legislative history also
indicate that a government penalty action does not bar a citizen suit for

S. REP.NO. 99-50, at 28 ( 1985).
H.R. CONF.REP.NO. 99-1004, at 133 (1986).
'89N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonorna County Water Agency, No. C 97-4263, 1998 WL
886645, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1998); see also Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Acme Electro-Plating, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1993); Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv.
Co., 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996).
290 Atl. States Legal Found. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, No. C-3-95156, 1996 WL 1670982 (S.D. Ohio Mar. I 1, 1996).
29' Id. at *6.
19' Lockett v. EPA, 3 19 F.3d 678, 689-90 (5th Cir. 2003).
292 E.g., CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000); see also Miller, supra note I, at 43643.
287

288
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an injunction requiring compliance. Yet in North and South Rivers Watershed Assn., Inc. v. Town of S ~ i r u a r e the
, ~ ~court
~
held that the preclusion
barred citizen suits for injunctions as well as for civil penalties. The court
reasoned that section 505 does not differentiate among remedies, but "simply provides civilians with a general grant of jurisdiction for all remedies
available."295It noted that the Court in Gwaltney had commented that the
provision for civil penalties and injunctions were in the same sentence in
section 505, but in different subsections in section 309, thus suggesting a
relation between the two remedies in section 505 that was absent in section 309.296From this and the Court's characterization of citizen suits in
Gwaltney as supplemental, the First Circuit concluded that the "309(g) bar
extends to all citizen actions brought under section 505, not merely civil
penal tie^."^^' It labeled a contrary result "absurd," because it would defer
to "the primary enforcement responsibility of the government only where
a penalty is sought in a civilian action, as if the policy considerations
limiting civilian suits were only applicable within that context."298
The Court's rejection of the clear statutory language of subsection
309(g) that bars only civil penalty actions is a high-water mark in the Court's
substitution of its policy judgment for legislative policy judgment. This substitution is harmful in its own right, and moreover, the Court's policy
judgment is flawed. While it may be rational to bar a citizen suit for a penalty after the state has assessed an administrative penalty under a state
law comparable to subsection 309(g), it is not rational to bar a suit for an
injunction because the state has assessed such a penalty. An administrative penalty with an upper limit of $125,000 will not deter a serious violation of a legal obligation that would require the expenditure of millions
of dollars. If EPA and citizens cannot seek an injunction after a state has
assessed a small penalty in such a situation, compliance with the statute will
have been subverted. Under the Scituate rationale, the state can insulate a
violator from compliance with the statute by assessing a small administrative penalty. Contrary to the Scituate court's opinion, that policy and
result is absurd. Nevertheless, some courts have followed Scituate in this
holding.299
'"949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991).
295 Id. at 557-58 (citing
- Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484
U.S. 49, 58 (1987)).
296 Id. at 557-58 (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58). This might enable the First Circuit
to conclude the provision would not block an EPA request for an injunction, while it would
block a citizen request for one. As discussed in the text, however, the provision does not
block either EPA or citizens from seeking an injunction to require compliance.
297 Id. at 558.
298 Id.
299 Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investment Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Or. 1995),
rev'd, 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996), followed Scituate without elaboration. The Eighth Circuit rejected some of the First Circuit's reasoning but came to the same conclusion in Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994). It commented that the opposite result was not absurd, although it was "undesirable" because i t
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The first decision rejecting the reasoning and results of Scituate was
Coalition for a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Department of
Environmental Pr~tection.~"
There the court found "no basis for the First
Circuit's redrafting of the statute" because "[tlhe language of 3 [309](g)(6)
is clear and unambiguous," and creates a "bar [that] applies only to civil
penalty actions."30' It found such partial bar supported by the policy underlying the preclusion device: preventing duplicative penalties for the
same violation while authorizing compliance injunctions against violations that continued despite the assessment of penalties. Moreover, it
found the fear of defendants being "whipsawed" between government
and citizen enforcement actions to be unfounded, for trial courts have sufficient authority to prevent that result, including the authority to stay citizen actions. It noted that federal courts in citizen suits should treat with
deference injunctive relief already granted by state courts.302That deference is not owed, however, where the state has only assessed a relatively
small administrative penalty. Most courts outside the First and Eighth Circuits reject the reasoning and results of Scitu~te.~O~
The Scituate approach ignores the underlying reason the CWA provided three sets of enforcers. Previous water pollution control legislation

"could result in undue interference with, or unnecessary duplication of, the legitimate efforts of the state agency." Id. at 383. Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (E.D. La.
2001), followed ICI Americas without elaboration.
830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 197.
'02 Id.
'03 See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner,
J.) ("Although broad reading of 'actions' would be consistent with Congress's evident desire
that citizens' suits supplement rather than displace state enforcement, we do not consider
the argument strong enough to override the statutory text, especially when we consider the
interminable character of much administrative process."); Atl. States Legal Found. v.
Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum
Mktg., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Sierra Club v. Hyundai Am., Inc., 23
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1179 (D. Or. 1997); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp.
769, 79 1 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 191 F.3d 5 16, 525
(4th Cir. 1999); Atl. States Legal Found. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, No.
C-3-95-156, 1996 WL 1670982, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 1996); N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Orange
Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). These cases followed
Livable West Side without elaboration. The court in California Sportfishing Protection
Alliance v. City of West Sacramento followed the reasoning of Livable West Side, finding
the language to be "unambiguous that only civil penalty actions are barred." 905 F. Supp.
790, 806 (E.D. Cal. 1995). Although it acknowledged some strength in the logic of Sciruate, it found such reasoning "perilous" when "dealing with a statute so complex as the
Clean Water Act which has within it so many cross currents." Id. at 806. These complex
"cross currents" run throughout section 505. See Miller, supra note I, at 445-49; Sierra
Club v. Hyundai Am., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d (D. Or. 1997); Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995). In Friends of Santa Fe, the court
found the subsection 309(g) bar simply to prevent duplicative penalties for the same violation: "many courts wish to read more into the citizen suit bar of this subsection than exists.
Although their desire is well-founded and their policy goals are laudable, their vision cannot be reconciled with the literal terms of the statute." 892 F. Supp. at 1347.
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was ineffective, in part because it was not well e n f ~ r c e d . ~It" is more
likely to be effectively enforced with three rather than only one or two enforcers. This is particularly true where the government's enforcement response is a small subsection 309(g) administrative penalty of up to only
$125,000. In the context of violations that cost far more to correct, this has
little or no deterrent value; if significant violators can be insulated from
compliance by paying traffic ticket penalties to state officials, enforcement
of and compliance with the CWA are thwarted. This was not Congress's
purpose in enacting subsection 309(g).
B. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Prior Notice to the State and
Barring Federal Action if the State Commences "Appropriate" Action

The foregoing analysis shows subsection 309(g) to be a complex preclusion containing a strict limitation based on each of the three elements
commonly used by Congress to preclude subsequent enforcement by EPA
and citizens. Other preclusions against EPA enforcement use each of the
three elements or a subset of them. This Section discusses preclusions in
several statutes that incorporate each of the notice, delay and bar elements
and analyzes legal issues that arise under these provisions.
The EPA enforcement provisions in the SDWA, FIFRA and CWA all
include preclusion devices under which EPA may enforce only after giving the state notice, waiting thirty days, and determining that the state has
not taken "appropriate" enforcement action. These versions of the preclusion device incorporate all three of its elements, in virtually the same form
found in most of the citizen suit provisions.
The SDWA provisions are the most restrictive on subsequent EPA enforcement. The SDWA has two primary regulatory programs: drinking
water standards for public water supplies and permits for underground injection of wastes and other materials. Both programs may be administered
either by EPA or by states with programs approved by EPA as meeting statutory criteria. EPA may enforce against violations of either drinking water
standards or underground injection requirements without restriction in states
lacking approved programs.305But in states with approved programs, it
must first notify the state and the violator and, for drinking water standards violations, provide advice and technical assistance to them. Under
either program, if the state has not "commenced appropriate enforcement
action" after thirty days, EPA may itself commence an administrative or
civil action for compliance and penalties.306

"See Miller, supra note I, at 407 n.22.

305 SDWA $5 1414(a)(2), 1423(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. $0 300g-3(a)(2), 300h-2(a)(2) (2000).
Subsection 1414(a)(2)(B) requires EPA to give prior notice to the local elected official
responsible for the water supply system. 42 U.S.C. 5 300g-3(a)(2)(B).
306 SDWA $5 1414(a)(l), 1423(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. $ 5 300g-3(a)(l), 300h-2(a)(l). For
drinking water standards violations, if the state in which the violation occurs has an ap-
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FIFRA, by contrast, authorizes EPA as the sole regulator of pesticide
manufacture and sale, but contemplates enforcement against violations of
pesticide use regulations by either EPA or states with EPA-approved programs or cooperative agreements with EPA.307There are no restrictions on
EPA enforcement of the federal manufacture and sale provisions. Nor are
there restrictions on EPA enforcement of the use requirements in states
lacking approved use programs or cooperative agreements. But in states
with approved use enforcement programs or cooperative agreements, EPA
may not enforce against use violations without "referring" the violation
to the state, providing the state thirty days to act, and finding the state has
not commenced "appropriate enforcement action."308 These restrictions
do not operate during emergency conditions requiring immediate action.309
CWA subsection 309(a) provides EPA a choice when enforcing in a
state with an approved permit program: It may proceed (1) under subsection 309(a)(3), requiring it only to provide the state with copies of its
enforcement document^,"^ or (2) under subsection 309(a)(l), which requires EPA first to give a notice of violation to the state and the violator,
wait thirty days, and then proceed only if the state has not commenced
"appropriate enforcement action.""' This is not much of a burden on EPA; it
may always choose to enforce under subsection 309(a)(3), unencumbered
by the notice, delay and bar preclusion, but if it does give the state and
violator a notice of violation, it chooses the notice, delay and bar route
and is bound by the requirements of section 309(a)(l). Of course, EPA
could also give the state informal prior notice of its intent to proceed under subsection 309(a)(3) and not give the violator prior notice, doubly
indicating that it is not proceeding under subsection 309(a)(l). This procedure has the advantage of giving the state the courtesy of notice without invoking the potential preclusion of subsection 309(a)(l).
It might be argued that subsection 309(a)(3) is a drafting error and
should be interpreted to include the notice and delay provisions of subsection 309(a)(l), but subsection 309(a)(3) would be redundant if it did
not authorize EPA to enforce without prior notice to the state. Where possible, statutes should be interpreted to avoid rendering portions of them suproved program, EPA must provide the state a copy of the order issued by EPA, and the
order does not become effective until EPA has afforded the state an opportunity to confer.
'07 FIFRA Q 26, 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-I (2000). Pesticide use must comply with directions
on pesticide labels approved by EPA in the course of registering the pesticide.
FIFRA Q 27(a), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(a) (2000).
IWFIFRA Q 26(c), 7 U.S.C. Q 136w-2(c) (2000). FIFRA does not contain a provision
comparable to those in CAA section 303, CWA section 504, and SDWA section 1431,
allowing EPA to take action to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment without
prior notice to the state and without a violation of the statute. EPA's authorization in FIFRA
subsection 27(a) to act without prior notice to the state, when EPA enforces against violations of the statute creating emergency conditions, in part makes up for FIFRA's lack of
emergency authority.
CWA Q 309(a)(3)-(4). 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(3)-(4) (2000).
CWA Q 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l).
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perfluou~."~
Moreover, the legislative history demonstrates that this result
is exactly what Congress intended. The Committee report accompanying
the House CWA bill, for instance, lists four enforcement authorities the bill
gave EPA, including both EPA's authority to issue administrative compliance orders without the preclusion device and its authority to issue such
orders with the preclusion device.313More pointedly, EPA's comments to
Congress on the proposed subsection 309(a)(3) indicated that the subsection might be a drafting error and should be amended to make it subject
to the notice and delay requirements of subsection 309(a)(1).314Congress
ignored the suggestion.
These preclusions on EPA enforcement are almost identical to the notice, delay and bar preclusions Congress typically placed in citizen suit
provisions."Wne difference is that the EPA delay period is shorter, thirty
days, rather than the sixty-day delay period common in citizen suit provisions. The legislative history does not explain the reason for this difference. Perhaps more importantly, the bar on EPA action is activated by an
"appropriate state enforcement action," while the bar on citizen action is
usually activated by commencement and "diligent prosecution" of specific
types of enforcement actions "to seek compliance." Again, the legislative
history provides no explanation for the difference.
These preclusions on EPA enforcement action raise several legal issues. Is an EPA enforcement action invalid without the required prior notice
and delay? When is a state action "commenced"? What is a state enforcement action? What is an "appropriate" state enforcement action? While
there are few reported decisions on these issues in the EPA preclusions
except for in the context of CWA subsection 309(g), decisions on identical issues in the citizen suit preclusions address all of the issues.316Because these EPA preclusion devices are virtually identical to the preclusion devices in the citizen suit sections, they should be interpreted in the
same way."'
With regard to whether an EPA enforcement action is invalid without
the required prior notice and delay, the Court has held that the preclusion
device in citizen suit provisions bars citizen actions unless plaintiffs have

"'See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 324 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759. 778 (1988); S . Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc. 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986)).
' I ' H . REP. NO. 92-91 1 , at 114-15 (1972), reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
srrpra note 40, at 801-02.
31" Id. at 160, reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 847.
' I 5 See Miller, supra note I , at 449-52; supra Part I.B.
" 6 See Miller, srrpra note I .
"'There is one significant difference regarding the notice required in the citizen and
EPA enforcement preclusion devices. The citizen suit preclusion devices typically require
citizens to give notice "in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation."
E.g., CWA 5 505(b), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b) (2000). EPA has promulgated rather detailed
regulations. See 4 0 C.F.R. Parts 54, 135, 254, 374 (2003). The EPA enforcement sections
contain no such requirements.
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complied with the required notice and delay period.j18 The Court did not
go so far as to hold that the notice was a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit, but held that a citizen suit must be dismissed absent proper notice
and delay. This leaves open a multitude of questions regarding the effects
of technical deficiencies in notices, and courts are split on whether technical deficiencies will defeat an enforcement action.319Both the Court's
holding and remaining questions regarding the effect of technical deficiencies with notices in the citizen suit preclusion device apply to the
preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions.320They are reinforced
by cases holding that the notice and delay elements in the EPA enforcement provisions are mandatory, even when their preclusion devices lack
the bar element.32'
Discussing when a state action is "commenced" virtually all the reported decisions in citizen suit cases hold that state actions barring citizen suits are "commenced" by formal initiation of the action, such as the
filing of a complaint with a court or administrative tribunal,322noting that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that a civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint in court.323Because these decisions interpret the
same word, in the same statute, in the same context and in different versions of the same preclusion device, the interpretation should apply to the
preclusions on EPA enforcement as
The third issue is which state enforcement actions may bar a federal action. The structures of the statutes are of some help here, as is precedent
from an analogous question under the citizen suit statutes. In all three statutes, the state "enforcement action" language appears in sections providing EPA specific enforcement authorities and entitled, in whole or in part,
" e n f o r ~ e m e n t . "Because
~~~
"enforcement" is used in the same sections to
refer to both EPA and state actions, the word should have the same meanings, whether the enforcer is a state or federal entity.326Those provisions
which indicate exactly what Congress meant by federal enforcement: the
exercise of the particular enforcement mechanisms Congress conferred
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
See Robin Kundis Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleadings: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Sujjicierzcy of Er~vironmentalCitizen Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. REV.
105 (1999).
'O See supra note 3 17.
3 2 1 See infra Part 1I.C.;ir~franote 350.
-'?'See Miller, supra note I , at 452-56.
323 Clorox Corp. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
The same or similar terms in a statute should be interpreted in the same way. See
ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 324 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) and
United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988)).
325CWA5 309, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (2000) ("Enforcement"); SDWA 8 1414, 42 U.S.C.
5 300g-3 (2000) ("Enforcement of drinking water regulations"); FlFRA 8 27, 7 U.S.C.
5 136w-2 (2000) ("Failure by the State to assure enforcement of State pesticide use requirements.").
3'6 See supra note 3 12.
318
3'9
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on EPA included ordering compliance, assessing administrative penalties,
and seeking civil penalties, injunctive relief and criminal sanctions. This
analysis suggests that unless otherwise specified, state enforcement actions may bar EPA enforcement actions only if the state actions are the same
types of actions EPA is authorized to take. The preclusion devices in the
citizen suit provisions and judicial interpretation of them reinforce this
conclusion. Although the citizen suit preclusion devices usually specify
the types of government action that will bar citizen suits, they also specify that only action for "compliance" will do so.327Only enforcement actions are actions for compliance.
What is an "appropriate" state enforcement action? Here, the structures of the statutes are helpful. In the EPA enforcement provisions, Congress directed EPA to issue orders requiring compliance and gave courts
jurisdiction to restrain violations and require compliance.328Because EPA
enforcement actions seek compliance,329a state action is "appropriate" to
bar federal action only if the state action seeks and is capable of achieving compliance. The citizen suit provisions bar suit if the government has
taken specified actions,330often in court, "to require c~mpliance."~~'
The
legislative history of the citizen suit preclusions equates an action "appropriate" to bar a citizen suit with an action capable of and calculated to
achieve compliance.332Indeed, even the Supreme Court emphasized that
the provisions "specifically provide that citizen suits are barred only if
the Administrator has commenced an action 'to require compliance."'333
Not every state "enforcement" action is capable of or calculated to require
compliance. An administrative order to comply may be incapable of achieving compliance when directed at a powerful, recalcitrant industry that has
disregarded a series of previous compliance orders. An administrative order
requiring an action other than compliance is not calculated to require
compliance, nor is an administrative order that appears to require compliance but is really an extension of a compliance date to accommodate
the violator. Decisions addressing the issue interpret the requirement that
state actions be capable of and calculated to require compliance to bar a
citizen suit in accordance with its plain meaning and legislative history.334
The remaining question is who must determine if a state action is
"appropriate" to bar EPA enforcement. Of necessity, EPA must make the
initial determination, because it must decide whether or not to act. Only
j2'See Miller, supra note 1 , at 436-45.

E.g., CWA Q 309(a)(l), (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l), (3).
In the CWA enforcement provision, for instance, EPA is to issue orders requiring
violators "to comply," and courts are to exercise authority to "restrain" violations and "to
require compliance." CWA Q 309(a)(l), (a)(3), (b), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(l), (a)(3), (b).
"O See Miller, supra note 1 , at 436-45.
j 3 ' E.g., CWA Q 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000).
33Z See Miller, supra note 1 , at 445-48.
j3' Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,60 n.7 (1987).
334 See Miller, supra note 1 , at 436-45.
jZ9
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later may the defendant ask a court to decide whether EPA made an acceptable determination. That raises the question of whether the court is
reviewing EPA's determination or making the determination de novo. If it
holds that
is reviewing EPA's determination, United States v. Mead CO.'.'~
EPA's determination is not entitled to deference following Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,336because EPA did not make
the determination in a rulemaking or other formal action. Even under Mead,
however, EPA may be entitled to some deference."' Perhaps Heckler v.
Chaney governs, holding that agency decisions to enforce are entitled to the
utmost deference.338However, Heckler v. Chaney defers to prosecutorial
discretion because there is no law generally applicable to when government enforcement is appropriate against a violator.
There are several differences between the situations here and in Heckler
v. Chaney. First, there are two enforcers here: the question is which of
them receives the most deference in federal judicial review. Second, the
statute specifies that EPA may enforce if the state does not take "appropriate" enforcement action, meaning an action capable of and calculated
to achieve compliance. Third, Heckler v. Chaney challenged the agency's
decision not to enforce, while this question addresses decisions to enforce. Finally, this may not be a question of judicial review at all. If EPA
must allege in its complaint that the state did not take appropriate enforcement action, EPA may have the burden of proof on the issue. This is
different from judicial review, although the degree of burden that EPA
must bear may be calculated in the same manner as the degree of deference to which its decision would be accorded on judicial review.
335533U.S. 218 (2001).
33b467U.S. 837 (1984).
337 The Court noted:
[tlhe fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with the circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and
to the persuasiveness of the agency's position. . . . The approach has produced a
spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end, to near indifference
at the other.
533 U.S. at 228 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Prior to Mead, courts had generally
looked to Chevron and deferred to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administered if
the statute was ambiguous and the agency's interpretation was reasonable. In Mead, the
Court limited Chevron deference, but did not impose bright-line limits. It indicated that
Chevron deference should be accorded to decisions by agencies acting under "express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or ruling for which deference is claimed." Id. at 229. It noted further
that most of the agency interpretations to which it had accorded Chevron deference were
"the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication." Id. at 230. EPA
decisions that a state action is "appropriate" to bar a deferral action are not such formal
actions and hence not subject to Chevron deference. But they are subject to some degree of
deference, which EPA can enhance by making the determinations with care, transparency,
and some degree of formality.
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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C. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Prior Notice to the State
The next most stringent preclusion provisions against EPA enforcement require only one of the three basic preclusion elements. This Section
investigates cases in which statutes require only notice before the initiation of subsequent enforcement activity. This type of preclusion is present in the CAA and RCRA, and each statute's provisions will be discussed in turn.
The CAA requires EPA to give the state and the violator notice thirty
days before commencing administrative or civil enforcement actions for
violations of state implementation plans, but not for other violations.339
As originally enacted, the CAA provision authorized EPA to enforce only
if the violation continued for more than thirty days after the notice.340The
purpose of the notice, as drawn from the original notice provision itself,
was to enable the violator to escape from enforcement by complying within
thirty days.341The notice requirement was, and still is, followed by a provision authorizing EPA, upon finding a state is generally not enforcing its
state implementation plan, to declare a "period of federally assumed enf ~ r c e m e n t . " ~ ~ Vonly
h e difference between EPA's normal enforcement
authority and its authority during a period of federally assumed enforcement is that during the latter it may enforce against violations of state
implementation plans without prior notice. The purpose of the notice apparent from the "federally assumed enforcement" provision is to enable
the state to enforce rather than to enable violators to come into complia n ~ eThe
. ~ fact
~ ~ that EPA is not required to give the state or the violator
prior notice before enforcing federally developed requirements of the
CAA reinforces this.344This makes policy sense, because state implementation plans are developed by states and are state law, unenforceable federally until federalized by EPA approval. The notice requirement was illsuited to that purpose of enabling enforcement, however, for it did not
bar EPA from enforcement if the state took enforcement action, but only
if the violator came into compliance.

'j9CAA 5 113(a)(l), (3), 42 U.S.C. 8 7413(a)(I), (3) (2000).
340CAA5 113(a)(l), 84 Stat. 1686 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(1)).
24' The current version allows EPA to enforce thirty days following the notice regardless of whether the violation is continuing. Now the violator no longer can escape from
enforcement by quick compliance. 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(I).
CAA 5 1 13(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(2).
343 United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe notice
of violation requirement for state implementation plans serves a different function than
simply alerting the violator . . . allowing the state to act to enforce its own implementation
before the EPA steps in.").
344 The purpose of the requirement that citizens give prior notice to EPA and states of
the citizens' intent to enforce is to give the government prosecutors the opportunity to take
the enforcement action themselves without the interference of a pending citizen suit.
Miller, supra note I, at 4 4 5 4 8 .
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The requirement was amended in 1990, continuing to require EPA to
give the state and the violator thirty day's prior notice before commencing administrative or civil actions for violations of state implementation
plans, but no longer barring EPA from enforcement under any circumstances after the thirty-day waiting period.345In terms of either rationale
for the notice, this amendment seems an empty formality. Of course, if
circumstances change within the thirty-day delay period, EPA may decide
not to enforce and either enforcement by the state or compliance by the violator might be a significant change of circumstances. But this leaves the
choice of whether to enforce under such circumstances entirely with
EPA. Whereas in the earlier version Congress ruled out enforcement if
the violator had come into compliance.
The EPA enforcement provision in RCRA Subchapter 111, the hazardous waste regulatory program, requires EPA to give prior notice to a
state before issuing an administrative order or commencing a civil action
against a violator in the state, but only if the state has an approved hazardous waste regulatory p r ~ g r a mThis
. ~ is similar to the CAA prior notice requirement before EPA enforcement against violations of state implementation plans, but there is no waiting period and no provision for a
"period of federally assumed enforcement." Since prior notice is required
only in states with approved programs, the evident purpose of the notice
is to allow these states, rather than EPA, to enforce. Since there is no waiting
period before EPA can enforce, however, the notice again seems an empty
gesture. Defendants have argued that EPA may not enforce under RCRA
if a state has already done so, but this is a losing argument because Congress knew how to provide such a bar, could have provided such a bar, and
did not.)47
A plain reading of these provisions requires EPA to give prior notice
to the state before enforcing. This reading is supported by the juxtaposition with neighboring provisions that do not require prior notice.348
The same reasoning might lead to the conclusion that if EPA commences an enforcement action without giving the required notice, its actions also must be dismissed. Indeed, one pre-Hallstrom decision held the
CANS prior notice provision to be j u r i ~ d i c t i o n a l but
, ~ ~its
~ persuasiveness
is dubious in view of the Court's refusal to so hold in Hallstrom. Other

Pub. L. NO. 101-549, Q 701, 104 Stat. 2399,2672-73 (1990).
RCRA Q 3008(a)(l), (2), 4 2 U.S.C. Q 6928(a)(1), (2) (2000).
347 See infra Part 1II.C.
In its neighboring provision, the CAA does not require EPA to give thirty days prior
notice before enforcing against violations of federally promulgated standards. CAA
§ 113(a)(3), 4 2 U.S.C. Q 7413(a)(3) (2000). In its neighboring provisions, RCRA does not
require EPA to give prior notice before enforcing against violations in a state without an
EPA approved state program. RCRA Q 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(a). See also supra Part
1I.B.
349 See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1547 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
345

)46
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courts have held that the CAA's prior notice provision is mandatory,350
but they were decided prior to the amendment of CAA subsection 113(a)
in 1990, which deleted the bar element that had precluded EPA from enforcement unless the violation continued for thirty days after the notice.
As long as the device contained a bar, EPA enforcement could be avoided
by compliance within the delay period. Once Congress removed the bar
from the CAA preclusion device, however, neither the violator nor the
state could prevent EPA from taking action. The same is true for the RCRA
preclusion device. Under these circumstances, no harm is done if EPA
fails to give proper notice, and there is no reason to hold the notice to be
mandatory. That result would avoid the issue of deciding the effect of
technical defects in notices if notices are held to be mandatory. As noted
above, however, the CAA's thirty-day waiting period at least offers both
the state and the violator the opportunity to convince EPA not to enforce.
Since EPA's failure to give such notice would deprive them of this congressionally mandated opportunity, the CAA notice should be interpreted
as mandatory and an EPA action without it should be dismissed or stayed
pending notice. This does not leave EPA without remedy if the violation
would cause real damage during the waiting period. Under the CAA,35'as
under most of the statutes,352EPA may issue an order or seek an injunction to abate imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or
welfare or the environment from air emissions, without a waiting p e r i ~ d , ' ~ '
and even in the absence of a violation of the statute.
D. Enforcement Provisions Requiring Subsequent Notice to the State

Like the preceding Section, the preclusions discussed in this Section
require the satisfaction of only the notice element to avoid preclusion. The
preclusions in this Section, however, require notice after, rather than before, initiation of subsequent enforcement. The CWA and CAA both contain specific provisions to this effect, requiring that EPA notify the state

3501d.at 1550 ("The Act is clear in its requirement that EPA must serve Ford with a
notice of violation of the applicable plan before it may proceed with either administrative
or judicial enforcement proceedings. The requirement is jurisdictional."); United States v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1 122, 1.1 28 (D. Colo. 1987)("[B]efore the EPA is
authorized to bring a civil enforcement action . . . (I) the EPA must issue a NOV to the
alleged offender, and (2) the violation alleged must continue for thirty days after the issuance of the NOV."); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st
Cir. 1989), aff'don other grounds, 496 U.S. 530 (1990); Navistar Int'l Transp. Co. v. EPA,
858 F.2d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding the notice requirement in CAA section 120, 42
U.S.C. (j 7420, is mandatory but technical defects in the notice are insufficient to defeat
EPA's action.).
'51 CAA 9 303,42 U.S.C. 9 7603 (2000).
352 See, e.g., CWA
504, 33 U.S.C. 1364(a) (2000); RCRA 7003,42 U.S.C. 6973
(1990).
353 The imminent and substantial endangerment provisions may require that EPA consult with the state before commencing action. See, e.g., CAA § 303,42 U.S.C. § 7603.
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when it takes a d m i n i ~ t r a t i v eor
~ ~civil
~
actions5 against violators in the
state. The CAA requires that EPA send to the state copies of EPA-issued
orders to comply with federally developed requirements and notice of the
commencement of all civil enforcement actions, while the CWA requires
that EPA do so immediately. A plain reading of those provisions does not
require EPA to give prior notice to the state, a reading that is supported
by their juxtaposition with neighboring provisions that do require prior
notice.356The CAA requires EPA to give prior notice to the state when enforcing against violations of state implementation plans, but only requires it
to give subsequent notice to the state when enforcing against violations
of federally developed requirements. This reflects, although imperfectly,
the degree of state involvement in the development, implementation and
enforcement of the particular requirement^.^^' The CWA requirement is
CWA $ 5 309(a)(4)-(5). 404(s)(2), 33 U.S.C. $9 13 19(a)(4)-(3, i344(s)(2) (2000);
1 13(a)(3)-(4). 42 U.S.C. $j7413(a)(3)-(4) (2000).
13 19(b), 1344(s)(3); CAA 8 1 13(b), 42
355 CWA $9 309(b), 404(s)(3), 33 U.S.C.
U.S.C. 7413(b).
356 In its neighboring provision, the CAA requires EPA to give thirty days prior notice
before enforcing against violations of state implementation plans and permits, a requirement discussed in supra Part 1I.C. CAA § 113(a)(3)-(4). (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)-(4),
(b). In its neighboring provision, the CWA requires EPA to give the state thirty days prior
notice before enforcing against violations of the statute and to refrain from further enforcement if the state initiates appropriate enforcement within that time, a requirement
discussed in the same section. CWA 3 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(l).
357 States are expected to develop implementation plans to achieve federally promulgated ambient air quality standards and to develop and administer permit programs addressing all CAA requirements for affected sources. CAA §§ 110, 501-507, 42 U.S.C.
$ 5 7410, 7661-7661f (2000). EPA must give states notice prior to taking enforcement
action against a violation of one of these requirements. On the other hand, EPA is to develop, implement and enforce standards for new sources, hazardous air pollutants, acid
rain precursors, and ozone depleting substances. CAA $ 8 1 1 1-1 12, 401-4 16, 601-6 18, 42
U.S.C. $9 741 1, 7651-76510, 7671-7671q (2000). EPA must give states only slrbseq~rerlt
notice after taking enforcement action against violations of one of these requirements. But
these distinctions are imprecise. See United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 36566 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining the distinction and holding that CAA subsection 113(b)(3)
does not require EPA to give prior notice before enforcing federally promulgated hazardous waste emission standards).
If a state fails to develop an implementation plan meeting the CAA's criteria, EPA itself ultimately may have to develop the plan. CAA § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (2000).
But EPA must give the state thirty days prior notice before taking enforcement action
against violations of a state implementation plan, whether the state or EPA developed it.
This prior notice is mandatory. See B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d at 363-66. At the same
time, the statute contemplates that EPA will delegate to states its implementation authorities over federally developed requirements. CAA $ 5 I l l(c), 112(1), 42 U.S.C. $ 3 741 I(c),
7412(1) (2000). EPA, however, is required only to give subsequent notice to the state when
enforcing against these violations, whether or not EPA has delegated implementation to a
state. Moreover, states are to develop permit programs applying all CAA requirements to
permitted sources, whether states or EPA developed the requirements. CAA $5 501-507,
42 U.S.C. $ 5 7661-7661f (2000). The enforcement provision requires EPA to give the state
thirty day's prior notice of EPA enforcement actions against violations of "an applicable
implementation plan or permit," while it also authorizes EPA to proceed to enforce with
subsequent notice only for violations of "subchapter V," the CAA subchapter establishing
the CAA permit program. Evidently, Congress has made the CAA far too complex for it to
maintain complete consistency in the degrees of state involvement warranting prior or
354

CAA
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less complicated but more curious. The basic regulatory device of the
CWA is a permit program that may be implemented either by EPA or by
a state with an EPA-approved program that meets all of the federal criteria.358If Congress followed the pattern it established in the CAA, it would
have required EPA to give prior notice before enforcing against violations
in a state with an approved program and subsequent notice after enforcing
against violations in states without approved programs. Instead, it required
EPA to give notice, albeit subsequent notice, to states without approved
programs, but left to EPA the choice to give either prior or subsequent
notice to states with approved programs.359
These "subsequent notice" requirements, by their very nature are not
conditions precedent to EPA enforcement. Not surprisingly, the few reported decisions considering the issue hold they are not conditions precedent to
The paucity of decisions probably results both from EPA's
faithfully providing states with subsequent notice and from the defendants' expectations that courts will not hold that EPA's failure to provide
subsequent notice deprives EPA of jurisdiction to proceed with properly
commenced enforcement actions.

E. Enforcement Provisions with No Preclusions on
Successive Enforcement
Up to this point, we have considered preclusion devices that use any
or all of the basic notice, delay and bar elements to govern subsequent enforcement. The final and weakest type of device uses none of these three
elements, instead allowing unrestrained subsequent enforcement by EPA.
Many EPA enforcement provisions contain no preclusions on EPA
enforcement."' Of course, there are no reported decisions on the lack of
statutory preclusions in these provisions. Common law preclusions may
still be relevant, however, if EPA commences an enforcement action after
citizens have taken an enforcement action under the citizen suit provision
of the statute or if the state has taken enforcement action under comparable state authority.
Despite the lack of controversy over these provisions, they are instructive for interpreting the other provisions because of the pattern of the
statutes in which they are found. Congress placed no preclusions on EPA
enforcement in statutes that contemplate exclusive federal implementa-

subsequent notice by EPA to a state.
358 See CWA Q 402, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342 (2000).
359 Compare CWA Q 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a)(l) (2000), with CWA 5 309(a)(3),
33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a)(3).
360 B & W 1nv. P r o p s , 38 F.3d at 365-66.
361 FlFRA Q 14, 7 U.S.C. Q 136(1)(2000); TSCA QQ 16, 207, 15 U.S.C. $8 2615, 2647
(2000); MPRSA Q 105,33 U.S.C. Q 1415 (2000); EPCRKA 5 325,42 U.S.C. 3 1 1045 (2000).
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tion and enforcement362or in parts of statutes that do so.363Statutes or
provisions that contemplate implementation and enforcement by both EPA
and states3@impose stronger versions of the preclusion on EPA enforcement discussed above. This pattern indicates that Congress varied the
strength of the preclusions in EPA enforcement provisions to match the
strength of EPA's role in relation to the role of the states in implementing
the particular program being enforced. Congress used variants of the
statutory preclusion knowingly and advisedly, intending the exact measure of preclusion provided in each enforcement provision. Interpreting
the preclusions differently than their plain meanings ignores the legislative intent inherent in this pattern.
111. LIMITATIONS
ON FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT
INFERRED
FROM
OTHERPROVISIONS
The preceding analysis described the various preclusions against subsequent EPA enforcement by analyzing the plain meaning, legislative history, and structure of the environmental statutes. While this analysis is
proper and should be exhaustive, some defendants in environmental cases
have attempted to infer additional preclusions against EPA action. This Part
examines the arguments levied by these parties and concludes that the primary reason all but one of these arguments fail is that, when Congress intended to limit EPA enforcement in such circumstances, it explicitly limited
it by the preclusion devices in the enforcement provisions themselves.
Defendants argue that federal law, including federal enforcement authorities, ceases to operate in the state once EPA approves a state program,
thereby making federal enforcement impossible. The statutes, however, do
not provide that they are suspended in a particular state upon approval of
that state's environmental program. Indeed, the statutes confer many authorities on EPA to oversee approved state programs. Those statutory authorities
would be meaningless if the federal statutes were suspended upon approval
of the state programs.
Defendants next argue that, if EPA approval of a state's program suspends the federal program but not the federal statute and its enforcement
authorities, violations of the approved state programs are violations of state
law and the federal statutes do not authorize federal enforcement against
violations of state law. Under some of the statutes, however, violations of
362TSCA$5 16, 207, 15 U.S.C. $5 2615; 2647 (regulating the manufacture and sale of
chemicals); MPRSA 5 105, 33 U.S.C. 5 1415 (regulating ocean dumping); EPCRKA 5 325,
42 U.S.C. 5 1 1045 (concerning emergency planning and public disclosure relating to manufacture and use of hazardous chemicals).
363 FIFRA 50 9, 14, 7 U.S.C. 55 1368, 136j (2000) (regulating the registration and sale
of pesticides); CWA $5 31 1-312, 33 U.S.C. $5 1321-1322 (2000) (regulating spills of oil
and hazardous waste and use of marine sanitation devices); CAA 5 205, 42 U.S.C. 5 7524
(2000) (regulating automobile emissions).
364 For example, the permitting programs of the CAA, CWA, and RCRA.
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approved state programs are violations of federal law, and all of the statutes authorize federal enforcement against violations of approved state programs.
Next, defendants argue that the statutes do not authorize successive federal enforcement against violations of approved state programs if states
have already taken an action against the violations. Congress developed
the preclusion device to deal with successive enforcement and varied the
device's three elements in each of the EPA enforcement provisions to
establish just how Congress intended to limit successive EPA enforcement under each statute, including whether and to what extent a state action
would bar a successive EPA enforcement action. Thus, the wording of the
enforcement provisions' preclusion devices should be looked to for determining whether Congress intended to preclude EPA enforcement; Congress did not intend that such a preclusion be inferred from other provisions.
Finally, defendants argue that the statutes do not authorize federal
enforcement against provisions of approved state programs that are beyond the scope of or more stringent than the comparable federal requirements. The structure of the statutes and EPA's interpretation of them suggest that a provision in an EPA-approved state program that is more
stringent than its federal counterpart is federally enforceable, while a provision in such a state program that is beyond the scope of the federal program
is not.
Although defendants make these arguments under all of the statutes,
they make them most frequently and most fervently under RCRA because of
the uniquely defendant-friendly wording in its state program approval
provision. Ultimately, however, their arguments fare no better under RCRA
than under the other statutes. Because the analysis under the CAA and
CWA is virtually identical, the Article considers them together. RCRA is
considered individually because although the analysis under RCRA is parallel to that under the CAA and CWA, it is complicated by its unique lang~age.~~~
A. Does EPA Approval of a State Program To Implement a Federal
Statute Suspend Operation of the Federal Statute in that State?
1. The CAA and CWA

The CAA and the CWA do not hint that they are suspended, in whole
or in part, by EPA approval of a state's air or water pollution control program. Moreover, that concept is inconsistent with their statutory structures for several reasons. First, both statutes establish major federally ad36s While this Article could make similar analyses under other statutes, most enforcement litigation occurs under these three statutes, thus rendering such further analysis of
limited value.
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ministered regulatory programs that are not part of the core cooperative
federalism programs. The CAA, for instance, establishes a program to
regulate motor vehicle emissions administered directly by EPA and not
through approved state implementation plans."6 The CWA establishes a
program to prevent and penalize spills of oil and hazardous substances administered by EPA and the Coast Guard and not through approved state
permit program^.'^' It would not make sense for EPA's approval of a state's
implementation plan or permit program to suspend these other environmental protection programs in the state. Such suspension would eliminate important federal environmental protections without replacing them
with state protections.
Second, in addition to the regulation of pollution sources that may
be accomplished either by EPA or states with EPA-approved programs,
both statutes confer general authorities on EPA alone. For instance, both
authorize EPA to make grants to state environmental agencies to administer pollution control program^."^ It would not make sense for EPA's approval of a state's implementation plan or permit program to suspend EPA's
grant authority, because the greatest need for federal financial assistance
to states occurs when states administer approved plans and programs.
Third, both the CAA and the CWA contemplate that EPA may approve
a state permit program encompassing some but not all of the federal permit program. Under the CAA, for instance, EPA may approve a state
permit program that does not include sources of pollutants in areas that
have already attained National Ambient Air Quality Standards or sources
subject to national emission standards for hazardous air pollutant^.'^^ The
CWA authorizes EPA to approve state permit programs covering a "significant and identifiable" "major category of discharge^.""^ EPA's approval
of a partial state permit program does not foreclose its implementation
and enforcement of the uncovered portion of the federal program.
Finally, both statutes establish EPA oversight authorities on state
implementation and enforcement of the approved plans and programs. The

266CAAQQ 202-250, 42 U.S.C. QQ 7521-7590 (2000). The CAA preempts state regulation of motor vehicle emissions placed on motor vehicle manufacturers, except for very
limited programs that are more stringent than EPA's. CAA Q 209, 42 U.S.C. 5 7543 (2000).
It also requires under some circumstances that states include in their implementation plans
programs to test motor vehicle emissions from vehicles being used by consumers to ensure
that they meet federal emission standards. See, e.g., CAA 5 182(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 42
U.S.C. Q 75 1 la(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3) (2000). See also CAA 55 601-618,42 U.S.C. $5 7671767 lq (2000) (concerning the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program).
367 CWA Q 3 1 1, 33 U.S.C. Q 1321. The Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. $0 2701-2761 (2000),
has subsumed much of the substance of this provision. See also CWA 5 404, 33 U.S.C.
Q 1344 (2000) (concerning the Wetlands Protection Program, a separate permit program
largely administered by the Army Corps of Engineers).
368CWAQ 105.33 U.S.C. 5 1255 (2000); CAA Q 105,42 U.S.C. Q 7405 (2000).
369 CAA Q 502(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(C), (f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 766la(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(C), (f)(3)
(2000).
270 CWA Q 402(n), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(n) (2000).
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CAA, for instance, charges EPA with the responsibility for assuring that
states' approved plans actually achieve the federal air quality standards
and requires the agency to impose sanctions on states if the plans do not.37'
The CWA authorizes EPA to withdraw approval of state permit programs
and to veto state-issued permits that do not meet federal standard^.'^^ Both
statutes authorize EPA to enforce against violations of state implementation plans and state-issued permits and to declare "periods of federally
assumed enforcement" if it finds widespread failure of the state to enforce the approved pr~gram.'~"t would not make sense for EPA's approval
of a state program to suspend these oversight authorities, for such authorities are not activated until EPA approves the state program. Such an interpretation would render those authorities meaningless. This interpretation is to be avoided, as statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to
all of their parts.374Finally, it has long been held under the CWA that
EPA may enforce against violations of a permit issued by a state with an
approved program, even if the state already has commenced an enforcement action.375

2. RCRA
The analysis of whether EPA approval of a state program suspends
operation of the federal RCRA standards in that state under RCRA is parallel to the analysis under the CAA and CWA, but is complicated by different language in RCRA. Congress provided in RCRA subsection 3006(b)
that an EPA approved state permit program operates "in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter" (subchapter 111), effectively suspending the federal program in states with approved program^."^ However, it
did not define the "program" that was suspended."' In determining what
is suspended, it is important to recognize that RCRA follows the same statutory pattern as the CAA and CWA with regard to the relationships between
the entire federal statute and the approved state programs. First, RCRA
establishes major regulatory programs that are not part of the core cooperative federalism program. For instance, it creates in Subchapter IV a
solid waste regulatory program that is not part of its core hazardous

e.g., CAA Q 179,42 U.S.C. Q 7509 (2000).
CWA 8 402(b)-(d), 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(b)-(d).
j7' CWA Q 309(a)(l)-(3), 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(a)(I)-(3) (2000); CAA Q 1 13(a)(l)-(b), 4 2
U.S.C. Q 7413(a)(l)-(b) (2000).
374See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 324 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 778 (1988) and South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22
(1986)).
'15 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981).
276 RCRA Q 3006(b), 4 2 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000).
377 Wyckoff CO. v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Flanagan,
126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
37' S e e ,
372
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waste permit program.378It would make no sense for EPA's approval of a
state hazardous waste program to suspend EPA's non-hazardous solid waste
program in the state, for that would eliminate an important federal environmental protection without replacing it with state protections.
Second, RCRA contains general authorities, some of which relate to,
but are not part of, the core hazardous waste program. For instance, like
the CAA and CWA, RCRA authorizes EPA to make grants to states to administer hazardous and solid waste control programs.379It would be counterproductive for EPA's approval of a state program to suspend these authorities and requirements for the same reasons that it is counterproductive under the CAA and CWA. The plain meaning of subsection 3006(b)
is that EPA approval of a state program suspends only the Federal program
under Subchapter 111. The subsection 3006(b) begins by stating that "[alny
State which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program
pursuant to this subchapter" shall submit its program for EPA approval.
If EPA approves the program, the "State is authorized to carry out such
program in lieu of the federal program under this subchapter . . . ."380 To
the extent these authorities are not contained in Subchapter 111, they fall
outside whatever program is suspended.
Third, RCRA, like the CAA and CWA, contemplates that EPA may
approve state programs that cover some, but not all, of the federal requirements. In the case of RCRA, however, Congress limited partial state programs to those covering all of the requirements of the original statute, authorizing EPA to issue permits covering requirements of the federal program added in subsequent amendment^.^^' EPA approval of a partial state
program, therefore, does not displace portions of the federal program for
which EPA has not approved the state program.
Finally, RCRA establishes EPA oversight authorities over approved
state programs, authorizing EPA to withdraw its approval of state programs
and to enforce against violations of permits issued by states with approved programs.382These authorities are in Subchapter III.383The "Federal program" suspended by subsection 3006(b) cannot be the entire Subchapter I11 itself, for it would not make sense for EPA's approval of a state
hazardous waste program to suspend the oversight authorities Congress

RCRA $9 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. $9 6941-6949a (2000). Subchapter IV authorizes
EPA only to establish standards to be met by solid waste disposal facilities.
379 RCRA 9 2007, 42 U.S.C. 9 6916 (2000).
38042U.S.C. 5 6926(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
RCRA 9 3006(~)(4),(g), 42 U.S.C. 9 6926(~)(4),(g) (2000). This reflects the fact
that while Congress enacted the full hazardous waste permitting program in 1976, it substantially amended that program in many details in 1984. States meeting the requirements
for approval under the 1976 statute could not meet many of the particulars added in 1984,
requiring both state and EPA action to issue permits meeting all of the statute's amended
requirements.
RCRA $5 3006(e)-3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. $9 6926(e)-6928(a)(l) (2000).
383 RCRA $5 3001-3019(e), 42 U.S.C. $5 6921-6939(e) (2000).
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granted EPA for approved state programs. That would render the oversight authorities superfluous, again an interpretation to be avoided.384On
the other hand, once EPA approves a state hazardous waste program under RCRA, there is no need for EPA's own regulations to continue in effect, to the extent they impose on the regulated public requirements that
are now governed by the approved state's hazardous waste regulations.
Therefore, it is logical to consider the federal regulations to be the "Federal program" that is suspended.
Nevertheless, defendants argue that EPA approval of a state RCRA program suspends all of RCRA, including EPA and citizen enforcement authorities, because RCRA subsection 3006(b) states that once EPA approves a state program, the
State is authorized to carry out such program in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter in such State and to issue and
enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste . . . .385
This provision cannot suspend all of RCRA, however, for its very words
limit its suspension to the federal program under Subchapter 111. When
EPA approves only part of a state Subchapter I11 program, it cannot suspend that part of the federal program for which the partially approved state
program has no counterpart. Such suspension would eviscerate those federal requirements. It cannot suspend the oversight authorities in Subchapter 111, for they can only operate after EPA approves a state program. It
makes no sense for it to suspend the EPA enforcement authorities in Subchapter I11 for violations of approved state programs for the same reasons.
Defendants reply that the subsection 3006(b) phrase means nothing if it
does not at least suspend EPA's enforcement authorities.
For subsection 3006(b) to suspend federal enforcement authorities, either: (1) the federal enforcement authorities must be included in the superseded "Federal program" or (2) "in lieu o f ' must modify "issue and
enforce permits." Parsing the sentence fragment demonstrates that neither
of these assertions can be sustained by a grammatical plain reading.386
See supra note 374.
42 U.S.C. fj 6926(b) (2000).
386 See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 323 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992), and United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693
(1988)); see also United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (D. Colo.
2000) (parsing the sentence fragment).
The subject of this sentence fragment is the approved "State" and the verb is the passive "is authorized." The object is the long conjunctive phrase, composed of two infinitive
sub-phrases. A more understandable restatement of the sentence fragment is: "the State is
authorized: ( I ) to carry out its approved program in the State in lieu of the Federal program, and (2) to issue and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste."
Defendants' first argument is that RCRA's federal enforcement authorities are included
384

385
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The structure and wording of the EPA enforcement sections also
demonstrate that subsection 3006(b) does not supersede EPA enforcement
authority. The House Report accompanying RCRA stated that:
[tlhis section [section 30061 develops a structure under which
states can plan and implement a state hazardous waste program,
in lieu of the federal program which is developed and implemented by the Administrat~r.'~'
EPA, of course, develops a regulatory program of standards for the regulated public to comply with, not a statutory program for the enforcement
of the regulatory provisions. The EPA enforcement provision specifically
requires EPA to give notice to a state with an approved program before
commencing civil or administrative enforcement against violations in the
state.388This authority would be meaningless if subsection 3006(b) suspended EPA's enforcement authority when EPA approved a state program.
The EPA enforcement provision also authorizes EPA to suspend or revoke a permit "issued by the Administrator or a State under this subchapter."389EPA could not suspend a permit issued by a state under RCRA
until EPA had approved the state's program, and it could not do so after
approval if approval suspended federal statutory authority.390Congress
within the superseded "Federal program" in the first infinitive sub-phrase, "to carry out
such program in lieu of the Federal program . . . ." That reading of the first sub-phrase,
however, renders the second sub-phrase, "and to issue and enforce permits," redundant and
without meaning. If the superseded "Federal program" includes permit issuance and enforcement, the second sub-phrase adds nothing to the first. On the other hand, giving full
force and meaning to the second phrase does not deprive the first phrase of meaning, if the
state program operating "in lieu o f ' the superseded "federal program," is that set of state
regulations establishing standards and procedures for permit issuance operating in place of
EPA regulations doing the same. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,6267.
Defendants' second argument is that "in lieu o f ' modifies "to issue and enforce permits." But "in lieu o f ' is placed in the middle of the first sub-phrase, behind the introductory infinitive. That confines its meaning to the first of the two sub-phrases. To modify the
second as well as the first infinitive sub-phrase, it should either be placed before both subphrases or repeated in the second sub-phrase. On the other hand, "in lieu o f ' has meaning
when it modifies only the first sub-phrase. Thus, as a matter of grammar, the "in lieu o f '
language in subsection 3006(b) does not suspend federal enforcement authorities when
EPA approves a state program, but does suspend the EPA regulations that apply to the
regulated public in the absence of an approved state program. There is no reason to assume
Congress used tortured grammar, intending "in lieu o f ' to apply to both sub-phrases, because the correct grammatical reading applying it only to the first sub-phrase has meaning
and makes sense. Legislative history supports this conclusion.
387 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6267
(emphasis added).
388 RCRA 5 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(2) (2000).
389 RCRA 5 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)(3).
390RCRA subsection 3005(d) contains similar authority, but appears to give EPA authority only to revoke EPA-issued permits. 42 U.S.C. 5 6925(d) (2000). RCRA 5 3008(a)(3) is
not redundant because it authorizes EPA to revoke state-issued permits. 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a)
(3) (2000).
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also amended the criminal provisions in section 3008 to clarify its intent
that federal enforcement authorities continue unimpeded in a state after
EPA approved the state's hazardous waste regulatory program. As originally
written in 1980, for instance, subsection 3008(d)(4) made criminal offenses of various fraudulent actions regarding records that "regulations
promulgated by the Administrator under this [subtitle]" required the regulated public to maintain.39' In 1984, Congress amended the subsection to
expand the offenses by adding the parenthetical phrase ("or by a State in
the case of an authorized State program") between "Administrator" and
"under."392Moreover, it used the same federal and state regulation wording when it added the new offense of transporting hazardous waste without a manifest in subsection 3008(d)(5).393The first two offenses in the
subsection are treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste without
or in violation of a permit "under this [subtitle]," evidencing similar intent.394Again, these provisions would be meaningless if subsection 3006(b)
suspended the federal enforcement provisions when EPA approved a state
program.
The conclusion that subsection 3006(b) does not suspend EPA enforcement authority is reinforced by the subsection's failure to suspend
citizen suit authority when EPA approves a state program. Subsection 3006
(b) does not suspend citizen suit authority because it only suspends the
federal program "under this [subtitle]." Subsection 3006(b) is in Subchapter I11 which does not include the citizen suit provision.395
These factors lead to the conclusion that RCRA's federal enforcement authorities are not suspended by EPA's approval of state hazardous
waste programs. If there is any ambiguity, deference must be given to
EPA's interpretation of the statute if it is a reasonable one and is embod. ~ ~ ~has repeatedly interpreted RCRA in rulemakied in a r ~ l e m a k i n gEPA
Pub. L. No. 96-482, 9 13, 94 Stat. 2334, 2340 (1980).
Pub. L. No. 98-616, 9 232(a)(3), 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 (1984). Congress also changed
the wording of subsection 3008(d)(3) to conform to this language.
39'

392
393

Id

3 9 4$ 5 k
3008(d)(l),
~ ~ (2), 42

U.S.C. $9 6928(d)(l), (2). Prior to amendment in
1984, RCRA subsection 3008(d)(l) made it an offense to transport hazardous waste to a
facility without a permit "under section 3005 (or section 3006 in the case of a State program)." Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3008(d)(l), 90 Stat. 2795, 2812 (1976). In 1984, Congress
shortened that wording to "a permit under this [subtitle]." Pub. L. No. 98-616, 9 232(a)(l),
98 Stat. 3221, 3256 (1984). It used the same shortened phrase in the new subsection
3008(d)(2), making it an offense to treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste without or in
violation of a "permit under this [subtitle]." Pub. L. No. 98-616, Q 232(a)(2), 98 Stat. 3221,
3256 (1984). Unired Stares v. MacDonald & Warson Wasre Oil Co. rejected the contention
that when Congress dropped the reference to state-issued permits in subsection 3008(a)(l),
it decriminalized the action in states with approved programs. 933 F.2d 35, 44-45 (1st Cir.
1991).
39542U.S.C. 9 6926(b) (2000). Subchapter VII contains the citizen suit provision.
RCRA 9 7002,42 U.S.C. Q 6972 (2000).
396 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
Because EPA's interpretation is embodied in its rulemakings, deference under Chevron
survives United Stares v. Mead Co., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). For examples of judicial defer-
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ings to continue EPA enforcement authority after it has approved the state
programs.397EPA has also repeatedly interpreted RCRA in formal adjudications to continue EPA enforcement authority after it has approved state
programs.398
Not surprisingly, courts universally hold that when EPA approves a
state hazardous waste program, subsection 3006(b) suspends operation of
the "Federal program."399Also, most courts considering the question have
held that EPA's approval of the state program does not suspend EPA and
citizen enforcement authorities over violations of the approved state program.400Most courts have held that the wording and structure of the statence to EPA's interpretation that RCRA's federal enforcement authorities-both of EPA
and citizens-operate in states with approved programs as well as in other states, see
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001). and Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 796
F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1986).
397 40 C.F.R. 5 271.16(~)(2004) provides that penalties assessed by states for violations of approved RCRA programs be "appropriate to the violation," and, in a note to the
subsection, EPA warns that it may commence an enforcement action for additional penalties when it believes the state has assessed inadequate penalties. In 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(e)
(2004), EPA notes it may take action to suspend violated state-issued permits under RCRA
subsection 3008(a)(3). In approving the Idaho RCRA program, EPA stated that it "retains
the authority under [section 30081 of RCRA to undertake enforcement actions in authorized States" and that, for such actions, it "will rely on Federal sanctions, Federal inspections authorities . . . rather than the authorized State analog." Hazardous Waste Management Program Codification of Approved State Hazardous Waste Program for Idaho, 55
Fed. Reg. 50,327, 50,327-28 (Dec. 6, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 272). quoted in
Elias, 269 F.3d at 1010 n. 14. In approving the Texas program, EPA reiterated its interpretation that both EPA and citizen suit enforcement authorities survived approval of the state
program. See Texas; Decision on Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (Dec. 12, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
271), quoted in Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 261-62 (M.D. Pa. 1989). EPA
also used similar language in approving Colorado's program. See Texas; Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036, 41,037 (Oct.
19, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 27 I), quoted in United States v. Power Eng'g Co.,
10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 191 F.3d 1224, 1229
(10th Cir. 1999).
398 Bil-Dry Corp., 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001); Gordon Redd Lumber Co., 5 E.A.D. 301, 308
(1994); S. Timber Prod., lnc. 3 E.A.D. 371, 378 (1990); Martin Elecs., 2 E.A.D. 381, 385
(1987).
399 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999); AM Int'l, Inc. v.
Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1350 (7th Cir. 1997); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935
F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); United
States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Power
Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2000), aff'd, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2000);
Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1039-40 (E.D. Tex. 1995);
Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33,43 (D. Me. 1994); Orange Env't, Inc. v.
County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Clorox Co. v. Chromium
Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 123-24 (N.D. Ill. 1994); City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F.
Supp. 971, 979 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 834 F. Supp.
953, 958-59 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 261 (M.D. Pa.
1989); Williamsburg-Around-the-Bridge Block Ass'n v. Jorling, No. 98-CV-47 1, 1989 WL
98631 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1989); Thompson v. Thomas, 680 F. Supp. 1.3 (D.D.C. 1987).
4WElias,269 F.3d at 1003; Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d at 1229; Ashoff v. City of
Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81
F.3d 1361 (5th Cir. 1996); MacDonald & Warson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d at 35; Wyckoff
Co., 796 F.2d at 2000-01; United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286-90 (C.D.
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Ute indicate the approved state "program" operating in lieu of the federal
program is the set of state regulations establishing requirements and standards applicable to the regulated public handling hazardous waste and,
correspondingly, the federal "program" that is suspended by the approval
of the state program is not RCRA itself, but the set of EPA regulations
promulgated under Subchapter I11 to do the same.401The courts have not
defined the superseded Subchapter I11 regulations with any precision, but
the logic of the decisions leads to the conclusion that EPA approval of a
state hazardous waste permit program does not suspend all EPA Subchapter I11 regulations. Several types of federal Subchapter I11 regulations cannot be suspended. First, Subchapter I11 charges EPA and other
federal agencies with some responsibilities that continue after EPA approves state programs.402Second, Congress authorized EPA to approve
only part of the state's RCRA hazardous waste program when it meets
some but not all of the federal requirement^.^^' When EPA does so, the federal regulations corresponding to the approved portions of the state program are suspended, but the remainder of the federal regulations continue
to operate.404Third, federal RCRA regulations relating to EPA oversight
of approved state programs cannot be suspended, for the statute authorizes oversight of approved permit programs, which can begin only after
they are approved. Of course, the conclusion that regulated entities cannot violate federal regulations when EPA has approved a comparable state
program is little help to violators if EPA and citizens can enforce against
violations of the approved state regulations, a question that is considered
in the next Section.

Cal. 2000); L.E.A.D. v. Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 1999); Glazer, 894 F. Supp. at 1029; Acme Printing Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp.
1237, 1244 (E.D. Wisc. 1995); Clorox Co., 158 F.R.D. at 124; Murray, 867 F. Supp. at 33;
Coalition for Health Concern, 834 F. Supp. 953, 958-59 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Sierra Club v.
Chem. Handling Corp., 824 F. Supp. 195, 197 (D. Colo. 1993); Lutz, 725 F. Supp. at 261.
40' Elias, 269 F.3d at 1012; AM Int'l, Inc., 106 F.3d at 1350; Power Eng'g Co., 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 1059-60; Orange Env't, bzc., 860 F. Supp. at 1020-21; Coalition for Health
Concern, 834 F. Supp. at 958-59; Clorox Co., 158 F.R.D. at 123.
40'For instance, RCRA section 3017 charges EPA with the responsibility to control the
export of hazardous waste, a responsibility that is peculiarly federal since it involves foreign relations and working with the Secretary of State. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2000). RCRA
subsection 3016(a) requires all federal agencies to report to EPA every two years the inventory of sites on which they treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste, and section 3021
requires the Department of Energy to make a series of reports with regard to its generation
and disposition of mixed hazardous and radioactive waste. 42 U.S.C. $ 5 6937(a), 6939c
(2000).
403This seeming anomaly came about because states with approved programs met
RCRA's requirements as it was enacted in 1976, but not as it was amended substantially in
1984, prompting Congress to authorize the continued operation of the pre-1984 portion of
RCRA by states with already approved programs and the operation of the post-1984 portions of the program by EPA until it approves new parts of the state's program developed
to meet the new federal requirements. See RCRA 5 3006(g), 42 U.S.C. 6926(g) (2000).
4c4 See Murray, 867 F. Supp. at 43; City of Heath, 834 F. Supp. at 979.
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A few courts have concluded that the approved state programs supersede all of RCRA or all of Subchapter 111, as well as EPA's implementing
regulations.405They have done so with little analysis. The decisions are
wrong, for the reasons discussed above. The most considered opinion in
this respect is Harmon Industries, Inc. v.
Harmon is usually
cited as an "overfiling" decision, holding that EPA may not enforce against a
RCRA violation once a state has done so,407an issue discussed below.408
The opinion, however, initially concludes that the "in lieu o f ' language "reveals a congressional intent for an authorized state program to supplant
the federal hazardous waste program in all respects including enforcement."409 "[I]n all respects," of course, includes the statute and its EPA
enforcement provisions, as well as the regulations. The court admits, however, that the "in lieu o f ' language "refers to the program itself," rather
than to enforcement, but finds federal enforcement to be superseded because
"the administration and enforcement of the program are inexorably intertwined," without explaining what that means.410The court later admits
that EPA may enforce against a violation of an EPA approved state program
under subsection 3008(a)(2) if EPA gives the state prior notice and the
state fails to e n f ~ r c e . ~However,
"
administration and enforcement do not
appear any less "inexorably intertwined" in that circumstance.
The only support the Harmon court provides for its initial conclusion that approval of the state program suspends the federal statute as
well as the federal regulations is that, under subsection 3006(b), EPA may
revoke its approval of a state's program if the state fails to enforce it adequately. This, it concludes, confirms that states "have the primary role of
enforcing their own hazardous waste pr~gram."~"This is a non sequitur.
The court then "harmonizes" EPA's program revocation authority in subsection 3006(e) with the requirement of subsection 3008(a)(2) that EPA
notify a state with an approved program before taking enforcement ac405 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Dague v. City of
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds 505 U.S. 557
(1992); Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 91 1 F. Supp. 273, 276 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Williamsburg-Around-the-Bridge Block Ass'n v. Jorling, No. 89-CV-47 l , 1989 WL 9863 l , at
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1989).
191 F.3d at 894.
indee deed, courts seeking an easy way to distinguish it as not applying to the issue at
hand comment that it is only an overfiling decision, addressing not whether but when EPA
may enforce in a state with an approved program. United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003,
101 1-12 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (explaining that Harmon "is not about if, but about when, the United States can
bring a civil action in federal court after it has authorized a state program.").
See infra Part 1II.C.
409 191 F.3d at 899 (emphasis added).
410 Id. Subsection 3006(b) does not actually mention "administration."
This is an erroneous reading of subsection 3008(a)(2) which requires EPA to give
notice to the state in these circumstances, but does not bar EPA from enforcing if the state
enforces.
412 191 F.3d at 899.
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tion, concluding that EPA may take enforcement action in a state with an
approved program only if EPA has withdrawn its approval of the state
program or the state has failed to enforce. The court's conclusions are
internally inconsistent, incomplete, and incorrect.
First, the decision is internally inconsistent. In the same paragraph it
concludes both that an "authorized state program . . . supplant[s] the federal hazardous waste program in all respects including enforcement," and
that EPA also may enforce against a violation of an approved state requirement if EPA first gives the state notice and the opportunity to enforce against the violation and the state fails to do s ~ . It
~ later
"
concludes
that EPA may enforce if it first revokes its approval of the state proThese two exceptions to the court's assumption that EPA has no
enforcement authority in a state with an approved program subsequently
recur in its contention that EPA has no authority to "overfile" once the
state has commenced an enforcement action. This Article subsequently considers the two exceptions in that
Second, the decision is incomplete. It "harmonizes" its conclusion
with the authorization in subsection 3008(a)(2) for EPA to enforce against
violations in such a state, but fails to recognize that subsection 3008(a)(3),
(c), and (d) also authorize EPA to enforce against violations in states with
approved programs and to reconcile those authorities with its conclusion.
Furthermore, the decision is incorrect. Its "harmonization," that EPA
has enforcement authority if the state fails to enforce, reads the prior notice requirement of subsection 3008(a)(2) as if it were a three-element
notice, delay and bar preclusion device, whereas the device includes only
the notice element. Its "harmonization" that EPA has no enforcement
authority if it first withdraws its approval of the state's program reads something into the statute that simply is not there. There are fatal problems with
these harmonization arguments that the court did not recognize. These are
explored subsequently.416
The decision did not recognize the pattern Congress developed in the
environmental statutes of varying the strength of the preclusion device in
EPA and citizen enforcement provisions in accordance with the balance
Congress intended to strike between federal and state authorities. If Congress had intended a different balance in RCRA subsection 3008(a)(2), it
would have included either or both of the delay or bar elements as it did
in RCRA subsection 7002(b) and in other environmental statutes or it
would have given EPA limited enforcement authority as it did in RCRA
~ ' government does not appear to have made this
subsection 4 0 0 5 ( ~ ) . ~The
argument. It did, however, make the lesser argument that Congress's inId. (emphasis added).
Id.
415 See infra Part 1II.C.
4 1 6 See infra Part 1II.C.
4 ' 7 See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
413

414
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clusion of the notice, delay and bar in RCRA's citizen suit preclusion device,
subsection 7002(b), and its omission of the delay and bar in subsection
3008(a)(2) preclusion device is evidence it intended not to include them
in section 3008. The court dismissed this by stating that the "mere fact
that Congress did not choose to employ the exact same language as contained in an unrelated part of the act" had no bearing on the interpretation
of subsection 3008(a)(2).418The two sections, of course, are not unrelated.
They both authorize federal enforcement of RCRA: section 3008 authorizes enforcement by EPA and section 7002 authorizes enforcement by
citizens acting in EPA's stead as private attorneys general. Section 7002
cross-references section 3008, authorizing courts to assess section 3008
civil penalties in citizen suits. The preclusions in the two sections are
part of the same grand pattern of preclusion devices Congress developed
in the EPA and citizen enforcement authorities in all the environmental
statutes. The court did not recognize that its interpretation of the statute
would leave citizen enforcers with considerably greater authority than
EPA to enforce against violations in states with approved programs. Under the Court's theory, EPA approval of a state program suspends Subchapter I11 statutory authority, which includes EPA but not citizen enforcement authority. In short, the court substituted its preferred balance between
EPA and state enforcement authority for the balance that Congress intended
and wrote into the statute.
The court makes one last attempt to justify its conclusions with legislative history. It quotes three passages from the House Report accompanying the 1976 enactment of RCRA. The first two are to the effect that
states with approved programs have "primary enforcement authority" and
may "take the lead in the enforcement."419These observations are compatible with EPA retaining the power to enforce after a state's program is
approved. Indeed, they imply that EPA has at least a secondary enforcement role in states with approved programs. The final House Report passage the court cites states, "EPA 'after giving the appropriate notice to a
state that is authorized to implement the state hazardous waste program,
that violations of this Act are occurring and the state [is] failing to take
action against such violations, is authorized to take appropriate action
against those persons in such state."'420 This passage does not mention a
delay period for the state to take action and it does not assert that EPA is
barred from taking an enforcement action if the state has done so. In discussing subsection 3008(a)(2), the Committee report merely stated that
before taking an enforcement action in a state with an approved program,
EPA "must give notice to the state 30 days prior to" enforcing.421Again,
19 1 F.3d at 900.
Id. at 901.
420 Id.
42' Indeed, this passage does not occur in the Committee's discussion of section 3008,
but rather in its discussion of section 3006. H. REP.NO. 94-1491, at 31 (1976), reprinted in
418

419
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this is no support for the court's conclusion that EPA's enforcement authority is displaced by its approval of a state program. In fact, the passage supports the conclusion that EPA retains its enforcement authority
after approving a state program. In any event, the history of what Congress
actually did indicates that Congress intended for EPA to enforce against
violations in a state with an approved program.
The Harmon court is wrong: EPA's approval of a state hazardous
waste program does not suspend operation of the federal RCRA in the
state any more than its approval of a CAA or CWA permitting program suspends operation of the CAA and CWA in the state. The same result appears to follow under RCRA Subchapter IV, governing non-hazardous
solid waste. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held in Ashoff v. City of Ukiah422
that citizens could enforce against federal criteria for sanitary landfills regardless of whether EPA had approved a state's solid waste landfill program.423
B. May EPA and Citizens Enforce State Law After EPA Approves a
State Program?

The second argument that defendants use to infer preclusions against
EPA enforcement is that once a state program has been approved, neither
EPA nor citizens may enforce the approved state law. As discussed above,
EPA's approval of a state program does not suspend operation of the federal statute or its enforcement authorities in the state. Nevertheless, the
requirements governing the behavior of the regulated public at that point
may be state regulations or state permits. Defendants argue that EPA and
citizens cannot use federal enforcement authorities to enforce against
violations of state law. There are three approaches to addressing this assertion. One is that EPA's approval of a state program "federalizes" it, so
that the approved state law becomes federal law. Another is that the federal statutes make violations of the approved state law violations of federal law, without resort to the concept of "federalizing" state law. The
final approach is that the federal enforcement provisions authorize enforcement against violations of approved state programs.
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,6269.
422 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997).
423 The decision seems to enunciate the theory that upon EPA approval of the state
program, it "becomes effective" under RCRA and therefore enforceable under it. Id. at
41 1-12. The court, however, held that if the approved state program has a requirement that
is more stringent than the federal criteria, the citizen may only enforce to the limits of the
federal criteria. Id. at 413. See infra Part 1II.D. for a discussion of this issue. It also cites
RCRA subsection 4005(a), authorizing citizens to enforce against violations of the federal
criteria, "even after EPA has approved a state program." 130 F.3d at 41 1 n.3. Although
subsection 4005(a) does not contain the quoted language, that is the import of the subsection, which prohibits "open dumping" except under a schedule for compliance established
by states with approved programs. "Open dumps" are landfills not meeting the federal
criteria for sanitary landfills. RCRA 5 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 6945(a) (2000).
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The first approach, as noted above, considers a federally approved
state program to be federal law, at least for the purposes of federal enforcement provisions. The idea is articulated in a number of judicial decisions in various contexts,424though the statutes do not explicitly incorporate this "federalization" concept. Perhaps the courts embrace it as shorthand for a combination of the latter two approaches. It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court rejected the "federalization" concept in United
States Department of Energy v. Ohio,425but the Court in that case was
interpreting specific wording in an unrelated part of the statute426in the
context of a waiver of sovereign immunity.427Waivers of sovereign immunity are interpreted narrowly under their own set of doctrine and preced e n t ~ Regardless,
.~~~
the concept of federalization is sufficiently amorphous
to encourage looking elsewhere for justification of federal enforcement
against violations of approved state programs.
The second approach, that the federal statutes make violations of the
approved state law violations of federal law without "federalizing" the state
law, flows from the structures of the statutes. The CWA, CAA and RCRA
prohibit air and water pollution or the treatment, storage and disposal of
hazardous waste except in compliance with a permit issued by EPA or a
state with an approved program. These prohibitions make the specified
actions illegal regardless of whether they occur in states with approved programs. In essence, in states with approved programs, the prohibitions
make violations of a permit issued under EPA-approved state law also
violations of federal law. The basic prohibition of CWA subsection 301(a),
for instance, makes it illegal to discharge a pollutant "[elxcept as in
compliance with" various sections, including the permitting section.429
Subsection 402(k), in the permitting section, provides that compliance
with a permit "issued pursuant to this section" is deemed compliance with
section 301 for the purposes of EPA and citizen enforcement provisions.430
424 See La. Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing regulations delegating CAA section 1 12 implementation authority to states).
425 503 U.S. 607 (1992). The defendant in United States v. Flanagan made this argument, but the court rejected it. 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1012 n.29 (9th Cir. 2001).
426 503 U.S. at 609 (interpreting "arising under Federal Law" in CWA section 313, 33
U.S.C. 1323 (2000)).
427 United States Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 615.
428 There is a long history of attempts by Congress to waive the sovereign immunity of
federal facilities in order to make them subject to federal and state environmental laws and
to allow citizens and states to enforce them. The Court has found one attempt after another
not explicit enough to accomplish a full waiver. Id. at 607 (holding that RCRA section 601
and CWA section 313 do not waive sovereign immunity for assessment of federal or state
civil penalty); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976)
(holding that CWA section 313 did not waive sovereign immunity for state water permitting requirements); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that CAA § 118 did
not waive sovereign immunity for state air pollution permitting fee requirements).
13 I l (a) (2000).
429 3 3 U.S.C.
430 3 3 U.S.C.
1342(k) (2000).
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Section 402 governs EPA's approval of state permit programs as well as
the requirements of permits, whether issued by EPA or a state with an approved program. Therefore, permits issued either by EPA o r states with
approved programs are "issued pursuant to7' section 402. If permits issued by states with approved programs were not "issued pursuant to" section 402, compliance with those permits would not immunize their holders from suit for violating subsection 301(a).
Similarly, CAA subsection 502(a) prohibits violation of a permit "issued under this subchapter," a subchapter that authorizes EPA both to approve state permit programs meeting the federal criteria and to issue permits in states without approved programs.43' RCRA subsection 3005(a)
prohibits the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste "except in
accordance" with a RCRA permit "issued pursuant to this
Section 3005 also authorizes EPA and states with programs approved by EPA
under RCRA section 3006 to issue permits.433Section 3006 governs state
programs "pursuant to this s u b ~ h a p t e r . "RCRA
~ ~ ~ subsection 3008(a) authorizes EPA to enforce against violations of "this subchapter," which
includes subsection 3005(a) and its prohibition.435Thus, all three statutes
make it illegal to undertake the proscribed actions except in compliance
with a permit issued by EPA or by a state with an approved program. Federal statutes making violations of state law also violations of federal law
have been upheld in other contexts as
The third approach, that federal enforcement provisions authorize
enforcement against violations of approved state programs, flows from
the structures of the statutes' enforcement provisions. The EPA enforcement provisions of all three statutes authorize EPA to enforce against violations in states with approved programs. CWA subsections 309(a)(l) and
(3) authorize EPA to enforce civilly and administratively against violations of "a permit issued by a State under an approved permit program,"
and subsection 309(c) makes such negligent and knowing violations criminal offenses.437CAA subsection 113(a) authorizes EPA to enforce civilly
and administratively against violations of "an applicable implementation
plan or permit," and subsection 113(c) makes such knowing violations
criminal offenses.438RCRA subsection 3008(d) authorizes EPA to enforce
civilly and administratively against "a violation of any requirement of this
subchapter," and subsection 3008(c) makes knowing violations criminal
42 U.S.C. 5 7661a(a) (2000).
42 U.S.C. 5 6925(a) (2000).
433 42 U.S.C. 55 6925(c), 6926 (2000).
434 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(c).
435 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(a) (2000).
436 The Lacey Act, for instance, makes it a federal offense to violate specified state
laws regulating fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. 5 3372 (2000); see also United States v. Bryant, 7 16 F.2d 1091, 1093 (6th Cir. 1983).
437 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l), (a)(3), (c) (2000).
43s 42 U.S.C. 5 741 3(a), (c) (2000).
43'

432
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offenses in states with approved programs.439While it could be argued
that a "violation of this subchapter" means only violations of federal
regulations to the extent they are not superseded by approved state programs, subsection 3008(a)(2) requires EPA to give notice to a state with an
approved program before undertaking civil or administrative enforcement
against violations in the state. If EPA cannot enforce in such states, that
paragraph would be superfluous. Moreover, subsections 3008(a)(3) and
(c) authorize EPA to issue administrative orders to revoke a violator's permit, whether issued by EPA or by a state, again authorizing EPA to enforce in states with approved programs, as only states with approved programs may issue permits under the statute. Moreover, subsection 3005(d)
gives EPA authority to suspend or revoke violators' permits where EPA is
administering the program, making the permit suspension and revocation
authorities in subsections 3008(a)(3) and (c) superfluous unless they include the authority to suspend or revoke state-issued permits. Several of
the RCRA criminal offenses also specifically include violations of regulations promulgated by states with approved programs,440provisions that
also would be superfluous if EPA could not enforce state requirements
that operate in lieu of the federal program after EPA approves a state program. The citizen suit provisions of all three statutes also authorize citizen enforcement against violations of the statutes regardless of whether
they are administered by EPA or states.44'Thus, all three statutes specifically
authorize federal enforcement in states with approved programs.

C. May EPA Enforce Against a Violation of an Approved State Program
When the State Has Already Enforced Against the Violation, i.e.,
May EPA "Over-le?"
The question addressed in this Section is whether the statutes preclude
EPA from enforcing against a violation that the state has already enforced against (commonly known as " ~ v e r f i l i n g " ) . ~ ~
In statutes or parts of statutes where Congress was most deferential
to state administration and enforcement, it either entirely withheld enforcement authority from EPA, or used the preclusion device with all three ele-

439

42 U.S.C. 8 6928(a), (d).

"'RCRA 5 3008(d)(3)-(5),

42 U.S.C. 8 6928(d)(3)-(5).
CWA subsection 505(a) authorizes suit against violations of "an effluent standard or
limitation," and subsection 505(f) defines that term to include violations of section 301 or
of permits "issued under" section 402. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a), (f)(2000). As discussed above
in this section, these include discharges without or violating permits issued by either EPA
or a state with an approved program.
"2 The related question of whether common law doctrines may preclude such successive action though its answer may be affected by the statutory question, is not addressed
here. If the statutes preclude overfiling, the common law preclusions are irrelevant. On the
other hand, if the statutes explicitly permit overfiling, they may override common law preclusions.

"'
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ments to bar EPA enforcement if the state had already taken "appropriate" enforcement action. Congress used the preclusion device with all
three elements in the citizen suit provisions of all of the statutes, but never
precluded all successive citizen actions.443In most statutes or parts of statutes, Congress used the preclusion device in EPA enforcement provisions
with only one or two elements. In a few statutes, it created no role for
state implementation and did not use any form of the preclusion device in
the EPA enforcement provisions.
Congress's constant and varying use of the preclusion device unmistakably demonstrates that it explicitly addressed overfiling in the EPA and
citizen enforcement provisions, precluding or limiting overfiling in them
when it intended and allowing overfiling when it intended.
The presence of a limited preclusion device in an EPA enforcement
provision demonstrates congressional intent to limit overfiling but not bar
it altogether. The particular wording of the preclusion device in each provision demonstrates the "precise conditions" of preclusion Congress intended to operate under that provision.444The absence of the preclusion device in an EPA enforcement provision demonstrates Congress intended
not to limit overfiling. This is perhaps most evident in EPA enforcement
provisions where Congress precluded or limited EPA overfiling against
some types of violations, but not others.445
Not surprisingly, EPA interprets the statutes to give it overfiling authority, except where clearly precluded or limited by a particular statute.446
At the same time, EPA is cognizant of the prerogatives of the states and
the implicit criticism of the state's enforcement that overfiling imp lie^.^'
EPA seeks to avoid controversies with states by encouraging them to undertake more aggressive enforcement so that EPA need not consider overfiling or by declining to overfile where the state action is marginally effective although not as aggressive as EPA action would be.44a
443 See Miller, supra note 1, at 416-20. Under CWA section 505, for instance, Congress did not preclude citizens from suing if the government did not act first, did not enforce judicially to seek compliance and did not prosecute vigorously to secure compliance.
M4 Cal. Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. City of Sacramento, 905 F. Supp. 792, 801
(E.D. Cal. 1995).
445 This is particularly pronounced in CWA section 309. Congress specifically precluded EPA from overfiling under the CWA for penalties when the state had assessed penalties for the same violation, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2000). and from overfiling if EPA
chose to issue a notice of violation to the state at the onset of EPA action and the state
commenced an "appropriate enforcement action." 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l). Congress did
not preclude EPA from overfiling under any other circumstances in the section. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a)(3).
4J6 See supra notes 442-443 and accompanying text; infra notes 4 5 8 4 6 7 and accompanying text.
447 Indeed, it has a number of policy documents restricting the instances in which it
will overfile and requiring its regional offices to enter into memoranda of understanding
with states to coordinate their enforcement efforts, with the objective, among other things,
to minimize overfiling. See infra notes 4 6 8 4 7 2 ; supra note 10.
The most extensive commentary on the issue investigated the frequency of EPA
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Except under RCRA, there are few reported decisions on overfiling,
perhaps because defendants recognize that the statutes grant EPA overfiling
authority and because EPA avoids overfiling in many cases.M9Not surprisingly, in cases where overfiling has been challenged, courts have had
little trouble holding that the statutes authorize EPA to o ~ e r f i l e . ~ ~ ~
Under RCRA, however, the issue is more clouded by the congressional
declarations in the state program approval provision that an approved state
program operates "in lieu o f ' the federal program and that the actions of
an approved state have the "same force and effect" as actions by EPA.4"
These declarations led the Eight Circuit to hold in Harmon Industries,
Inc. v. Browner that EPA did not have authority to overfile under RCRA.452
As discussed above, the opinion also contains contradictory conclusions
on whether the "in lieu o f ' language suspends federal enforcement authority when EPA approves a state program.453
The Harmon court held that if. EPA may enforce in a state with an approved program when the state takes no action, the "same force and effect" language precludes EPA from enforcing when the state takes an enforcement action. Its analysis depends entirely on its contention that the
"same force and effect" language in subsection 3006(d) covers enforcement actions by the state, although the heading of the subsection is "Effect of State errn nit.""^ If that heading has any meaning, it can only be
that the state's action in issuing a permit has the same force and effect as
EPA's action in issuing a federal permit. The court's interpretation of the
subsection renders the heading meaningless, an interpretation to be
avoided.455In an earlier era when printers added section and subsection
headings to congressionally written statutory text, it made sense to disregard headings as a meaningful part of the statute. Here, however, because
Congress wrote the "Effect of State permit" heading and enacted it as
overfiling and found it to be very infrequent. Ellen R. Zahren, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at State Heels to Protect the Environment, 49 EMORYL.J. 373, 375
n.18 (2000) (noting the testimony of an assistant administrator before a Congressional
Committee that EPA overfiled in only a handful of cases a year); see also Joel A. Mintz,
Enforcement "Overfiling" in the Federal Courts: Some Thoughts on the Post-Harmon
Cases, 21 VA. ENVTL.L.J. 425,427 (2003).
M9 See infra notes 468-472; supra note 10.
450UnitedStates v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2001) (RCRA); United
States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999) (CWA); S. Ohio Coal Co. v.
Office of Surface Mining, 20 F.3d 1418 (1994) (CWA); United States v. 1TT Rayonier,
Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980) (CWA); United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
143 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (CAA); United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 118
F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (CAA); United States v. City of Youngstown, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 739, 741 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (CWA); United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp.
41 1 (D. Md. 1985) (CAA); United States v. Harford Sands, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md.
1983) (CAA); United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 741-42 (D. Del. 1981) (CWA).
451 RCRA 5 3006(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(b), (d)(2000).
452 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
453 See supra Part 1II.B.
4"42 U.S.C. 5 6926(d).
455 See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 324.
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part of the statute, it is entitled to consideration when interpreting the meaning of the subsection.456An often-cited precedent suggests ~therwise,''~'
but it is easily d i s t i n g u i ~ h e d . ~ ~ ~
The Harmon court found support for its conclusion in RCRA subsection 3006(e), authorizing EPA to withdraw its approval of a state program if EPA determines the state is "not administering and enforcing" the
program "in accordance with the requirements o f ' the section.459The court
evidently believed this provision was the remedy Congress intended EPA
to use when a state enforced against a violation, but did so inadequately.
Thus, the court concluded that EPA could enforce in a state with an approved program only if the state "took no action" or if EPA first withdrew its approval of the state program.460
The court may have thought this an optimal solution, assuring adequate enforcement of RCRA, while preserving the supremacy of the state
in administering and enforcing its approved program. Unfortunately, it
preserves state supremacy but does not assure adequate enforcement. Under
the court's analysis, as long as the state takes some enforcement action,
EPA can take no enforcement action unless it revokes its approval of the
state program.46'The court did not recognize that this leaves several holes
456

2A NORMANJ. SINGER,SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
3 47.14 (5th ed.

1992).
Bd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519,526-29 (1947).
While the section heading in the Trainmen statute and the subsection heading in
subsection 3006(d) both appear to narrow the following text, they have nothing else in
common. The Court in Trainmen interpreted one of seventeen subsections in a section of
the Interstate Commerce Act entitled "Commission procedure; delegation of duties; rehearings." Id. at 527. One of those subsections dealt with intervention. Read alone, the subsection applied to intervention both in administrative proceedings before the Commission and
in judicial proceedings in which the Commission was a party. The appellees contended that
the section heading limited the reach of the intervention subsection to administrative proceedings before the Commission. Id. The Court disagreed, reasoning that: the section was a
long and complicated collection of many authorities; the section heading was nothing more
than an incomplete summary of its contents; several of the subsections included authorities
beyond administrative proceedings before the Commission; and the intervention subsection
was one of a number of latter-day amendments to the section. Id. at 527-28. Moreover, the
Court cited legislative history demonstrating Congress was aware that some of the subsections did not deal with administrative procedures, making clear that it did not intend the
section heading to narrow any of the subsection authorities to only administrative proceedings. Id. at 528':
The relationship between subsection 3006(d) and its heading is entirely different. It is
not a section heading followed by seventeen disparate subsections. It is a subsection heading followed by a thirty-one word, single sentence subsection. In Trainmen, the administrative proceeding description in the section heading referred to much of the section, but not
all of it, and in particular not to the intervention subsection. In subsection 3006(d), the
subsection heading can refer only to the sentence that follows it. Congress wrote "[elffect
of State permit" to have some meaning. The only meaning it could have is that the state
actions in the subsection that have the same effect of federal actions are permit actions.
Nothing in the legislative history of subsection 3006(d) suggests otherwise. Neither the
reasoning nor the facts of Trainmen suggest a contrary interpretation.
459 42 U.S.C. $ 5 6901-6992k (2000).
4" See supra Part 1II.B.
46' "If the state fails to initiate any action, then the EPA may institute it own action."
457

458
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in the compliance/enforcement net. First, the court held that if the state
took any action against a violator, it would bar all EPA enforcement against
the same violator.462In other words, state enforcement against one violation by a defendant would foreclose EPA from enforcing against entirely
different violations by that defendant, perhaps even at different facilities.
Worse, if the state issued an administrative order deferring compliance
indefinitely, reducing the substantive requirements with which the violator must comply, or simply penalizing a continuing violation at one dollar a day, such actions would foreclose EPA from ever seeking compliance. This, of course, would enable the state to shield RCRA violators from
EPA enforcement and from compliance with RCRA. Carried to an extreme, it could allow a state to render RCRA inoperative within its borders.
The court would likely reply that Congress gave EPA a remedy for
that eventuality: revocation of EPA's approval of the state program. Yet
the court did not fully consider the nature of revocation of state program
approval. Revocation of a state's program is a shotgun rather than a rapier remedy in the context of federalism. Revocation of program approval
would run counter to the Congressional preference for state implementation of the program. Worse, from EPA's perspective, it would require an
immediate injection of federal personnel to conduct implementation tasks
previously performed by state personnel. It is the sort of remedy that EPA
would use only if it was clear the state was incapable of administering or
was systematically undercutting the program. The rapier remedy of EPA
overfiling is much less disruptive. Moreover, the only court considering
this issue, albeit under the CWA, expressed "skepticism whether a state authority's unsatisfactory handling of a single permit would ever warrant EPA
revocation."463 In all probability, that court would have reached the same
conclusion if the state had failed to enforce adequately against only one
violator.
EPA revocation of approval of a state program may be a remedy in a
situation in which a state renders RCRA entirely inoperative within its
borders by issuing inconsequential enforcement orders against all violators, thus shielding them from successive EPA enforcement for compliance with RCRA. Revocation is an inappropriate remedy, however, in situations of serious but not pervasive instances of the practice.4MMoreover,
-

Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
562 Id.
46'Save the Bay, Inc. v. Adm'r, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1290 (5th Cir. 1977). By contrast
to RCRA, Congress gave EPA a remedy under the CWA when a state issues a permit that
fails to meet the requirements of the CWA: EPA can veto the state permit and issue a federal permit. CWA § 402(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (2000); see also United States v.
Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 740 (D.Del. 1981); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 134, at 326 (noting the "[r]ule against interpreting statutes to be retroactive" and citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988)).
4M EPA has on occasion raised the specter of states sabotaging the federal program by
similar means. In United States v. General Motors Corp., it argued that states could thwart
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even if EPA did revoke its approval of the state's program in such a situation, it is not clear under the Harmon court's analysis that revocation of
approval would remove the shield against EPA enforcement that the earlier state order had conferred on the violator. Unless the revocation of
approval is retrospective, an order made by the state prior to revocation
would still have the same force and effect as if EPA had issued the order
itself; it would preclude EPA from further enforcement. The Court's general presumption against retrospective application of government action,
unless it is clearly intended, might assure this result.465RCRA subsection
3006(e) does not specify that revocation of approval of a state program is
retrospective. Indeed, the provision requires EPA to notify the state and
allow it to take appropriate corrective action within a reasonable time
before revoking approval of the program.466This suggests that revocation
would not be retrospective.
Moreover, the consequences of retrospective revocation of approval
would be problematic. The state program approval could not have been void
from the beginning, since the inadequate enforcement action justifying
revocation occurred later. If revocation is retrospective to the time that the
inadequate enforcement action was taken, actions taken by the state after
that time but in conformity with RCRA also would be ineffective. That
would yield a counterproductive and chaotic result.
The Harmon court did not defer to EPA's interpretation of the statute. EPA has long interpreted the statute to allow it to overfile. This interpretation was enunciated in an opinion of its General Counsel in 1986.467Soon
thereafter the opinion was attached to a policy statement, "Guidance on
RCRA Overfiling," which instructed that "[rlegions should continue to
overfile RCRA enforcement actions when the state fails to take timely
and appropriate
EPA's Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB")
and, before the EAB's creation, EPA's Chief Judicial Officer ("CJO"),
adopted this interpretation in rejecting challenges to RCRA administrative penalty assessments.469EPA has also incorporated this interpretation

enforcement of the CAA by flooding EPA with revisions to their state implementation
plans. 876 F.2d 1060, 1067 (1 st Cir. 1989).
465 E.g., Landgraf v. US1 Film Prods., 51 1 U.S. 244, 280-86 (1994).
4" See 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(e) (2000).
Effect on EPA Enforcement Action Taken by State With Approved RCRA Program,
Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to Lee M. Thomas, EPA
Administrator (May 9, 1986), available at http:Nwww.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/
policies/civil/rcra/rcraoverfiling-mem.pdf(last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
468 Memorandum from A. James Barnes, Deputy Administrator (May 19, 1986), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/civiYrcra/rcraoverfiling-mem.pdf
(last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
469 Bil-Dry, 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001); Harmon Elecs., lnc., 7 E.A.D. 1, 9-10 (1997); Gordon
Redd Lumber Co., 5 E.A.D. 301, 308 (1994); S. Timber Prods., Inc., 3 E.A.D. 37 1, 378
(1990); Martin Elecs., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 381, 385 (1987).
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into its rule making^.^^^ Thus, EPA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron4"
deference, even under Mead.472The Eighth Circuit's opinion not only completely ignores EPA's longstanding interpretation, but it reads a subsection heading out of the statute. Not only is the decision ill-conceived, but
its result allows states effectively to modify the application of national standards by inadequate enforcement, thereby undermining national uniformity of regulatory standards and protection of public health.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Harmon court is correct in concluding
that subsection 3006(d) deems a state's enforcement action to have the same
force and effect as an EPA enforcement action, the impact of that conclusion on EPA overfiling depends on the force and effect an EPA enforcement
action would have on a successive EPA enforcement action. The court does
not ask whether an EPA enforcement action would bar a subsequent EPA
enforcement action or the extent to which it would do so. While the court
used res judicata as a separate basis of its analysis,473it did not do so as
part of its subsection 3006(d) analysis.474Nothing in the text of RCRA section 3008, the EPA enforcement section, bars EPA from subsequent enforcement if EPA has already enforced. Because the section's goal is compliance, it would be contrary to the section's purpose to bar EPA from sub-

470 The note following 4 0 C.F.R. § 27 1.16(c) (2003) cautions that when a state with an
approved program assesses inadequate penalties against a violation, EPA may bring an
action for additional penalties.
471 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
472 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Even if EPA's interpretation is
not entitled to Chevron deference, it is entitled to respect in accordance with the formality
of the procedures in which it developed the interpretation, the longevity and consistency of
its interpretation, and the persuasiveness of the interpretation. Id. at 235-38. If EPA's procedures were not formal enough to warrant Chevron deference, they were open, formal,
subject to notice and comment, and judicial review. The interpretation has been in force
and followed consistently since at least 1986, and it is a persuasive and reasonable interpretation.
EPA's CJO ruled in BKK Corn. that EPA is orecluded from enforcine in a state with an
approved plan if the State had taken reasonable and appropriate enforcement action against
the same violations. No. RCRA-IX-84-0012, 1984 WL 50073 (Apr. 13, 1984). vacated,
No. IX-84-0012, 1985 WL 57150 (Oct. 23, 1985). His decision was based on the same
rationale as the decision in Harmon: the "in lieu o f ' language
- - of RCRA subsection
3006(b) and the language in subsection 3006(d) that actions of states with approved programs are "deemed to be the actions" of EPA. He came to a substantially different conclusion than Harmon, however, for the Eighth Circuit held that EPA was precluded from enforcement when the state had taken any enforcement action, not just a reasonable and appropriate one. In response to a petition for reconsideration by EPA staff, the Administrator
dismissed the complaint and vacated the final order of the CJO and the initial decision of
the Administrative Law Judge, rendering them without value as precedent in the Agency.
RCRA 3008, 84-85 (Oct. 23, 1985). EPA did not object to the policy enunciated in the
CJO's opinion or even to its application to the facts. It objected to enshrining the interpretation of the statute in a formal agency interpretation of the statute. Because of concessions
by the staff, the Administrator was able to declare the controversy over and dismiss the
case without addressing the legal issue. Shortly after this event, EPA issued its policy on
overfiling under RCRA. See supra note 450.
473 Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 1 F.3d 894,902-03 (8th Cir. 1999).
474 Id. at 899-901 (citing 42 U.S.C. 5 6926 (2000)).
-

z

-
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sequent enforcement if its initial enforcement against a violator was ineffective in securing compliance. Not surprisingly, if EPA issues a compliance order to a violator and the order does not secure compliance, nothing
in the text of the section bars EPA from issuing a subsequent order, seeking an injunction, or seeking a criminal sanction.475Indeed, the section explicitly contemplates such subsequent enforcement,476as do citizen s ~ i t s . ~ "
The other statutes have similar provisions contemplating successive enforcement by EPA against the same or different violation^.^'^ Indeed, nothing in any of the statutes precludes the government from taking both civil
and criminal actions against the same violations.479Furthermore, EPA would
be expected to take successive actions against the same violator if its violations continued after the first action. If subsequent EPA enforcement in
this context is barred, it is barred by common law, not by RCRA.
Harmon spawned a burst of commentary, much of which is critical of
the decision and argues that it does not apply under other statutes.480Courts
have rejected attempts to invoke Harmon under other statutes,481and have
also rejected further attempts to invoke it under RCRA, but often because
it was di~tinguishable.~~?
Moreover, the EAB has rejected it, though also

RCRA $ 3008,42 U.S.C. 8 6928.
See RCRA 8 3008(c), 42 U.S.C. $ 6928(c).
477 See supra Pan I.C.
478 CWA subsection 309(d) and CAA subsection 113(b)(2) authorize a court to assess
penalties for violations of EPA compliance orders. 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
9: 7413(b)(2) (2000).
479 See LAND& NATURAL
RESOURCES
DIVISION,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,DIRECTIVE
NO. 5-87: GUIDELINES
FOR CIVILA N D CRIMINAL
PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
(1987), available at http://www.sprlaw.comlhtml/guidelines.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2004) (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review); Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator,
Parallel Proceedings Policy (June 22, 1994), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMESDESKBOOK199 (1996).
480 Cristiana Coop, Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 253 (2001);
Lisa Dittman, Comment, Overjling: Policy Arguments in Support of the Gorilla in the
Closet, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV.375 (2000); Bryan S. Miller, Harmonizing RCRA's Enforcement Provisions: RCRA Overjling in Light of Harmon Industries v. Browner, 5 ENVTL.L.
585 (1999); Bryan S. Miller, Understanding Overfiling: The Impact of Two Recent Federal
Cases on EPA Over$ling, 15 J . ENVTL.L. & LITIG.21 (2000); Mintz, supra note 448;
Zahren, supra note 448. The Miller articles favor the Harmon decision; the others criticize
it, presenting legal and policy reasons to justify overfiling.
48'SeeUnited States v. Bryant, 716 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983).
482 United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 101 1 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Flanagan,
126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Browner is not about if, but about when,
the United States can bring a civil enforcement action in federal court after it has authorized a state program."); United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F, Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo.
2000), aff'd on other grounds, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (offering a detailed and
analytic rejection of Harmon).
475

476
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in a case that was disting~ishable.~~'
Not surprisingly, EPA has announced it
will not follow Harmon, even under RCRA, except in the Eighth Cir~uit.~~''
D. May EPA and Citizens Enforce Against Violations of Approved State
Program Requirements that Are More Stringent Than or Beyond the
Scope of the Superseded Federal Program?

The final imputed preclusion promoted by defendants would bar EPA
and citizens from enforcing against violations of approved state programs
that are either more stringent or beyond the scope of existing federal regulations on the subject. Unlike the spurious arguments heretofore discussed
in this Section, this imputed preclusion has merit in some cases, but not
others, depending on the enforcement mechanism used in each statute. This
Section will examine the different possible approaches to resolving this
complex issue, then discuss the application of the imputed preclusion in
each statute.
A state requirement that is more stringent than a federal requirement
regulates a pollutant or an activity already subject to a federal requirement,
but regulates it more than the corresponding federal regulation. A state
requirement that is beyond the scope of a federal requirement regulates a
pollutant or an activity that is not regulated at all by the federal program.
A federally approved state program might include both state requirements
that are more stringent than the corresponding federal requirements and
state requirements that are beyond the scope of the federal requirements.
The statutes establish minimum criteria that state programs must
meet to gain EPA approval485and explicitly preserve the rights of the states
to provide requirements more stringent but not less stringent than the federal
requirements.486EPA, therefore, could not disapprove part of a state program because it was more stringent than the federal program.487EPA, how483 Bil-Dry Corp., 9 E.A.D. 575 (2001). Although the EAB took pains to reject Harmon,
the appeal it decided was of an EPA penalty assessment for a violation in a state with an
approved program, but not in a case where the state had already taken enforcement action.
EPA simply had not overfiled.
484 "In the wake of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, EPA's General Counsel has reaffirmed
that while Harmon is final and binding on EPA in that particular case, the Agency would
not adopt the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of RCRFA nationwide." Bil-Dry Corp., 9
E.A.D. 575, 590 (2001) (citing Letter from Gary S. Guzy to Congressman David M.
McIntosh, at 3 (May 22, 2000)).
CWA 5 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (2000); RCRA 5 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. 8 6926(b)
(2000); CAA 5 I lO(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a) (2000). See supra Part 1II.C.
486 CWA 5 510, 33 U.S.C. 8 1370 (2000); CAA Q 1 16, 42 U.S.C. Q 7416 (2000); RCRA
Q 3009.42 U.S.C. 5 6929 (2000).
487 This may not be true for RCRA, which requires EPA to approve state programs that
are "equivalent to the Federal program" and "not [inlconsistent" with the Federal or State
programs applicable in the other States. 42 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000). This would give EPA
authority to disapprove a state program, for example, that went so far beyond the federal
program as to effectively remove the state as a repository of hazardous wastes. If all states
did so, of course, interstate movement of hazardous waste would be threatened and inter-
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ever, could disapprove of part of a state program because it was beyond
the scope of the federal program, i.e., it was not responsive to the statutory criteria for approving the program. Such disapproval would not invalidate the state requirements; they would remain in effect under state law,
but would not become effective under federal law. None of the statutes explicitly address whether state requirements more stringent than or beyond
the scope of federal requirements are federally enforceable. As an abstract proposition, it may be argued that neither should be federally enforceable, for both are beyond the requirements that EPA and citizens could enforce in the absence of an approved state program. As a practical matter,
however, many of the more stringent state requirements are inseparable from
the corresponding federal requirements. As to these requirements, the underlying federal requirement could not be achieved without enforcing the
more stringent state equivalents. The same cannot be said for state requirements that are beyond the scope of the federal requirements. This suggests
that state requirements that are more stringent than federal requirements
should be federally enforceable while state requirements that are beyond
the scope of federal requirements should not be. Of course, these general
propositions may be ovenidden by the wording of the particular statutes.
1. Three Approaches to the Question

Confronted with attempts to enforce against violations of federally approved state programs that are more stringent than their corresponding federal requirements, courts could rule either that the more stringent state
standards: (1) are not federally enforceable; (2) are federally enforceable,
but only up to the level of the corresponding federal requirements; or (3) are
enforceable in their entirety. The first alternative leaves the corresponding federal requirements unenforceable. A state, thus, could insulate all
its sources from federal standards simply by submitting a state program
slightly more stringent than every requirement in the federal program and
then not enforcing the state requirements. If EPA and citizens could not
enforce the federal requirements because they were supplanted by the
state requirements,488and could not enforce the approved state requirements
because they were more stringent than the federal requirements, pollution
sources in the state would be effectively insulated from the federal requirements. This first alternative, therefore, is unacceptable, as it thwarts the
very purposes of the federal statutes.
The second alternative appears to meet exactly the purposes of the federal statutes and to be the correct alternative. As a practical matter, however, it is feasible only when both the state and federal standards are stated
state manufacturing would be imperiled from lack of places to treat and dispose of hazardous waste. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
488 See supra Part 1I.B.
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in numerical units of measurement. To demonstrate, assume a pollution
source emits 1.5 ppm of the organic pollutant subject to a 1.0 ppm federal limitation and a 0.5 ppm state limitation. The pollution source violates both requirements. EPA or citizens could obtain a federal injunction
requiring the source to comply with the 1.0 ppm federal standard, thus leaving the source in violation of the more stringent 0.5 ppm state standard.
The state, if it chose, would still be able to obtain a state injunction to
comply with its more stringent standard. There is no problem with separable enforcement as long as the federal and state requirements are stated
in quantitative units of measurement.
Federal and state requirements that are not stated in quantitative units
of measurement, however, may not be separable. For instance, requirements that are narrative and qualitative may not be separable from requirements that are stated in quantitative units of measurement. The number
and location of groundwater monitoring wells surrounding a facility, for
example, must be "sufficient" and "appropriate" to indicate the quality of
groundwater affected by the permitted facility.489Many RCRA regulatory
requirements are established by the professional judgment of the permit
writer.490Since there is no objective standard useful for comparison of the
federal and state standard, any attempt to draw a line where the federal standard ends and the state standard begins will be in vain.
Enforceability by EPA and citizens only up to the level of the federal
requirement could be effective in instances in which state and federal
limitations are separable, leaving the first or third alternatives to apply in
other instances. However, that scheme brings with it the undesirable results inherent in the first and third alternatives, albeit on a more limited basis
than if either alternative applied in all cases. Moreover, it does not help
to determine whether the first or third alternatives apply in such circumstances.
That conclusion leaves only the third alternative, that state requirements are enforceable in their entirety. While federal enforcement of the
more stringent state standard may be overkill in terms of the environmental-

489

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.97(a) (2004):

The ground-water monitoring system must consist of a sufficient number of wells,
installed at appropriate locations and depths to yield ground-water samples from
the uppermost aquifer that: (1) represent the quality of background water that has
not been affected by leakage from the regulated unit . . . and (2) Represent the
quality of ground-water passing the point of compliance.
490 If the state's regulation adds after "appropriate" in the federal regulation "but at
least every 25 feet," the state requirement is a more stringent state requirement when it
requires more monitoring wells than an EPA permit writer would require under the federal
regulation. It is impossible, however, to determine whether the state requirement is more
stringent than the federal requirement in a particular permit without a parallel federal permit issuance in order to determine whether the federal requirement would allow more than
twenty-five feet between the wells.
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protection purpose of the federal statute, it is consistent with the policy
and goals of the federal statutes to allow states to establish pollution abatement standards more stringent than the federal standard^.^^' Courts that have
rejected the third alternative have done so because federal enforcement of
the more stringent state standard removes from the state its prosecutorial
discretion to determine if and when the more stringent part of the state
standard may be enforced.492This rationale allows the state discretion to
insulate sources from the federal standard, unacceptably defeating the
environmental-protection purpose of the federal statute.
This holding should not be followed because the state can preserve
its discretion not to enforce its more stringent state standard, while preserving the federal enforceability of the federal standard. It can do so by
not submitting the more stringent portion of the state standard as part of
the state program to be approved by EPA. For instance, in the monitoring
well example,493the state could simply submit a clone of the federal regulation to EPA for approval and, after approval, amend the state regulation
to make it more stringent. This leaves a less stringent standard as part of
the approved and federally enforceable state program, and the more
stringent portion of the standard enforceable by the state but not part of
the approved and federally enforceable state program. Such part-approval
amendments could trigger federal review to determine whether the state
program still qualifies for federal approval. This requires a statute-specific
analysis, but generally the statutes preserve the states' authority to have
requirements more stringent than the federal requirements.494
Because the objectionable result of the third alternative can be avoided
by the state, it is the preferable alternative, either alone or in combination
with the second alternative. Moreover, it is preferable alone rather than in
combination with the second alternative because applying it alone results
in a single rule for the federal enforceability of more stringent state standards in approved state programs.

2. Statute-by-Statute Analysis
This abstract analysis, however, may be greatly affected by differences
between the federal statutes. The CWA, for instance, requires state water
49' These statutes generally have state administration as a policy. See, e.g., CWA Q 101(b),
33 U.S.C. Q 1251(b). At the same time, they preserve the rights of states to have standards
more stringent than the federal standards. See, e.g., CWA Q 510, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000).
Stricter state standards provide more environmental protection than less stringent federal
standards, thus furthering the environmental protection goals of the statutes. See, e.g.,
CWA Q 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a).
492Ashoffv. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that RCRA
does not authorize citizen suits based on more stringent state standards).
493 See supra note 490.
494 See, e.g., CWA 5 510, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000); RCRA Q 3009, 42 U.S.C. Q 6929
(2000); CAA Q 1 16,42 U.S.C. 5 7416 (2000).
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pollution standards that are more stringent than federal standards to be
included as conditions in permits and to be complied with.495It also requires EPA to include in permits all conditions that a state in which the permitted discharge is located deems necessary to meet state requirements
relating to water.496The Supreme Court held in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Department of Ecology that federal agencies issuing permits have no choice but to include such conditions in permits, even
though they do not originate in federal requirement^.^^' These conditions
could include state standards that are either more stringent than their corresponding federal standards or beyond the scope of the federal program.
The CWA also authorizes both EPA and citizens to enforce against violations of permits, whether issued by EPA or states.498It follows that both
may enforce against violations of permit conditions derived from state standards that are more stringent than the corresponding federal standards.
EPA's regulations, however, establish that provisions of approved state
programs beyond the scope of the CWA are not federally enforceable, although the regulations do not specifically address the enforceability of
permit conditions based on such state provisions.499
Relying on EPA's regulations and misapplying other Supreme Court
precedent, one court has held that citizens may not enforce against violations of conditions in state-issued permits that are beyond the scope of the
CWA.500It does not make sense, however, for EPA and citizens to enforce
state provisions beyond the scope of the CWA in EPA-issued permits, but
not in state-issued permits. The court did not consider this. It issued its
495 CWA subsection 301(b)(l)(C) requires compliance with more stringent state standards. 33 U.S.C. Q 131 l(b)(l)(C) (2000). CWA subsection 402(a)(l)(A) requires EPA to
include section 301 requirements in permits, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(a)(l)(A) (2000), and CWA
subsection 402(b)(l)(A) requires states with approved programs to do so as well, 33 U.S.C.
Q 1342(b)(l)(A). Finally, CWA subsection 309(a) authorizes EPA to enforce against violation of "any condition" based on section 301 in a permit issued by EPA or a state with an
approved program. 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(a) (2000).
496 CWA $5 302(b)(l)(C), 401(a), 401(d), 33 U.S.C. QQ 1312(b)(l)(C), 1341(a), 1341(d)
(2000).
497 51 1 U.S. 700 (1994).
CWA Q Q 309(a)(l), 505(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. Q Q 13 19(a)(l), 1365(a)(l) (2000).
499 40 C.F.R. Q 123.1(i)(2) (2004).
500 Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co. held that requirements in a permit
issued by a state with an approved program broader in scope than the federal standards
were not enforceable by citizens. 12 F.3d 353, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1994) The court relied on
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio which held that citizens could not enforce the penalty provisions in an approved state program because they did not arise under federal law.
503 U.S. 607, 624-25 (1992). In that case, Ohio, suing the Department of Energy ("DOE")
under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and RCRA, was thwarted in its attempt to
have penalties assessed under the penalty provisions of the federal statutes because the
Court held the statutes did not waive sovereign immunity in that regard. Id. at 620. Ohio
then tried to have penalties assessed under the state statute, but the Court held that that was
beyond the jurisdiction of the citizen suit provisions. Id. at 625-26. The decision, of
course, does not deal with state standards or requirements, but with state procedures. It
also involved an asserted waiver of federal sovereign immunity, subject to a long history of
narrow interpretation. See supra note 428.
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opinion before PUD No. I and might well have come to a different conclusion in light of that decision. Under the peculiar structure and wording of
the CWA, conditions of permits derived from state requirements that are
either more stringent or beyond the scope of their federal counterparts are
enforceable by both EPA and citizens.50'
The CAA contains no provision comparable to CWA subsection 30 1 (b)
(l)(C), which requires EPA to include state requirements more stringent
or beyond the scope of the corresponding federal requirements in EPAissued permits. The conceptual basis of the CAA program is substantially
different in this regard. EPA promulgates national ambient air quality
standards for individual pollutants, and states develop implementation
plans to achieve the federal standards.502The implementation plans include emission limitations on air pollution sources designed to reduce pollution sufficiently to achieve the federal ambient air quality standards. For
any source of a pollutant for which EPA has promulgated a standard, it is
difficult to determine whether the state requirements in the implementation plan are more or less stringent than federal requirements, for they are
just part of the mix of controls on all sources that must, in the aggregate,
achieve the federal standard. Indeed, the Court has held that EPA must approve a state implementation plan that goes beyond and is more stringent
than federal requirements.503The structure of the CAA, therefore, suggests that state requirements in an approved implementation plan for an
individual pollutant that are more stringent than federal requirements are
federally enforceable. On the other hand, state requirements beyond the
scope of the CAA may not fit this rationale. For instance, state requirements
for controlling a pollutant for which EPA has not promulgated a standard
are beyond the scope of the federal program and need not be federally enforceable to achieve the goals of the CAA.S04Courts have generally held that
such requirements are not federally enforceable.505
50' United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 795-96 (E.D. Va. 1997),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 19 1 F.3d 5 16, 526 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that EPA may enforce stricter state requirement included in permit issued by state with
approved program); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620
(D. Md. 1987) (applying stricter state upset and bypass defense in citizen suit for violation
of permit issued by state with approved program.).
'OzCAA $5 109-1 l 0 , 4 2 U.S.C. 00 7409-7410 (2000).
503 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
504 Both the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions authorize enforcement against "an
applicable implementation plan." 42 U.S.C. 09 7413(a)(I), 7604(a)(1), 7604(f) (2000). The
CAA defines "applicable implementation plan" to mean a plan or portion of a plan approved by EPA "which implements the relevant requirements for this chapter." 42 U.S.C.
5 7602(q) (2000). State requirements beyond the scope of the CAA do not implement its
requirements, while state requirements more stringent than the C A R S requirements do
implement its requirements.
505 But see Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding that citizens may enforce requirements in State Implementation Plans
("SIP") that are more stringent than federal standards, but not SIP standards that are beyond the scope of the CAA). The Seventh Circuit discussed but did not decide the issue in
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Under RCRA, EPA may not approve a state program unless it is
"equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program under Subchapter
III.506A state may impose requirements on the handling of hazardous waste
that are "more stringent" than those under Subchapter 111,507but may not
impose requirements that are "less stringent."508Therefore, once EPA approves a state RCRA program, the state may impose more stringent requirements on the regulated public than are required by RCRA. Most such
requirements, of course, are contained in permits issued by the state. Because the requirements imposed by RCRA are fairly stringent and most
state programs are virtual clones of RCRA, this is not often the case, but
it does occur on occasion. EPA may enforce civilly against violations of
"any requirement of this ~ u b c h a p t e r . "Its
~ ~ ~authority to enforce criminally is detailed more explicitly, but includes treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste without or in violation of a "permit under this
s u b ~ h a p t e r . "Citizens
~~~
may enforce against violations of "any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order that has
become effective pursuant to this ~hapter."~"
At least with regard to the
common violations of treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste
without or in violation of a RCRA permit, the plain wording of the statute makes it illegal for anyone to treat, store or dispose of hazardous waste
without or in violation of an EPA issued RCRA permit.512Once EPA approves a state program, the state issues permits "in lieu o f ' EPA and the
effect of a state permit is deemed to have the "same force and effect" as
an EPA-issued permit.513Insofar as they are incorporated in a state-issued
permit, "more stringent state" requirements operate in lieu of EPA requirements and have the same force and effect as EPA requirements. EPA
and citizens, therefore, may enforce them as if they were EPA requirements. Indeed, EPA's regulations provide that more stringent standards in
an approved state plan are enforceable under RCRA,514while state requirements that are beyond the scope of RCRA are not part of the approved plan and therefore are not federally enfor~eable."~
The sole decision of which the author is aware, addressing the issue under RCRA SubVillage of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1994). It
did indicate that federal enforcement of SIP requirements more stringent than federal requirements was conceivable, for they might be counterbalanced by other SIP requirements
that were less stringent than federal requirements, in a balance meeting the desired air
quality. Id.
506 RCRA Q 3006(b), 4 2 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) (2000).
507 But see supra note 487.
508 RCRA Q 3009,42 U.S.C. 5 6929 (2000).
509 RCRA 3 3008(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(a)(1) (2000).
5 1 0 RCRA 5 3008(d)(2)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. Q 6928(d)(2)(A)-(B).
5 1 1 RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000).
5 1 2 RCRA 5 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. Q 6925(a) (2000).
5 1 3 RCRA Q 3006(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. 5 6926(b), (d) (2000).
5 1 4 4 0 C.F.R. Q 27 1 . 1 (h)(i)(l) (2003).
5 1 5 4 0 C.F.R. Q 27 I . 1 (h)(i)(2).
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chapter 111, cited these regulations as authoritative, but found the defendant had not adequately briefed its contention that the state requirements
it allegedly violated were beyond the scope of RCRA.5'6
The Ninth Circuit held in Ashoff v. City of Ukiah5" that citizens could
enforce the minimum federal standard under RCRA Subchapter IV, regulating non-hazardous waste landfills, but not the more stringent state standard, in essence allowing EPA and citizen enforcement only to the limit
of the federal standards. Because the suit was to enforce against Subchapter
IV violations rather than Subchapter I11 violations, the statutory analysis
suggested above does not apply, although the practical difficulties with alternative two remain. Although the court did not notice
the substantial differences between Subchapters I11 and IV support the court's conclusion. There is no federal program under Subchapter IV. EPA is to promulgate "sanitary landfill" criteria for non-hazardous waste landfills.
Landfills not meeting the federal criteria are declared "open dumps." States
are to develop permit programs to close open dumps or make them conform to the federal criteria and submit them to EPA for approval. Thereafter,
states are supposed to implement and enforce the programs and permits. If a
state's program is approved, EPA has no enforcement authority. If a state
does not have an approved permit program, EPA does not develop one or
issue permits, although it may enforce the federal criteria against individual open
The court's conclusion appears to be grounded in its
implicit observation that RCRA invests considerably less importance in
the effective implementation and enforcement of the Subchapter IV program than it does in the Subchapter I11 program. The court could have
reached the opposite conclusion, however, by finding that the more stringent state standard and the permit requirement based on it had "become
effective" pursuant to RCRA upon EPA's approval of the state program
and thus enforceable under the citizen suit provision, subsection 7002(a)(l)
(A). But since EPA could not enforce the more stringent state standard in
a state with an approved program, to allow citizens to do so seems anomalous. EPA cannot enforce even its own solid waste standards in a state with
an approved program, while citizens may, which also seems anomalous.520
In conclusion, analysis of the statutes suggests that requirements in
federally approved state programs that are more stringent than corre5 ' 6 Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1040-41 (E.D. Tex.
1995). The court in United Stares v. Flanagan came to the same conclusion, although it
was not squarely faced with the issue. 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
5 ' 7 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 ' 8 The court instead noted differences between RCRA section 7 0 0 2 . 4 2 U.S.C. 5 6972
(2000). on the one hand and CWA section 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000), and CAA section
304, 4 2 U.S.C. 5 7404 (2000), on the other. It noted that the CWA and CAA provisions
authorized citizens to enforce against state-issued orders, while the RCRA provision did
not. Ashoff, 130 F.3d at 41 2-1 3.
519 RCRA 5 4005(c), 4 2 U.S.C. 5 6945(c) (2000).
520 See supra Part I.A.3.
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sponding federal requirements generally are federally enforceable, particularly if they are incorporated into permits. Conversely, requirements
in federally approved state programs that are beyond the scope of the federal
programs are generally considered not to be part of the federally approved
programs and hence generally are not federally enforceable. Under the
unique certification provision of the CWA,"' however, such requirements
are enforceable when incorporated into EPA-issued permits.

Part One observed that courts split dramatically when interpreting some
parts of the preclusion device in citizen suit provisions, particularly on
~ ~ ~ most courts are conthe meaning of "is diligently p r o ~ e c u t i n g . "While
tent to interpret the device in accordance with the plain meaning, others
depart from its plain meaning to thwart citizen enforcement in favor of
the prosecutorial discretion of the earlier government enforcer, usually a
state government. Those courts find encouragement to disregard the plain
meaning of the statutes in the Supreme Court's observation in Gwaltney
~ ' citizen enforceof Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay F o ~ n d a t i o n ~that
ment supplements rather than supplants government enforcement. Part One
analyzed Gwaltney and found it to be a deeply flawed opinion in this regard. Although Gwaltney did not interpret the preclusion device,524every
decision interpreting the device to defeat citizen suits has relied heavily
on it. Their reliance on Gwaltney's observation is ironic, for the Court's
primary interpretive technique in the decision was to apply the plain meaning of the tenses Congress used in the statute. Part One concluded that
Congress intended exactly what it wrote in the citizen suit preclusion device:
that courts should interpret the device in accordance with its plain meaning,
and that those courts refusing to do so have ignored both congressional
intent and dominant canons of statutory interpretation.
The same split in courts interpreting the preclusion device in citizen
suit provisions is evident in courts interpreting the preclusion device in
EPA enforcement provisions, particularly in CWA subsection 309(g). The
device in that provision partially precludes both citizen and EPA enforcement and most decisions interpreting it have been in citizen suits.
Courts thwarting subsequent enforcement under CWA subsection 309(g)
do not merely support prosecutorial discretion by broadly interpreting "is
diligently prosecuting," but do so by disregarding several limitations Congress carefully drafted into subsection 309(g)'s preclusion device.'*' While
CWA 5 401, 33 U.S.C.5 1341 (2000).
Miller, supra note I , at 463-73, 479-84.
523 484 U.S. 4 9 (1987).
52"nstead, it interpreted "in violation" to mean that the citizen suit provision granted
jurisdiction for citizens to sue only for ongoing violations. Id. at 57.
525 See supra Part II.A.2.
52'

522
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these courts continue to rely on Gwaltney for a general policy direction,
they rely specifically on North and South Rivers Watershed Assn., Inc. v.
Town of S c i t u ~ t eone
, ~ ~of~ the first circuit court decisions interpreting subsection 309(g) and a decision that is even more flawed than G ~ a l t n e y . ~ ~ '
The division between the courts is not as evident in decisions interpreting the preclusion device in other EPA enforcement provisions, in part
because there are fewer decisions under them and in part, because deference to governmental prosecutorial discretion is blurred when EPA overfiles, for the enforcement discretion of both EPA and state enforcers are
involved.
Considering the judicial divide in the context of EPA as well as citizen enforcement makes its implications more disturbing. On the one hand,
most courts faithfully apply the plain wording of the preclusion to allow
EPA or citizens to enforce when initial state enforcement has not achieved
compliance or has not assessed a sufficient penalty to provide deterrent
value. On the other hand, some courts ignore the plain wording of the
preclusion to prevent EPA or citizens from enforcing under these circumstances. While most of the latter decisions interpret the preclusion device
only in citizen suit provisions, the similarity of the device in both EPA
and citizen provisions suggests it has the same meaning in both sets of
enforcement provisions. The end result of ignoring the preclusion device's
plain wording is that state enforcement insulates the violator from enforcement by EPA or citizens regardless of the effectiveness of state enforcement. Unfortunately, the factual settings of many of the reported
decisions suggest that state enforcement is often far from effective.528To
allow states to insulate their regulated public from compliance with federal environmental requirements can thwart and potentially eviscerate federal law. To interpret the preclusion device in either EPA or citizen enforcement provisions to allow this, ignores the text of the provisions, the
major canons of statutory construction, and the balance Congress struck between federal and state enforcement.
V. INTEGRATED
INTERPRETATION
OF THE STATUTORY
BARSTO EPA
CITIZENENFORCEMENT

AND

Congress enacted broad authority for EPA and citizen enforcement
actions to promote compliance with environmental laws. It intended the
citizen suit provisions also to promote citizen participation in environmental enforcement. It enacted these enforcement authorities against a
backdrop of cooperative federalism in the implementation of environmental
programs. For many of the most important programs, Congress envisioned
949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992).
See supra Parts II.A.3.b.(ii).-(iii)., II.A.3.e.
52s See supra notes 349-360 and accompanying text.
526
527
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that states would assume the primary implementation role, including
primary enforcement, subject to EPA oversight, and with EPA as the default implementer and enforcer if states did not assume the primary role.
Congress foresaw that unfettered citizen enforcement could result in successive citizen enforcement actions against the same violations, potentially
conflicting with government enforcement. It also foresaw that, in programs with federalized implementation, unfettered EPA and citizen enforcement could result in successive federal enforcement actions against
the same violations, potentially conflicting with state enforcement. It therefore included in the broad EPA and citizen enforcement authorities variants of the three-element notice, delay and bar preclusion device to limit
conflicts from successive enforcement.
The preclusion device is not absolute; it is limited. Moreover, Congress used somewhat different versions of the device in different EPA and
citizen enforcement provisions. Each preclusion device incorporates its
own set of qualifications, allowing and preventing varying sets of successive enforcement actions. The purposes of the broad enforcement authorities and of the limited preclusions are not entirely complementary,
but are the result of legislative compromise. For this reason, EPA and citizen
enforcement provisions and their preclusion devices cannot be interpreted
through the lens of a single legislative purpose. Congressional intent is
better understood by recognizing that Congress, in different ways in different
provisions, made compromises among opposing desires for (1) achieving
full compliance through enforcement; (2) avoiding interference with government enforcement by limiting successive citizen enforcement; and
(3) avoiding federalism conflicts by limiting successive federal enforcement. While the best indicia of congressional intent is normally the plain
meaning of the words it uses, this is particularly true when the provision
interpreted is the result of compromising divergent goals. The preclusion
devices in EPA and citizen suit provisions, then, are best interpreted by
reference to their plain English meaning, unless that interpretation causes
internal inconsistencies, renders clauses redundant or meaningless, or
reaches absurd results.
Most courts have used a plain-English meaning interpretation of
most issues arising under the provisions with straightforward results compatible with the statute's goals of full compliance. Some courts have reached
tortured and aberrant results by disregarding the plain meaning of the
provisions and instead interpreting them to defer as much as possible to
the government's-particularly the state's-enforcement discretion. They
elevate a provision's exception over its purpose, contrary to the canon of
construction that exceptions be interpreted narrowly. Worse, they threaten
judicial amendment of the underlying statutes by effectively allowing
violators to shield themselves from compliance with federal law by soliciting ineffective enforcement actions from state enforcers who may not
be zealous guardians of federal law. These interpretations and their re-
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sults are not true to-indeed, they do violence.to-the purpose, wording
and history of the provisions and should be disregarded.
The preclusion device appears no less than sixteen times in the EPA
and citizen enforcement provisions of the nine statutes implemented by
EPA. The author is aware of no other device that Congress used as often
in these statutes. The preclusion device is sophisticated; while it establishes
an exception for successive actions to the broad enforcement authorities
conferred by the statutes, it creates exceptions to that exception. Congress
crafted sophistication into the device by creating it from three elements,
each of which it could vary to achieve the exact preclusion it intended in
each statutory provision. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that
when Congress intended to preclude successive enforcement, it did so by
placing a variant of the preclusion device in the relevant enforcement provision, not by obliquely implying preclusion from another provision. It is
also clear that Congress intended to preclude successive enforcement under
a particular provision to the extent, and only to the extent, of the words it
included in the provision's preclusion device. Courts thus need look no
further than the wording of a particular preclusion to determine the extent to which it allows or forbids successive enforcement.
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